Introducing systematic dispatcher-assisted cardiopulmonary resuscitation (telephone-CPR) in a non-Advanced Medical Priority Dispatch System (AMPDS): implementation process and costs.

OBJECTIVE: In order to improve the quality of our Emergency Medical Services (EMS), to raise bystander cardiopulmonary resuscitation rates and thereby meet what is becoming a universal standard in terms of quality of emergency services, we decided to implement systematic dispatcher-assisted or telephone-CPR (T-CPR) in our medical dispatch center, a non-Advanced Medical Priority Dispatch System. The aim of this article is to describe the implementation process, costs and results following the introduction of this new "quality" procedure. METHODS: This was a prospective study. Over an 8-week period, our EMS dispatchers were given new procedures to provide T-CPR. We then collected data on all non-traumatic cardiac arrests within our state (Vaud, Switzerland) for the following 12months. For each event, the dispatchers had to record in writing the reason they either ruled out cardiac arrest (CA) or did not propose T-CPR in the event they did suspect CA. All emergency call recordings were reviewed by the medical director of the EMS. The analysis of the recordings and the dispatchers' written explanations were then compared. RESULTS: During the 12-month study period, a total of 497 patients (both adults and children) were identified as having a non-traumatic cardiac arrest. Out of this total, 203 cases were excluded and 294 cases were eligible for T-CPR. Out of these eligible cases, dispatchers proposed T-CPR on 202 occasions (or 69% of eligible cases). They also erroneously proposed T-CPR on 17 occasions when a CA was wrongly identified (false positive). This represents 7.8% of all T-CPR. No costs were incurred to implement our study protocol and procedures. CONCLUSIONS: This study demonstrates it is possible, using a brief campaign of sensitization but without any specific training, to implement systematic dispatcher-assisted cardiopulmonary resuscitation in a non-Advanced Medical Priority Dispatch System such as our EMS that had no prior experience with systematic T-CPR. The results in terms of T-CPR delivery rate and false positive are similar to those found in previous studies. We found our results satisfying the given short time frame of this study. Our results demonstrate that it is possible to improve the quality of emergency services at moderate or even no additional costs and this should be of interest to all EMS that do not presently benefit from using T-CPR procedures. EMS that currently do not offer T-CPR should consider implementing this technique as soon as possible, and we expect our experience may provide answers to those planning to incorporate T-CPR in their daily practice.

Relative price riddles in international business cycle theory: Are transport costs the explanation?

We study relative price behavior in an international business cyclemodel with specialization in production, in which a goods marketfriction is introduced through transport costs. The transporttechnology allows for flexible transport costs. We analyze whetherthis extension can account for the striking differences betweentheory and data as far as the moments of terms of trade and realexchange rates are concerned. We find that transport costs increaseboth the volatility of the terms of trade and the volatility of thereal exchange rate. However, unless the transport technology isspecified by a Leontief technology, transport costs do not resolvethe quantitative discrepancies between theory and data. Asurprising result is that transport costs may actually lower thepersistence of the real exchange rate, a finding that is in contrastto much of the emphasis of the empirical literature.

Asymmetric effects of monetary policy in the US: Positive vs. negative or big vs. small?

This paper reconsiders the empirical evidence on the asymmetricoutput effects of monetary policy. Asymmetric effects is a common feature ofmany theoretical models, and there are many different versions of suchasymmetries. We concentrate on the distinctions between positive andnegative money-supply changes, big and small changes in money-supply, andpossible combinations of the two asymmetries. Earlier research has foundempirical evidence in favor of the former of these in US data. Using M1 asthe monetary variable we find evidence in favor of neutrality of big shocksand non-neutrality of small shocks. The results may, however, be affected bystructual instability of M1 demand. Thus, we substitute M1 with the federalfunds rate. In these data we find that only small negative shocks affectreal aggregate activity. The results are interpreted in terms of menu-costmodels.

Consumer Advisory Bulletin, "Free" and "Low-Cost" Computers: Beware of Unexpected Costs, January 2008

The Attorney General’s Consumer Protection Division receives hundreds of calls and consumer complaints every year. Follow these tips to avoid unexpected expense and disappointments. This record is about: "Free" and "Low-Cost" Computers: Beware of Unexpected Costs

Consumer Advisory Bulletin, "Free" and "Low-Cost" Computers: Beware of Unexpected Costs, June 2005

The Attorney General’s Consumer Protection Division receives hundreds of calls and consumer complaints every year. Follow these tips to avoid unexpected expense and disappointments. This record is about: "Free" and "Low-Cost" Computers: Beware of Unexpected Costs

Consumer Advisory Bulletin, "Rent-to-Own" -- Know the Costs!, January 2008

The Attorney General’s Consumer Protection Division receives hundreds of calls and consumer complaints every year. Follow these tips to avoid unexpected expense and disappointments. This record is about: "Rent-to-Own" -- Know the Costs!

Análisis del comportamiento de los resultados en 'full' y 'direct costing'

In this paper we perform a mathematical analyse of profits and losses indirect and full costing. They are compared in different situations, mainlythe utilisation of productive capacity and the existence of beginninginventories. Direct costing was conceived as a system of cost accountingwhich would show profits as a function of sales. In full costing profitsdepend on available combinations of sales, production, costs of beginninginventories, etc., and information displayed in financial statements displayappears incongruent. Differences in profits with full and direct costingincrease when full costing allocates fixed costs according to normalproduction, in some cases differences, and financial statements would showmore incongruent performance. It is concluded about the importance thatprofit and loss statement expresses profits in both costing systems.

Hiring and firing costs, adverse selection and long-term unemployment

In this paper, we present a matching model with adverse selection that explains why flows into and out of unemployment are much lower in Europe compared to North America, while employment-to-employment flows are similar in the two continents. In the model,firms use discretion in terms of whom to fire and, thus, low quality workers are more likely to be dismissed than high quality workers. Moreover, as hiring and firing costs increase, firms find it more costly to hire a bad worker and, thus, they prefer to hire out of the pool of employed job seekers rather than out of the pool of the unemployed, who are more likely to turn out to be 'lemons'. We use microdata for Spain and the U.S. and find that the ratio of the job finding probability of the unemployed to the job finding probability of employed job seekers was smaller in Spain than in the U.S. Furthermore, using U.S. data, we find that the discrimination of the unemployed increased over the 1980's in those states that raised firing costs by introducing exceptions to the employment-at-will doctrine.

Price regulation of plastic money: A critical assessment of Spanish rules

Recent decisions by the Spanish national competition authority (TDC) mandate paymentsystems to include only two costs when setting their domestic multilateral interchange fees(MIF): a fixed processing cost and a variable cost for the risk of fraud. This artificiallowering of MIFs will not lower consumer prices, because of uncompetitive retailing; but itwill however lead to higher cardholders fees and, likely, new prices for point of saleterminals, delaying the development of the immature Spanish card market. Also, to the extent that increased cardholders fees do not offset the fall in MIFs revenue, the task of issuing new cards will be underpaid relatively to the task of acquiring new merchants, causing an imbalance between the two sides of the networks. Moreover, the pricing scheme arising from the decisions will cause unbundling and underprovision of those services whose costs are excluded. Indeed, the payment guarantee and the free funding period will tend to be removed from the package of services currently provided, to be either provided by third parties, by issuers for a separate fee, or not provided at all, especially to smaller and medium-sized merchants. Transaction services will also suffer the consequences that the TDC precludes pricing them in variable terms.

Finance versus costs for teaching hospitals in Spain

In this paper we analyse the observed systematic differences incosts for teaching hospitals (THhenceforth) in Spain. Concernhas been voiced regarding the existence of a bias in thefinancing of TH s has been raised once prospective budgets arein the arena for hospital finance, and claims for adjusting totake into account the legitimate extra costs of teaching onhospital expenditure are well grounded. We focus on theestimation of the impact of teaching status on average cost. Weused a version of a multiproduct hospital cost function takinginto account some relevant factors from which to derive theobserved differences. We assume that the relationship betweenthe explanatory and the dependent variables follows a flexibleform for each of the explanatory variables. We also model theunderlying covariance structure of the data. We assumed twoqualitatively different sources of variation: random effects andserial correlation. Random variation refers to both general levelvariation (through the random intercept) and the variationspecifically related to teaching status. We postulate that theimpact of the random effects is predominant over the impact ofthe serial correlation effects. The model is estimated byrestricted maximum likelihood. Our results show that costs are 9%higher (15% in the case of median costs) in teaching than innon-teaching hospitals. That is, teaching status legitimatelyexplains no more than half of the observed difference in actualcosts. The impact on costs of the teaching factor depends on thenumber of residents, with an increase of 51.11% per resident forhospitals with fewer than 204 residents (third quartile of thenumber of residents) and 41.84% for hospitals with more than 204residents. In addition, the estimated dispersion is higher amongteaching hospitals. As a result, due to the considerable observedheterogeneity, results should be interpreted with caution. From apolicy making point of view, we conclude that since a higherrelative burden for medical training is under public hospitalcommand, an explicit adjustment to the extra costs that theteaching factor imposes on hospital finance is needed, beforehospital competition for inpatient services takes place.

The impact of firing costs on turnover and unemployment: Evidence from the Colombian labour market reform

Reductions in firing costs are often advocated as a way of increasingthe dynamism of labour markets in both developed and less developed countries. Evidence from Europe and the U.S. on the impact of firing costs has, however, been mixed. Moreover, legislative changes both in Europe and the U.S. have been limited. This paper, instead, examines the impact of the Colombian Labour Market Reform of 1990, which substantially reduced dismissal costs. I estimate the incidence of a reduction in firing costs on worker turnover by exploiting the temporal change in the Colombian labour legislation as well as the variability in coverage between formal and informal sector workers. Using a grouping estimator to control for common aggregate shocks and selection, I find that the exit hazard rates into and out of unemployment increased after the reform by over 1% for formal workers (covered by the legislation) relative to informal workers (uncovered). The increase of the hazards implies a net decrease in unemployment of a third of a percentage point, which accounts for about one quarter of the fall in unemployment during the period of study.

Conglomeration with bankruptcy costs: Separate or joint financing?

The paper analyzes the determinants of the optimal scope of incorporation in the presenceof bankruptcy costs. Bankruptcy costs alone generate a non-trivial tradeoff between thebenefit of coinsurance and the cost of risk contamination associated to joint financing corporate projects through debt. This tradeoff is characterized for projects with binary returns,depending on the distributional characteristics of returns (mean, variability, skewness, heterogeneity, correlation, and number of projects), the bankruptcy recovery rate, and the taxrate advantage of debt relative to equity. Our testable predictions are broadly consistentwith existing empirical evidence on conglomerate mergers, spin-offs, project finance, andsecuritization.

A retail benchmarking approach to efficient two-way access pricing

We study a retail benchmarking approach to determine access prices for interconnected networks. Instead of considering fixed access charges as in the existing literature, we study access pricing rules that determine the access price that network i pays to network j as a linear function of the marginal costs and the retail prices set by both networks. In the case of competition in linear prices, we show that there is a unique linear rule that implements the Ramsey outcome as the unique equilibrium, independently of the underlying demand conditions. In the case of competition in two-part tariffs, we consider a class of access pricing rules, similar to the optimal one under linear prices but based on average retail prices. We show that firms choose the variable price equal to the marginal cost under this class of rules. Therefore, the regulator (or the competition authority) can choose one among the rules to pursue additional objectives such as consumer surplus, network coverage or investment: for instance, we show that both static and dynamic e±ciency can be achieved at the same time.

Estimates of patient costs related with population morbidity: Can indirect costs affect the results?

A number of health economics works require patient cost estimates as a basic information input.However the accuracy of cost estimates remains in general unspecified. We propose to investigate howthe allocation of indirect costs or overheads can affect the estimation of patient costs in order to allow forimprovements in the analysis of patient costs estimates. Instead of focusing on the costing method, thispaper proposes to highlight changes in variance explained observed when a methodology is chosen. Wecompare three overhead allocation methods for a specific Spanish population adjusted using the ClinicalRisk Groups (CRG), and we obtain different series of full-cost group estimates. As a result, there aresignificant gains in the proportion of the variance explained, depending upon the methodology used.Furthermore, we find that the global amount of variation explained by risk adjustment models dependsmainly on direct costs and is independent of the level of aggregation used in the classification system.

The elusive costs and the immaterial gains of fiscal contraints

We study whether and how fiscal restrictions alter the business cycle features macrovariables for a sample of 48 US states. We also examine the 'typical' transmission properties of fiscal disturbances and the implied fiscal rules of states with different fiscal restrictions. Fiscal constraints are characterized with a number of indicators. There are similarities in second moments of macrovariables and in the transmission properties of fiscal shocks across states with different fiscal constraints. The cyclical response of expenditure differs in size and sometimes in sign, but heterogeneity within groups makes point estimates statistically insignificant. Creative budget accounting isresponsible for the pattern. Implications for the design of fiscal rules and thereform of the Stability and Growth Pact are discussed.