Modeling security and cooperation in wireless networks using game theory

This research involves the design, development, and theoretical demonstration of models resulting in integrated misbehavior resolution protocols for ad hoc networked devices. Game theory was used to analyze strategic interaction among independent devices with conflicting interests. Packet forwarding at the routing layer of autonomous ad hoc networks was investigated. Unlike existing reputation based or payment schemes, this model is based on repeated interactions. To enforce cooperation, a community enforcement mechanism was used, whereby selfish nodes that drop packets were punished not only by the victim, but also by all nodes in the network. Then, a stochastic packet forwarding game strategy was introduced. Our solution relaxed the uniform traffic demand that was pervasive in other works. To address the concerns of imperfect private monitoring in resource aware ad hoc networks, a belief-free equilibrium scheme was developed that reduces the impact of noise in cooperation. This scheme also eliminated the need to infer the private history of other nodes. Moreover, it simplified the computation of an optimal strategy. The belief-free approach reduced the node overhead and was easily tractable. Hence it made the system operation feasible. Motivated by the versatile nature of evolutionary game theory, the assumption of a rational node is relaxed, leading to the development of a framework for mitigating routing selfishness and misbehavior in Multi hop networks. This is accomplished by setting nodes to play a fixed strategy rather than independently choosing a rational strategy. A range of simulations was carried out that showed improved cooperation between selfish nodes when compared to older results. Cooperation among ad hoc nodes can also protect a network from malicious attacks. In the absence of a central trusted entity, many security mechanisms and privacy protections require cooperation among ad hoc nodes to protect a network from malicious attacks. Therefore, using game theory and evolutionary game theory, a mathematical framework has been developed that explores trust mechanisms to achieve security in the network. This framework is one of the first steps towards the synthesis of an integrated solution that demonstrates that security solely depends on the initial trust level that nodes have for each other.^

Adaptive dynamic path re-planning RRT algorithms with game theory for UAVs

The main aim of this paper is to describe an adaptive re-planning algorithm based on a RRT and Game Theory to produce an efficient collision free obstacle adaptive Mission Path Planner for Search and Rescue (SAR) missions. This will provide UAV autopilots and flight computers with the capability to autonomously avoid static obstacles and No Fly Zones (NFZs) through dynamic adaptive path replanning. The methods and algorithms produce optimal collision free paths and can be integrated on a decision aid tool and UAV autopilots.

Letters & Numbers : a vehicle to illustrate mathematical and computing fundamentals

The television quiz program Letters and Numbers, broadcast on the SBS network, has recently become quite popular in Australia. This paper explores the potential of this game to illustrate and engage student interest in a range of fundamental concepts of computer science and mathematics. The Numbers Game in particular has a rich mathematical structure whose analysis and solution involves concepts of counting and problem size, discrete (tree) structures, language theory, recurrences, computational complexity, and even advanced memory management. This paper presents an analysis of these games and their teaching applications, and presents some initial results of use in student assignments.

Pricing and Power allocation in Femtocells using Stackelberg Game Theory

We consider a system with multiple Femtocells operating in a Macrocell. The transmissions in one Femtocell interfere with its neighboring Femtocells as well as with the Macrocell Base Station. We model Femtocells as selfish nodes and the Macrocell Base Station protects itself by pricing subchannels for each usage. We use Stackelberg game model to study this scenario and obtain equilibrium policies that satisfy certain quality of service.

Discussion on the basic mathematical models of neurons - Double synaptic weight neuron in general-purpose neurocomputer, theory and application

Based on the introduction of the traditional mathematical models of neurons in general-purpose neurocomputer, a novel all-purpose mathematical model-Double synaptic weight neuron (DSWN) is presented, which can simulate all kinds of neuron architectures, including Radial-Basis-Function (RBF) and Back-propagation (BP) models, etc. At the same time, this new model is realized using hardware and implemented in the new CASSANN-II neurocomputer that can be used to form various types of neural networks with multiple mathematical models of neurons. In this paper, the flexibility of the new model has also been described in constructing neural networks and based on the theory of Biomimetic pattern recognition (BPR) and high-dimensional space covering, a recognition system of omni directionally oriented rigid objects on the horizontal surface and a face recognition system had been implemented on CASSANN-H neurocomputer. The result showed DSWN neural network has great potential in pattern recognition.

Employment regulation, game theory, and the lacuna in employee participation in liberal economies

Employee participation is a vital ingredient of what the International Labour Organization (ILO) calls ‘representation security’. This article provides theoretical and empirical insights relating to social policy impact of worker participation, specifically the European Information and Consultation Directive (ICD) for employee voice rights. While existing research on the ICD offers important empirical insights, there is a need for further theoretical analysis to examine the potential effectiveness of the regulations in liberal market economies (LMEs). Drawing on data from 16 case studies, the article uses game theory and the prisoner's dilemma framework to explain why national implementing legislation is largely ineffective in diffusing mutual gains cooperation in two LMEs: UK and the Republic of Ireland. Three theoretical (metaphorical) propositions advance understanding of the policy impact of national information & consultation regulations in LMEs.

On lattices from combinatorial game theory modularity and a representation theorem: Finite case

We show that a self-generated set of combinatorial games, S, may not be hereditarily closed but, strong self-generation and hereditary closure are equivalent in the universe of short games. In [13], the question “Is there a set which will give an on-distributive but modular lattice?” appears. A useful necessary condition for the existence of a finite non-distributive modular L(S) is proved. We show the existence of S such that L(S) is modular and not distributive, exhibiting the first known example. More, we prove a Representation Theorem with Games that allows the generation of all finite lattices in game context. Finally, a computational tool for drawing lattices of games is presented.

On lattices from combinatorial game theory modularity and a representation theorem: finite case

We show that a self-generated set of combinatorial games, S. may not be hereditarily closed but, strong self-generation and hereditary closure are equivalent in the universe of short games. In [13], the question "Is there a set which will give a non-distributive but modular lattice?" appears. A useful necessary condition for the existence of a finite non-distributive modular L(S) is proved. We show the existence of S such that L(S) is modular and not distributive, exhibiting the first known example. More, we prove a Representation Theorem with Games that allows the generation of all finite lattices in game context. Finally, a computational tool for drawing lattices of games is presented. (C) 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Three essays on game theory and bargaining

A PhD Dissertation, presented as part of the requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy from the NOVA - School of Business and Economics

Spiteful Strategies. The ontogeny and the practice of spite in human interaction: an experimental game theory approach and empirical applications

As estratégias de malevolência implicam que um indivíduo pague um custo para infligir um custo superior a um oponente. Como um dos comportamentos fundamentais da sociobiologia, a malevolência tem recebido menos atenção que os seus pares o egoísmo e a cooperação. Contudo, foi estabelecido que a malevolência é uma estratégia viável em populações pequenas quando usada contra indivíduos negativamente geneticamente relacionados pois este comportamento pode i) ser eliminado naturalmente, ou ii) manter-se em equilíbrio com estratégias cooperativas devido à disponibilidade da parte de indivíduos malevolentes de pagar um custo para punir. Esta tese propõe compreender se a propensão para a malevolência nos humanos é inerente ou se esta se desenvolve com a idade. Para esse efeito, considerei duas experiências de teoria de jogos em crianças em ambiente escolar com idades entre os 6 e os 22 anos. A primeira, um jogo 2x2 foi testada com duas variantes: 1) um prémio foi atribuído a ambos os jogadores, proporcionalmente aos pontos acumulados; 2), um prémio foi atribuído ao jogador com mais pontos. O jogo foi desenhado com o intuito de causar o seguinte dilema a cada jogador: i) maximizar o seu ganho e arriscar ter menos pontos que o adversário; ou ii) decidir não maximizar o seu ganho, garantindo que este não era inferior ao do seu adversário. A segunda experiência consistia num jogo do ditador com duas opções: uma escolha egoísta/altruísta (A), onde o ditador recebia mais ganho, mas o seu recipiente recebia mais que ele e uma escolha malevolente (B) que oferecia menos ganhos ao ditador que a A mas mais ganhos que o recipiente. O dilema era que se as crianças se comportassem de maneira egoísta, obtinham mais ganho para si, ao mesmo tempo que aumentavam o ganho do seu colega. Se fossem malevolentes, então prefeririam ter mais ganho que o seu colega ao mesmo tempo que tinham menos para eles próprios. As experiências foram efetuadas em escolas de duas áreas distintas de Portugal (continente e Açores) para perceber se as preferências malevolentes aumentavam ou diminuíam com a idade. Os resultados na primeira experiência sugerem que (1) os alunos compreenderam a primeira variante como um jogo de coordenação e comportaram-se como maximizadores, copiando as jogadas anteriores dos seus adversários; (2) que os alunos repetentes se comportaram preferencialmente como malevolentes, mais frequentemente que como maximizadores, com especial ênfase para os alunos de 14 anos; (3) maioria dos alunos comportou-se reciprocamente desde os 12 até aos 16 anos de idade, após os quais começaram a desenvolver uma maior tolerância às escolhas dos seus parceiros. Os resultados da segunda experiência sugerem que (1) as estratégias egoístas eram prevalentes até aos 6 anos de idade, (2) as tendências altruístas emergiram até aos 8 anos de idade e (3) as estratégias de malevolência começaram a emergir a partir dos 8 anos de idade. Estes resultados complementam a literatura relativamente escassa sobre malevolência e sugerem que este comportamento está intimamente ligado a preferências de consideração sobre os outros, o paroquialismo e os estágios de desenvolvimento das crianças.************************************************************Spite is defined as an act that causes loss of payoff to an opponent at a cost to the actor. As one of the four fundamental behaviours in sociobiology, it has received far less attention than its counterparts selfishness and cooperation. It has however been established as a viable strategy in small populations when used against negatively related individuals. Because of this, spite can either i) disappear or ii) remain at equilibrium with cooperative strategies due to the willingness of spiteful individuals to pay a cost in order to punish. This thesis sets out to understand whether propensity for spiteful behaviour is inherent or if it develops with age. For that effect, two game-theoretical experiments were performed with schoolboys and schoolgirls aged 6 to 22. The first, a 2 x 2 game, was tested in two variants: 1) a prize was awarded to both players, proportional to accumulated points; 2), a prize was given to the player with most points. Each player faced the following dilemma: i) to maximise pay-off risking a lower pay-off than the opponent; or ii) not to maximise pay-off in order to cut down the opponent below their own. The second game was a dictator experiment with two choices, (A) a selfish/altruistic choice affording more payoff to the donor than B, but more to the recipient than to the donor, and (B) a spiteful choice that afforded less payoff to the donor than A, but even lower payoff to the recipient. The dilemma here was that if subjects behaved selfishly, they obtained more payoff for themselves, while at the same time increasing their opponent payoff. If they were spiteful, they would rather have more payoff than their colleague, at the cost of less for themselves. Experiments were run in schools in two different areas in Portugal (mainland and Azores) to understand whether spiteful preferences varied with age. Results in the first experiment suggested that (1) students understood the first variant as a coordination game and engaged in maximising behaviour by copying their opponent’s plays; (2) repeating students preferentially engaged in spiteful behaviour more often than maximising behaviour, with special emphasis on 14 year-olds; (3) most students engaged in reciprocal behaviour from ages 12 to 16, as they began developing higher tolerance for their opponent choices. Results for the second experiment suggested that (1) selfish strategies were prevalent until the age of 6, (2) altruistic tendencies emerged since then, and (3) spiteful strategies began being chosen more often by 8 year-olds. These results add to the relatively scarce body of literature on spite and suggest that this type of behaviour is closely tied with other-regarding preferences, parochialism and the children’s stages of development.

The Seemingly Unrelated Dynamic Cointegration Regression Model and Testing for Purching Power Parity.

This paper studies seemingly unrelated linear models with integrated regressors and stationary errors. By adding leads and lags of the first differences of the regressors and estimating this augmented dynamic regression model by feasible generalized least squares using the long-run covariance matrix, we obtain an efficient estimator of the cointegrating vector that has a limiting mixed normal distribution. Simulation results suggest that this new estimator compares favorably with others already proposed in the literature. We apply these new estimators to the testing of purchasing power parity (PPP) among the G-7 countries. The test based on the efficient estimates rejects the PPP hypothesis for most countries.

Sharing a River

A group of agents located along a river have quasi-linear preferences over water and money. We ask how the water should be allocated and what money transfers should be performed. We are interested in efficiency, stability (in the sense of the core), and fairness (in a sense to be defined). We first show that the cooperative game associated with our problem is convex : its core is therefore large and easily described. Next, we propose the following fairness requirement : no group of agents should enjoy a welfare higher than what it could achieve in the absence of the remaining agents. We prove that only one welfare vector in the core satisfies this condition : it is the marginal contribution vector corresponding to the ordering of the agents along the river. We discuss how it could be decentralized or implemented.