Productivity growth and competition in Spanish manufacturing firms: What has happened in recent years?

This paper addresses the issue of the relationship between productivity and market competition. In comparison to the economies of other European countries, the Spanish economy has been growing, while productivity growth has stagnated. Here we provide empirical evidence about the relationship between productivity and market competition from Spanish manufacturing firms at firm level between 1994 and 2004. Correcting for selection bias, our study pays special attention to the patterns of productivity growth between openness and non-openness firms. When market competition increases the effect on firms operating in domestic markets is positive but when the level of competition is high incentives to invest in innovation and productivity gains disappear. The empirical relationship between competition and productivity is an inverted U-shape, where productivity growth is highest at intermediate levels of competition. The productivity growth of firms operating in international markets is higher than that of non-openness firms, but when market competition rises they moderate their productivity growth. Our empirical results suggest that the correct competition policy in the Spanish economy should remove the barriers to competition in internal markets in order to increase the incentives for manufacturing firms to invest in innovation and productivity growth.

Why the EU does not Have an Independent Competition Agency: French Interests and Transaction Costs in Early European Integration

A major achievement of new institutionalism in economics and political science is the formalisation of the idea that certain policies are more efficient when administered by a politically independent organisation. Based on this insight, several policy actors and scholars criticise the European Community for relying too much on a multi-task, collegial, and politicised organisation, the European Commission. This raises important questions, some constitutional (who should be able to change the corresponding procedural rules?) and some political-economic (is Europe truly committed to free and competitive markets?). Though acknowledging the relevance of legal and normative arguments, this paper contributes to the debate with a positive political-scientific perspective. Based on the view that institutional equilibria raise the question of equilibrium institutions, it shows that collegiality was (a) an equilibrium institution during the Paris negotiations of 1950-51; and (b) an institutional equilibrium for the following 50 years. The conclusion points to some recent changes in the way that European competition policy is implemented, and discusses how these affect the “constitutional” principle of collegial European governance.

Intra-Group Competition and Inter-Group Conflict: An Application to Northern Ireland

This paper reviews four economic theories of leadership selection in conflictual settings. The first of these by Cukierman and Tomassi (1998) labeled the ‘information rationale’, argues that hawks may actually be necessary to initiate peace agreements. The second labeled the ‘bargaining rationale’ borrowing from Hamlin and Jennings (2007) agrees with the conventional wisdom that doves are more likely to secure peace, but post-conflict there are good reasons for hawks to be rationally selected. The third found in Jennings and Roelfsema (2008) is labeled the social psychological rationale. This captures the idea of a competition over which group can form the strongest identity, so can apply to group choices which do not impinge upon bargaining power. As in the bargaining rationale, dove selection can be predicted during conflict, but hawk selection post-conflict. Finally, the expressive rationale is discussed which predicts that regardless of the underlying structure of the game (informational, bargaining, psychological) the large group nature of decision-making by making individual decision makers non-decisive in determining the outcome of elections may cause them to make choices based primarily on emotions which may be invariant with the mode of group interaction, be it conflictual or peaceful. Finally, the paper analyses the extent to which the theories can throw light on Northern Ireland electoral history over the last 25 years.

A behavioral study of alpha-1b adrenergic receptor knockout mice: increased reaction to novelty and selectively reduced learning capacities.

Knockout mice lacking the alpha-1b adrenergic receptor were tested in behavioral experiments. Reaction to novelty was first assessed in a simple test in which the time taken by the knockout mice and their littermate controls to enter a second compartment was compared. Then the mice were tested in an open field to which unknown objects were subsequently added. Special novelty was introduced by moving one of the familiar objects to another location in the open field. Spatial behavior and memory were further studied in a homing board test, and in the water maze. The alpha-1b knockout mice showed an enhanced reactivity to new situations. They were faster to enter the new environment, covered longer paths in the open field, and spent more time exploring the new objects. They reacted like controls to modification inducing spatial novelty. In the homing board test, both the knockout mice and the control mice seemed to use a combination of distant visual and proximal olfactory cues, showing place preference only if the two types of cues were redundant. In the water maze the alpha-1b knockout mice were unable to learn the task, which was confirmed in a probe trial without platform. They were perfectly able, however, to escape in a visible platform procedure. These results confirm previous findings showing that the noradrenergic pathway is important for the modulation of behaviors such as reaction to novelty and exploration, and suggest that this is mediated, at least partly, through the alpha-1b adrenergic receptors. The lack of alpha-1b adrenergic receptors in spatial orientation does not seem important in cue-rich tasks but may interfere with orientation in situations providing distant cues only.

Increased clozapine plasma concentrations and side effects induced by smoking cessation in 2 CYP1A2 genotyped patients.

Clozapine, an atypical antipsychotic, depends mainly on cytochrome P4501A2 (CYP1A2) for its metabolic clearance. CYP1A2 is inducible by smoking, and lower plasma concentrations of clozapine are measured in smokers than in nonsmokers. Case reports have been published on the effects of discontinuing smoking in patients receiving clozapine, which might lead to elevated plasma concentrations and severe side effects. We present 2 cases on the consequences of smoking cessation in patients receiving this drug. In the first patient, smoking cessation resulted, within 2 weeks, in severe sedation and fatigue, with an approximately 3-fold increase of plasma clozapine concentrations. In the second patient, a very high plasma concentration of clozapine (3004 ng/mL) was measured 6 days following a 16-day stay in a general hospital, during which smoking was prohibited. In the latter patient, the replacement of omeprazole, a strong CYP1A2 inducer, by pantoprazole, a weaker CYP1A2 inducer, could have contributed, in addition to smoking cessation, to the observed strong increase of plasma clozapine concentrations. Genotyping of the 2 patients revealed that they were carriers of the AA genotype for the -164C>A polymorphism (CYP1A2*1F) in intron 1 of CYP1A2 gene, which has previously been shown to confer a high inducibility of CYP1A2 by smoking. Thus, at the initiation of clozapine treatment, smoking patients should be informed that, if they decide to stop smoking, they are encouraged to do so but must inform their prescriber beforehand. Also, because of the increased use of no-smoking policies in many hospitals, studies examining the consequences of such policies on the pharmacokinetics/pharmacodynamics of drugs metabolized by CYP1A2, taking into account different CYP1A2 genotypes, are needed.

Harmful competition in the insurance markets

There is a general presumption that competition is a good thing. In this paper we show that competition in the insurance markets can be bad and that adverse selection is in general worse under competition than under monopoly. The reason is that monopoly can exploit its market power to relax incentive constraints by cross-subsidization between different risk types. Cream-skimming behavior, on the contrary, prevents competitive firms from using implicit transfers. In effect monopoly is shown to provide better coverage to those buying insurance but at the cost of limiting participation to insurance. Performing simulation for di erent distributions of risk, we find that monopoly in general performs (much) better than competition in terms of the realization of the gains from trade across all traders in equilibrium. However, most of the surplus is retained by the firm and, as a result, most individuals prefer competitive markets notwithstanding their performance is generally poorer than monopoly.

A stable phage lysin (Cpl-1) dimer with increased antipneumococcal activity and decreased plasma clearance.

Bacteriophages (phages) produce endolysins (lysins) as part of their lytic cycle in order to degrade the peptidoglycan layer of the infected bacteria for subsequent release of phage progeny. Because these enzymes maintain their lytic and lethal activity against Gram-positive bacteria when added extrinsically to the cells, they have been actively exploited as novel anti-infectives, sometimes termed enzybiotics. As with other relatively small peptides, one issue in their clinical development is their rapid inactivation through proteolytic degradation, immunological blockage and renal clearance. The antipneumococcal lysin Cpl-1 was shown to escape both proteolysis and immunological blockage. However, its short plasma half-life (20.5 min in mice) may represent a shortcoming for clinical usefulness. Here we report the construction of a Cpl-1 dimer with a view to increasing both the antipneumococcal specific activity and plasma half-life of Cpl-1. Dimerisation was achieved by introducing specific cysteine residues at the C-terminal end of the enzyme, thus favouring disulphide bonding. Compared with the native monomer, the constructed dimer demonstrated a two-fold increase in specific antipneumococcal activity and a ca. ten-fold decrease in plasma clearance. As several lysins are suspected to dimerise on contact with their cell wall substrate to be fully active, stable pre-dimerised enzymes may represent a more efficient alternative to the native monomer.

Rebound Effects from Increased Efficiency in the Use of Energy by UK Households

In this paper, we use CGE modelling techniques to identify the impact on energy use of an improvement in energy efficiency in the household sector. The main findings are that 1) when the price of energy is measured in natural units, the increase in efficiency yields only to a modification of tastes, changing as a result, the composition of household consumption; 2) when households internalize efficiency, the improvement in energy efficiency reduces the price of energy in efficiency units, providing a source of improved competitiveness as the nominal wage and the price level both fall; 3) the short-run rebound can be greater than the long run rebound if the household demand elasticity is the same for both time frames, however, the short run rebound is always lower than in the long-run if the demand for energy is relatively more elastic in the long-run; 4) the introduction of habit formation changes the composition of household consumption, modifying the magnitude of the household rebound only in the short-run. In this period, household and economy wide rebound are lowest for external habit formation and highest when consumers’ preferences are defined using a conventional utility function.

Universal banking, competition and risk in a macro model

A stylized macroeconomic model is developed with an indebted, heterogeneous Investment Banking Sector funded by borrowing from a retail banking sector. The government guarantees retail deposits. Investment banks choose how risky their activities should be. We compared the benefits of separated vs. universal banking modelled as a vertical integration of the retail and investment banks. The incidence of banking default is considered under different constellations of shocks and degrees of competitiveness. The benefits of universal banking rise in the volatility of idiosyncratic shocks to trading strategies and are positive even for very bad common shocks, even though government bailouts, which are costly, are larger compared to the case of separated banking entities. The welfare assessment of the structure of banks may depend crucially on the kinds of shock hitting the economy as well as on the efficiency of government intervention.

Technical progress and product reliability under competition and monopoly

Technical progress lowers costs and prices but appears to have an ambiguous effect on product reliabilty. This paper presents a simple model which explains this observation.

Trade Costs, International Competition and Selection: The Effects of Unionisation on Market Size

Within a two-country model of international trade in which heterogeneous firms face firm-specific unions, we study the effects of different forms of trade liberalisation on market structure and competitive selection in the presence of inter-country asymmetries in size and labour market institutions. For given levels of trade openness, an increase in a country’s relative unions’ strength reduces the average productivity of its domestic producers but increases that of its exporters. Whilst an unfavourable union power differential, by increasing wages, weakens a country’s firms’ competitive position, the higher wages reinforce standard market access mechanisms to give rise to aggregate income effects. When the initial levels of trade openness are sufficiently low, this ‘expansionary’ aggregate effect can attract industry in the country with stronger unions and also result in an increase in the extensive margin of exports. For sufficiently large inter-country differences in the bargaining power of unions, trade liberalization can then result in a pro-variety effect, with an increase in the total availability of varieties to consumers in both countries, regardless of there being inter-country differences in size.

(No)competition in the Spanish retailing gasoline market: a variance filter approach

Various methodologies in economic literature have been used to analyse the international hydrocarbon retail sector. Nevertheless at a Spanish level these studies are much more recent and most conclude that generally there is no effective competition present in this market, regardless of the approach used. In this paper, in order to analyse the price levels in the Spanish petrol market, our starting hypothesis is that in uncompetitive markets the prices are higher and the standard deviation is lower. We use weekly retail petrol price data from the ten biggest Spanish cities, and apply Markov chains to fill the missing values for petrol 95 and diesel, and we also employ a variance filter. We conclude that this market demonstrates reduced price dispersion, regardless of brand or city.

Market Competition and Lower Tier Incentives

The relationship between competition and performance-related pay has been analyzed in single-principal-single-agent models. While this approach yields good predictions for managerial pay schemes, the predictions fail to apply for employees at lower tiers of a firm's hierarchy. In this paper, a principal-multi-agent model of incentive pay is developed which makes it possible to analyze the effect of changes in the competitiveness of markets on lower tier incentive payment schemes. The results explain why the payment schemes of agents located at low and mid tiers are less sensitive to changes in competition when aggregated firm data is used. Journal of Economic Literature classiffication numbers: D82, J21, L13, L22. Keywords: Cournot Competition, Contract Delegation, Moral Hazard, Entry, Market Size, Wage Cost.

The added value from a general equilibrium analyses of increased efficiency in household energy use

The aim of the paper is to identify the added value from using general equilibrium techniques to consider the economy-wide impacts of increased efficiency in household energy use. We take as an illustrative case study the effect of a 5% improvement in household energy efficiency on the UK economy. This impact is measured through simulations that use models that have increasing degrees of endogeneity but are calibrated on a common data set. That is to say, we calculate rebound effects for models that progress from the most basic partial equilibrium approach to a fully specified general equilibrium treatment. The size of the rebound effect on total energy use depends upon: the elasticity of substitution of energy in household consumption; the energy intensity of the different elements of household consumption demand; and the impact of changes in income, economic activity and relative prices. A general equilibrium model is required to capture these final three impacts.

Mafia in the ballot box

We study the impact of organized crime on electoral competition. Assuming that the mafia is able to bring votes to the supported party in exchange of money, we show that (i) the strongest party is willing to pay the highest price to secure mafia services; (ii) the volume of electoral trade with the mafia increases with political competition and with the efficiency of the mafia. Studying in detail parliamentary elections in Sicily for the period 1946- 1992, we document the significant support given by the Sicilian Mafia to the Christian Democratic party, starting at least from the 1970s. This is consistent with our theoretical predictions, as political competition became much tighter during the 1970s and the Sicilian mafia experienced an extensive centralization process towards the end of the 1960s, which increased substantially its control of the territory. We also provide evidence that in exchange for its electoral support the mafia got economic advantages for its activities in the construction industry.