Bargaining one-dimensional policies and the efficiency of super majority rules

We consider negotiations selecting one-dimensional policies. Individuals have single-peaked preferences, and they are impatient. Decisions arise from a bargaining game with random proposers and (super) majority approval, ranging from the simple majority up to unanimity. The existence and uniqueness of stationary subgame perfect equilibrium is established, and its explicit characterization provided. We supply an explicit formula to determine the unique alternative that prevails, as impatience vanishes, for each majority. As an application, we examine the efficiency of majority rules. For symmetric distributions of peaks unanimity is the unanimously preferred majority rule. For asymmetric populations rules maximizing social surplus are characterized.

The role of fixed delays in neuronal rate models

Fixed delays in neuronal interactions arise through synaptic and dendritic processing. Previous work has shown that such delays, which play an important role in shaping the dynamics of networks of large numbers of spiking neurons with continuous synaptic kinetics, can be taken into account with a rate model through the addition of an explicit, fixed delay. Here we extend this work to account for arbitrary symmetric patterns of synaptic connectivity and generic nonlinear transfer functions. Specifically, we conduct a weakly nonlinear analysis of the dynamical states arising via primary instabilities of the stationary uniform state. In this way we determine analytically how the nature and stability of these states depend on the choice of transfer function and connectivity. While this dependence is, in general, nontrivial, we make use of the smallness of the ratio in the delay in neuronal interactions to the effective time constant of integration to arrive at two general observations of physiological relevance. These are: 1 - fast oscillations are always supercritical for realistic transfer functions. 2 - Traveling waves are preferred over standing waves given plausible patterns of local connectivity.

On Strategy-proofness and symmetric single-peakedness

We characterize the class of strategy-proof social choice functions on the domain of symmetric single-peaked preferences. This class is strictly larger than the set of generalized median voter schemes (the class of strategy-proof and tops-only social choice functions on the domain of single-peaked preferences characterized by Moulin (1980)) since, under the domain of symmetric single-peaked preferences, generalized median voter schemes can be disturbed by discontinuity points and remain strategy-proof on the smaller domain. Our result identifies the specific nature of these discontinuities which allow to design non-onto social choice functions to deal with feasibility constraints.

Work values, endogenous sentiments and redistribution

We examine the interactions between individual behavior, sentiments and the social contract in a model of rational voting over redistribution. Agents have moral "work values". Individuals' self-esteem and social consideration of others are endogenously determined comparing behaviors to moral standards. Attitudes toward redistribution depend on self-interest and social preferences. We characterize the politico-economic equilibria in which sentiments, labor supply and redistribution are determined simultaneously. The equilibria feature different degrees of "social cohesion" and redistribution depending on pre-tax income inequality. In clustered equilibria the poor are held partly responsible for their low income since they work less than the moral standard and hence redistribution is low. The paper proposes a novel explanation for the emergence of different sentiments and social contracts across countries. The predictions appear broadly in line with well-documented differences between the United States and Europe.

Preference intensities and risk aversion in school choice: a laboratory experiment

We experimentally investigate in the laboratory two prominent mechanisms that are employed in school choice programs to assign students to public schools. We study how individual behavior is influenced by preference intensities and risk aversion. Our main results show that (a) the Gale-Shapley mechanism is more robust to changes in cardinal preferences than the Boston mechanism independently of whether individuals can submit a complete or only a restricted ranking of the schools and (b) subjects with a higher degree of risk aversion are more likely to play "safer" strategies under the Gale-Shapley but not under the Boston mechanism. Both results have important implications for the efficiency and the stability of the mechanisms.

Italy's urban waste metabolism

The problem of waste management is causing growing concern due to increasing generation rates, the emissions into soil, water and air, the social conflicts derived from the election of disposal sites and the loss of resources and energy among others. In this work, an innovative methodology is used to enable a better understanding of the waste generation and management system in Italy. Two new waste indicators are built to complement the conventional indicators used by official statistics. Then a multi-scale analysis of the Density of Waste Disposed (DWD) is carried out to highlight the territorial diversity of waste performances and test its contribution to detect plausible risky areas. Starting from Italian regions, the scale down goes on to the provincial level and, only for the region of Campania, the municipal one. First, the analysis shows that the DWD is able to complement the information provided by the conventional waste indicators. Second, the analysis shows the limitations of using a unique institutional solution to waste management problems. In this sense the multi-scale analysis provides with a more realistic picture of Italian waste system than using a single scale.

Welfare Maximizing Contest Success Functions when the Planner Cannot Commit

We analyze how a contest organizer chooses optimally the winner when the contestants' efforts are already exerted and commitment to the use of a given contest success function is not possible. We de…ne the notion of rationalizability in mixed-strategies to capture such a situation. Our approach allows to derive different contest success functions depending on the aims and attitudes of the decider. We derive contest success functions which are closely related to commonly used functions providing new support for them. By taking into account social welfare considerations our approach bridges the contest literature and the recent literature on political economy. Keywords: Endogenous Contests, Contest Success Function, Mixed-Strategies. JEL Classi…cation: C72 (Noncooperative Games), D72 (Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections), D74 (Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances)

The Political cost of reforms

This paper formalizes in a fully-rational model the popular idea that politicians perceive an electoral cost in adopting costly reforms with future benefits and reconciles it with the evidence that reformist governments are not punished by voters. To do so, it proposes a model of elections where political ability is ex-ante unknown and investment in reforms is unobservable. On the one hand, elections improve accountability and allow to keep well-performing incumbents. On the other, politicians make too little reforms in an attempt to signal high ability and increase their reappointment probability. Although in a rational expectation equilibrium voters cannot be fooled and hence reelection does not depend on reforms, the strategy of underinvesting in reforms is nonetheless sustained by out-of-equilibrium beliefs. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, uncertainty makes reforms more politically viable and may, under some conditions, increase social welfare. The model is then used to study how political rewards can be set so as to maximize social welfare and the desirability of imposing a one-term limit to governments. The predictions of this theory are consistent with a number of empirical regularities on the determinants of reforms and reelection. They are also consistent with a new stylized fact documented in this paper: economic uncertainty is associated to more reforms in a panel of 20 OECD countries.

Two necessary conditions for strategy-proofness: on what domains are they also sufficient?

A social choice function may or may not satisfy a desirable property depending on its domain of definition. For the same reason, different conditions may be equivalent for functions defined on some domains, while different in other cases. Understanding the role of domains is therefore a crucial issue in mechanism design. We illustrate this point by analyzing the role of different conditions that are always related, but not always equivalent to strategy-proofness. We define two very natural conditions that are necessary for strategy-proofness: monotonicity and reshuffling invariance. We remark that they are not always sufficient. Then, we identify a domain condition, called intertwinedness, that ensures the equivalence between our two conditions and that of strategy-proofness. We prove that some important domains are intertwined: those of single-peaked preferences, both with public and private goods, and also those arising in simple models of house allocation. We prove that other necessary conditions for strategy-proofness also become equivalent to ours when applied to functions defined on intertwined domains, even if they are not equivalent in general. We also study the relationship between our domain restrictions and others that appear in the literature, proving that we are indeed introducing a novel proposal.

Spatial Analysis of Cell Composition Data

A version of Matheron’s discrete Gaussian model is applied to cell composition data.The examples are for map patterns of felsic metavolcanics in two different areas. Q-Qplots of the model for cell values representing proportion of 10 km x 10 km cell areaunderlain by this rock type are approximately linear, and the line of best fit can be usedto estimate the parameters of the model. It is also shown that felsic metavolcanics in theAbitibi area of the Canadian Shield can be modeled as a fractal

Thermodynamics and log–contrast analysis in fluid geochemistry

There are two principal chemical concepts that are important for studying the naturalenvironment. The first one is thermodynamics, which describes whether a system is atequilibrium or can spontaneously change by chemical reactions. The second main conceptis how fast chemical reactions (kinetics or rate of chemical change) take place wheneverthey start. In this work we examine a natural system in which both thermodynamics andkinetic factors are important in determining the abundance of NH+4 , NO−2 and NO−3 insuperficial waters. Samples were collected in the Arno Basin (Tuscany, Italy), a system inwhich natural and antrophic effects both contribute to highly modify the chemical compositionof water. Thermodynamical modelling based on the reduction-oxidation reactionsinvolving the passage NH+4 -& NO−2 -& NO−3 in equilibrium conditions has allowed todetermine the Eh redox potential values able to characterise the state of each sample and,consequently, of the fluid environment from which it was drawn. Just as pH expressesthe concentration of H+ in solution, redox potential is used to express the tendency of anenvironment to receive or supply electrons. In this context, oxic environments, as thoseof river systems, are said to have a high redox potential because O2 is available as anelectron acceptor.Principles of thermodynamics and chemical kinetics allow to obtain a model that oftendoes not completely describe the reality of natural systems. Chemical reactions may indeedfail to achieve equilibrium because the products escape from the site of the rectionor because reactions involving the trasformation are very slow, so that non-equilibriumconditions exist for long periods. Moreover, reaction rates can be sensitive to poorly understoodcatalytic effects or to surface effects, while variables as concentration (a largenumber of chemical species can coexist and interact concurrently), temperature and pressurecan have large gradients in natural systems. By taking into account this, data of 91water samples have been modelled by using statistical methodologies for compositionaldata. The application of log–contrast analysis has allowed to obtain statistical parametersto be correlated with the calculated Eh values. In this way, natural conditions in whichchemical equilibrium is hypothesised, as well as underlying fast reactions, are comparedwith those described by a stochastic approach

A note on discrete claims problems

In this note, we consider claims problems with indivisible goods. Specifically, by applying recursively the P-rights lower bound (Jiménez-Gómez and Marco-Gil (2008)), we ensure the fulfillment of Weak Order Preservation, considered by many authors as a minimal requirement of fairness. Moreover, we retrieve the Discrete Constrained Equal Losses and the Discrete Constrained Equal Awards rules (Herrero and Martíınez (2008)). Finally, by the recursive double imposition of a lower and an upper bound, we obtain the average between them. Keywords: Claims problems, Indivisibilities, Order Preservation, Constrained Egalitarian rules, Midpoint. JEL classification: C71, D63, D71.

Fair bounds based solidarity

How should scholarships be distributed among the (public) higher education students? We raise this situation as a redistribution problem. Following the approach developed in Fleurbaey (1994) and Bossert (1995), redistribution should be based on the notion of solidarity and it re-allocates resources taking into account only agents’ relevant characteristics. We also follow Luttens (2010a), who considers that compensation of relevant characteristics must be based on a lower bound on what every individual deserves. In doing so, we use the so-called fair bound (Moulin (2002)) to define an egalitarian redistribution mechanism and characterize it in terms of non-negativity, priority in lower bound and solidarity. Finally, we apply our approach to the scholarships redistribution problem. Keywords: Redistribution mechanism, Lower bounds, Scholarship, Solidarity. JEL classification: C71, D63, D71

Modelling world investment markets using threshold conditional correlation models

In this paper we propose a parsimonious regime-switching approach to model the correlations between assets, the threshold conditional correlation (TCC) model. This method allows the dynamics of the correlations to change from one state (or regime) to another as a function of observable transition variables. Our model is similar in spirit to Silvennoinen and Teräsvirta (2009) and Pelletier (2006) but with the appealing feature that it does not suffer from the course of dimensionality. In particular, estimation of the parameters of the TCC involves a simple grid search procedure. In addition, it is easy to guarantee a positive definite correlation matrix because the TCC estimator is given by the sample correlation matrix, which is positive definite by construction. The methodology is illustrated by evaluating the behaviour of international equities, govenrment bonds and major exchange rates, first separately and then jointly. We also test and allow for different parts in the correlation matrix to be governed by different transition variables. For this, we estimate a multi-threshold TCC specification. Further, we evaluate the economic performance of the TCC model against a constant conditional correlation (CCC) estimator using a Diebold-Mariano type test. We conclude that threshold correlation modelling gives rise to a significant reduction in portfolio´s variance.

Uncertainty, electoral Incentives and political myopia

In this paper, we study the determinants of political myopia in a rational model of electoral accountability where the key elements are informational frictions and uncertainty. We build a framework where political ability is ex-ante unknown and policy choices are not perfectly observable. On the one hand, elections improve accountability and allow to keep well-performing incumbents. On the other, politicians invest too little in costly policies with future returns in an attempt to signal high ability and increase their reelection probability. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, uncertainty reduces political myopia and may, under some conditions, increase social welfare. We use the model to study how political rewards can be set so as to maximise social welfare and the desirability of imposing a one-term limit to governments. The predictions of our theory are consistent with a number of stylised facts and with a new empirical observation documented in this paper: aggregate uncertainty, measured by economic volatility, is associated to better ...scal discipline in a panel of 20 OECD countries.