To what extent do pupils perceive science to be inconsistent with religious faith? An exploratory survey of 13-14 year-old English pupils

Scientists hold a wide range of beliefs on matters of religion, although popular media coverage in the UK commonly suggests that atheism is a core commitment for scientists. Considering the relationship between religion and science is a recommended topic in the English National Curriculum for lower secondary pupils (11-14 year-olds), and it is expected that different perspectives will be considered. However it is well established that many pupils may have difficulty accessing sophisticated ideas about the nature of science, and previous research suggests some may identify science with scientism. To explore pupil impressions of the relationship between science and religion, 13-14 year old pupils were surveyed in one class from each of four English secondary schools, by asking them to rate a set of statements about the relationship between science and religion, and scientific and religious perspectives on the origins of the world, and of life on earth, on the value of prayer and on the status of miracles. The survey revealed diverse views on these issues, reflecting the wider society. However it was found that a considerable proportion of the pupils in the sample considered religious beliefs and scientific perspectives to be opposed. The basis and potential consequences of such views are considered, and the need for more attention to this area of student thinking is highlighted.

Why UK public lawyers need to be legal and political theorists

My aim in this article is to encourage UK public lawyers to engage with contemporary debates in legal, political and constitutional theory. My argument is motivated by three related concerns. First, there is an extricable link between these disciplines: behind every proposition of public law can be found a theory of law, govenment, the state and so on; secondly, public lawyers have historically neglected or fudged theory in their work; finally, a growing number of public lawyers are now using cutting-edge legal and political theories to fashion radical new understandings of the British constitution: other (more conservative-minded) public lawyers have no option, I argue, but to answer these new challenges. I illustrate my argument with reference to debates about Parliamentary sovereignty, the constitutional foundations of judicial review, political constitutionalism, and judicial deference.

Valuation 'accuracy' within the Right to Buy process

Based on surveys undertaken with local authorities and valuers who provide the valuations on which purchase prices for local authority houses under the Right to Buy are based, this paper reports on research which aims to establish the reasons for the differences between the initial valuations provided by the local authority valuers and those provided by the District Valuer on appeal. The paper reports on the reasons why tenants appeal the initial valuation and discusses issues of valuation accuracy, uncertainty and the different and imperfect data available to valuers employed by the organisations involved, as well as the factors within the valuation process, including the absence of any requirement to agree a value, which contribute to the different outcomes.

Does convective aggregation need to be represented in cumulus parameterizations?

Tropical deep convection exhibits a variety of levels of aggregation over a wide range of scales. Based on a multisatellite analysis, the present study shows at mesoscale that different levels of aggregation are statistically associated with differing large-scale atmospheric states, despite similar convective intensity and large-scale forcings. The more aggregated the convection, the dryer and less cloudy the atmosphere, the stronger the outgoing longwave radiation, and the lower the planetary albedo. This suggests that mesoscale convective aggregation has the potential to affect couplings between moisture and convection and between convection, radiation, and large-scale ascent. In so doing, aggregation may play a role in phenomena such as “hot spots” or the Madden-Julian Oscillation. These findings support the need for the representation of mesoscale organization in cumulus parameterizations; most parameterizations used in current climate models lack any such representation. The ability of a cloud system-resolving model to reproduce observed relationships suggests that such models may be useful to guide attempts at parameterizations of convective aggregation.

Does ochre have the potential to be a remedial treatment for As-contaminated soils?

Ochre is an iron oxyhydroxide-rich waste that accumulates in water bodies associated with disused mines. Laboratory experiments were conducted to examine the potential of four different ochres to be used as remedial agents for As contaminated soils. The ochres removed As from solution (200 and 500 mg L−1) in adsorption experiments at pH 3 and 8 and, when added to As contaminated soil (5% w/w) significantly reduced As release to solution. In both these experiments the highest surface area ochres performed best. The impact of ochre amendments on uptake of As from soil by plants and humans and release of As to ground water was assessed in a year-long incubation study. Ochres increased soil pH and reduced CaCl2 extractable As but had no consistent effect on plant growth, plant As uptake or As extraction in physiologically-based extraction tests. Ochre may be better used for water treatment than soil remediation.

Expecting moral philosophers to be reliable

Are philosophers’ intuitions more reliable than philosophical novices’? Are we entitled to assume the superiority of philosophers’ intuitions just as we assume that experts in other domains have more reliable intuitions than novices? Ryberg raises some doubts and his arguments promise to undermine the expertise defence of intuition-use in philosophy once and for all. In this paper, I raise a number of objections to these arguments. I argue that philosophers receive sufficient feedback about the quality of their intuitions and that philosophers’ experience in philosophy plausibly affects their intuitions. Consequently, the type of argument Ryberg offers fails to undermine the expertise defence of intuition-use in philosophy.