On compliance of business processes with business contracts

This paper addresses the problem of ensuring compliance of business processes, implemented within and across organisational boundaries, with the constraints stated in related business contracts. In order to deal with the complexity of this problem we propose two solutions that allow for a systematic and increasingly automated support for addressing two specific compliance issues. One solution provides a set of guidelines for progressively transforming contract conditions into business processes that are consistent with contract conditions thus avoiding violation of the rules in contract. Another solution compares rules in business contracts and rules in business processes to check for possible inconsistencies. Both approaches rely on a computer interpretable representation of contract conditions that embodies contract semantics. This semantics is described in terms of a logic based formalism allowing for the description of obligations, prohibitions, permissions and violations conditions in contracts. This semantics was based on an analysis of typical building blocks of many commercial, financial and government contracts. The study proved that our contract formalism provides a good foundation for describing key types of conditions in contracts, and has also given several insights into valuable transformation techniques and formalisms needed to establish better alignment between these two, traditionally separate areas of research and endeavour. The study also revealed a number of new areas of research, some of which we intend to address in near future.

A Computational Framework for Institutional Agency

This paper provides a computational framework, based on Defeasible Logic, to capture some aspects of institutional agency. Our background is Kanger-Lindahl-P\"orn account of organised interaction, which describes this interaction within a multi-modal logical setting. This work focuses in particular on the notions of counts-as link and on those of attempt and of personal and direct action to realise states of affairs. We show how standard Defeasible Logic can be extended to represent these concepts: the resulting system preserves some basic properties commonly attributed to them. In addition, the framework enjoys nice computational properties, as it turns out that the extension of any theory can be computed in time linear to the size of the theory itself.

Corporate stadium sponsorships, signaling theory, agency conflicts, and shareholder wealth

Contrary to the plethora of critical articles recently appearing in both the popular and business press, this carefully controlled investigation of 49 stadium- and arena-naming-rights agreement announcements provides striking evidence that such sponsorships can significantly enhance the stock prices of sponsoring companies. Indeed, the results of the study show that the average stadium sponsor's stock prices increased by 1.65 percent at the time of announcement of the programs-a result considerably in excess of the returns associated with other major marketing programs such as the signing of Olympic sponsorships and celebrity endorsers. A multiple regression analysis employing firm-specific changes in stock prices as the dependent variable and quantifiable corporate and sponsorship-related attributes as independent variables is also presented. Variables positively and significantly correlated with perceived sponsorship success include team-winning percentages, contract length, and high technology and locally based companies. Overall, the findings of the study are consistent with the novel hypothesis that, for some firms, the real value-added of a stadium sponsorship may lie in its ability to serve as an effective or honest signal of managerial confidence in the future of the company.