Public and private learning from prices, strategic substitutability and complementarity, and equilibrium multiplicity

We study a general static noisy rational expectations model where investors have private information about asset payoffs, with common and private components, and about their own exposure to an aggregate risk factor, and derive conditions for existence and uniqueness (or multiplicity) of equilibria. We find that a main driver of the characterization of equilibria is whether the actions of investors are strategic substitutes or complements. This latter property in turn is driven by the strength of a private learning channel from prices, arising from the multidimensional sources of asymmetric information, in relation to the usual public learning channel. When the private learning channel is strong (weak) in relation to the public we have strong (weak) strategic complementarity in actions and potentially multiple (unique) equilibria. The results enable a precise characterization of whether information acquisition decisions are strategic substitutes or complements. We find that the strategic substitutability in information acquisition result obtained in Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) is robust. JEL Classification: D82, D83, G14 Keywords: Rational expectations equilibrium, asymmetric information, risk exposure, hedging, supply information, information acquisition.

The link between public support and private R&D effort: What is the optimal subsidy?

The effectiveness of R&D subsidies can vary substantially depending on their characteristics. Specifically, the amount and intensity of such subsidies are crucial issues in the design of public schemes supporting private R&D. Public agencies determine the intensities of R&D subsidies for firms in line with their eligibility criteria, although assessing the effects of R&D projects accurately is far from straightforward. The main aim of this paper is to examine whether there is an optimal intensity for R&D subsidies through an analysis of their impact on private R&D effort. We examine the decisions of a public agency to grant subsidies taking into account not only the characteristics of the firms but also, as few previous studies have done to date, those of the R&D projects. In determining the optimal subsidy we use both parametric and nonparametric techniques. The results show a non-linear relationship between the percentage of subsidy received and the firms’ R&D effort. These results have implications for technology policy, particularly for the design of R&D subsidies that ensure enhanced effectiveness.

Management of Private Practice in Health Service Hospitals in Northern Ireland: A Handbook November 2007 (PDF147KB)

Management of Private Practice in Health Services Hospitals in Northern Ireland: A Handbook

Price policies and Price dispersion in the private healthcare insurance industry: The Catalan case

We present an overlapping generations model that explains price dispersion among Catalonian healthcare insurance firms. The model shows that firms with different premium policies can coexist. Furthermore, if interest rates are low, firms that apply equal premium to all insureds can charge higher average prices than insurers that set premiums according to the risk of insured. Economic theory, health insurance, health economics.

COAC "To Protect and to Serve" the separate representation of children in private law proceedings (PDF 379 KB)

Children Order Advisory Committee discussion paper on separate representation of children in private law proceedings

Public sector rationing and private sector selection [paper accepted and forthcoming in Journal of Public Economic Theory]

We study the interaction between nonprice public rationing and prices in the private market. Under a limited budget, the public supplier uses a rationing policy. A private firm may supply the good to those consumers who are rationed by the public system. Consumers have different amounts of wealth, and costs of providing the good to them vary. We consider two regimes. First, the public supplier observes consumers' wealth information; second, the public supplier observes both wealth and cost information. The public supplier chooses a rationing policy, and, simultaneously, the private firm, observing only cost but not wealth information, chooses a pricing policy. In the first regime, there is a continuum of equilibria. The Pareto dominant equilibrium is a means-test equilibrium: poor consumers are supplied while rich consumers are rationed. Prices in the private market increase with the budget. In the second regime, there is a unique equilibrium. This exhibits a cost-effectiveness rationing rule; consumers are supplied if and only if their costbenefit ratios are low. Prices in the private market do not change with the budget. Equilibrium consumer utility is higher in the cost-effectiveness equilibrium than the means-test equilibrium [Authors]

Impact of an intervention to control risk associated with patient transfer.

QUESTION UNDER STUDY: Hospitals transferring patients retain responsibility until admission to the new health care facility. We define safe transfer conditions, based on appropriate risk assessment, and evaluate the impact of this strategy as implemented at our institution. METHODS: An algorithm defining transfer categories according to destination, equipment monitoring, and medication was developed and tested prospectively over 6 months. Conformity with algorithm criteria was assessed for every transfer and transfer category. After introduction of a transfer coordination centre with transfer nurses, the algorithm was implemented and the same survey was carried out over 1 year. RESULTS: Over the whole study period, the number of transfers increased by 40%, chiefly by ambulance from the emergency department to other hospitals and private clinics. Transfers to rehabilitation centres and nursing homes were reassigned to conventional vehicles. The percentage of patients requiring equipment during transfer, such as an intravenous line, decreased from 34% to 15%, while oxygen or i.v. drug requirement remained stable. The percentage of transfers considered below theoretical safety decreased from 6% to 4%, while 20% of transfers were considered safer than necessary. A substantial number of planned transfers could be "downgraded" by mutual agreement to a lower degree of supervision, and the system was stable on a short-term basis. CONCLUSION: A coordinated transfer system based on an algorithm determining transfer categories, developed on the basis of simple but valid medical and nursing criteria, reduced unnecessary ambulance transfers and treatment during transfer, and increased adequate supervision.

White Paper on Private Health Insurance

This White Paper, which arises from commitments in the Action Programme for the New Millennium, sets out the Government’s policy objectives and proposals regarding the role of private health insurance in the overall healthcare system, the regulation of the health insurance market, and the corporate structure and status of the Voluntary Health Insurance Board Download the Report here

Review of the effectiveness of caps on indemnity cover for doctors in private practice

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Neither Private nor Public: The Effects of Communal Provision of Water on Child Health in Peru

The literature on local services has focused on the effects of privatization and, if anything, has compared the effects of private and mixed public-private systems versus public provision. However, alternative forms of provision such as cooperatives, which can be very prevalent in many developing countries, have been completely ignored. In this paper, we investigate the effects of communal water provison (Comités Vecinales and Juntas Administrativas de Servicios de Saneamiento) on child health in Peru. Using detailed survey data at the household- and child-level for the years 2006-2010, we exploit the cross-section variability to assess the differential impact of this form of provision. Despite controlling for a wide range of household and local characteristics, the municipalities served by communal organizations are more likely to have poorer health indicators, what would result in a downward bias on the absolute magnitude of the effect of cooperatives. We rely on an instrumental variable strategy to deal with this potential endogeneity problem, and use the personnel resources and the administrative urban/rural classi fication of the municipalities as instruments for the provision type. The results show a negative and signi cant effect of comunal water provision on diarrhea among under- five year old children. Keywords: water utilities, cooperatives, child health, regulation, Peru. JEL Classi fication Numbers: L33; L50; L95