Las limitaciones de los mecanismos de aproximación jurídica para el diseño de la nueva arquitectura financiera internacional (Tema Central)

A nivel internacional existe consenso respecto a la importancia que tiene el marco institucional para el funcionamiento eficiente del sistema financiero y para la generación de incentivos correctos para mantener la disciplina de mercado. Por eso mismo, durante los últimos diez años, se ha estado discutiendo, especialmente a nivel técnico, respecto de las condiciones de una nueva arquitectura financiera internacional que se ajuste a la realidad de un sistema financiero globalizado, y se han generado políticas, lineamientos y mínimos estándares para los sistemas financieros que han sido recogidos fundamentalmente por normas informales conocidas como softlaw y por órganos igualmente informales. La Declaración de la Cumbre del G20 en Washington de noviembre de 2008 estableció cinco principios comunes para reforma del sistema financiero que deben ser considerados en esta nueva arquitectura, a la que se puede definir como ""el establecimiento e implementación, a nivel nacional e internacional, de reglas, principios y arreglos institucionales que aseguren la estabilidad del sistema financiero internacional, previniendo las crisis y estableciendo los mecanismos institucionales para enfrentarlas o mitigarlas"". Sin embargo de esto, no existe una conciencia clara de que el problema de la nueva arquitectura financiera internacional es un problema ante todo jurídico: los órganos informales creados y el softlaw son insuficientes para crear las condiciones necesarias para asegurar el obligatorio cumplimiento y la aplicación general de este marco de regulación financiera global. Además, el principio de la soberanía de los Estados, base de los ordenamientos y sistemas jurídicos actuales, de naturaleza fundamentalmente nacional, y norma fundamental para las relaciones entre Estados, en el Derecho público internacional, vuelve complejay demorada la creación de un nuevo sistema de gobernanza global que viabilice esta nueva arquitectura financiera internacional y permita devolver rápidamente la confianza perdida y la estabilidad de este nuevo sistema financiero global.

Efectos en los mercados financieros internacionales de la derogatoria en 1999 de la Ley Glass Steagall de los EE.UU. (Tema Central)

Actualmente la profunda crisis del sistema financiero internacional, similar a la que vivió Estados Unidos en los años treinta, es el punto más importante de discusión en todo el mundo. Por ello, se consideró importante realizar un análisis de la Ley Glass Steagall Act, promulgada en el año 1933, justamente como una salida a la crisis financiera estadounidense, de aquella época, precisando cuáles son sus principales características, y sobre todo los efectos que su derogatoria (en 1999) trajo consigo en el sistema financiero mundial, pues como veremos, para muchos la actual crisis es producto de la inadecuada mezcla de regulación y libertad que se produjo con la promulgación de la Ley Gramm Leach Bliley Act, mediante la cual los bancos comerciales empezaron a incursionar en operaciones bursátiles, actividades que anteriormente estaban vetadas, y por tanto existían garantías suficientes para los depositantes.

The creation of euro area financial safety nets. Bruegel Working Paper 2012/09, July 2012

The financial crisis has exposed the need to devise stronger and broader international and regional safety nets in order to deal with economic and financial shocks and allow for countries to adjust. The euro area has developed several such mechanisms over the last couple of years through a process of trial and error and gradual enhancement and expansion. Their overall architecture remains imperfect and leaves areas of vulnerabilities. This paper provides an overview of the recent financial stability mechanisms and their various shortcomings and tries to brush the outline of a more comprehensive safety net architecture that would coherently address the banking, sovereign and external imbalances crises against both transitory and more permanent shocks. It aims to provide a roadmap for further improvements of the current mechanism and the creation of new devices including a banking resolution mechanism and amore powerfulmechanismto provide financial assistance addressing both the sovereign and external dimensions of the shocks thereby reducing the need for the ECB to fill the current void.

Central Banks in Times of Crisis: The FED vs. the ECB. CEPS Policy Brief No. 276, 11 July 2012,

Different economic and financial structures require different crisis responses. Different crises also require different tools and resources. The first ‘stage’ of the financial crisis (2007-09) was similar on both sides of the Atlantic, and the response was also quite similar. The second stage of the crisis is unique to the euro area. Increasing financial disintegration within the region has forced the ECB to become the central counterparty for the entire cross-border banking market and to intervene in the sovereign bond market of some stressed countries. The actions undertaken by the European Central Bank (ECB), however, have not always represented the best response, in terms of effectiveness, consistency and transparency. This is especially true for the Securities Markets Programme (SMP): by de facto imposing its absolute seniority during the Greek PSI (private sector involvement), the ECB has probably killed its future effectiveness.

spotlight europe 20120/05, August 2012: Confronting the crisis

The euro crisis has not gone away on holiday. In fact, it continues to generate a never-ending string of horrific headlines. Where is it all going to end? In this article we describe the proposed remedies that are currently being discussed, and what blue and red eurobonds, euro bills, FIRE and the debt redemption fund can actually achieve.

spotlight europe #2012/05, August 2012: Der Krise die Stirn bieten = Confronting the crisis

No abstract.

EU Grand Strategy: Optimism is Mandatory. Egmont Security Policy Brief No. 36, July 2012

The Arab Spring, the American pivot, and the global crisis: these affect all of EU external action, but also present opportunities for EU action. A debate on grand strategy remains necessary.

The implications for the EU and national budgets of the use of EU instruments for macro-financial stability. CEPS Special Report, 4 September 2012

The euro crisis has forced member states and the EU institutions to create a series of new instruments to safeguard macro-financial stability of the Union. This study describes the status of existing instruments, the role of the European Parliament and how the use of the instruments impinges on the EU budget also through their effects on national budgets. In addition, it presents a survey of other possible instruments that have been proposed in recent years (e.g. E-bonds and eurobonds), in order to provide an assessment of how EU macro-financial stability assistance could evolve in the future and what could be its impact on EU public finances.

A sovereign wealth fund to lift Germany's curse of excess savings. CEPS Policy Brief No. 280, 28 August 2012

As an alternative to the present system of intermediation of the German savings surplus, this paper suggests that the risk-adjusted rate of return could be improved by creating a sovereign wealth fund for Germany (designated DESWF), which could invest excess German savings globally. Such a DESWF would offer German savers a secure vehicle paying a guaranteed positive minimum real interest rate, with a top-up when real investment returns allowed. The vehicle would invest the funds in a portfolio that is highly diversified by geography and asset classes. Positive real returns can be expected in the long run based on positive real global growth. Since, in this case, a significant amount of funds would flow outside the euro area, the euro would depreciate, which would help crisis countries presently struggling to revive growth through exports and to close their external deficits so as to recoup their international credit-worthiness. Target imbalances would gradually disappear and German claims abroad would move from nominal claims on the ECB to diversified real and nominal claims on various private and public foreign entities in a variety of asset classes.

The euro crisis: ten roots, but fewer solutions. Bruegel Policy Contribution 2012/17, October 2012

Many factors have contributed to the euro crisis. Some have been addressed by policymakers, even if belatedly, and European Union member states have been willing to improve the functioning of the euro area by agreeing to relinquish national sovereignty in some important areas. However, the most pressing issue threatening the integrity, even the existence, of the euro, has not been addressed: the deepening economic contraction in southern euro-area member states. The common interest lies in preserving the integrity of the euro area and in offering these countries improved prospects. Domestic structural reform and appropriate fiscal consolidation, wage increases and slower fiscal consolidation in economically stronger euro-area countries, a weaker euro exchange rate, debt restructuring and an investment programme should be part of the arsenal. In the medium term, more institutional change will be necessary to complement the planned overhaul of the euro area institutional framework. This will include the deployment of a euro-area economic stabilising tool, managing the overall fiscal stance of the euro area, some form of Eurobonds and measures to make euro-area level decision making bodies more effective and democratically legitimate.

The policy mix and macroeconomic adjustment in the Euro area. CEPS Commentary, 15 October 2012

Against the background of the IMF’s latest global economic forecast, Jørgen Mortensen and Cinzia Alcidi raise questions in a new CEPS Commentary about the timing of the implementation and the effects of the three main categories of economic policy – fiscal, monetary and structural.

How to deal with macroeconomic imbalances? CEPS Special Report No. 69, 23 November 2012

Lax financial conditions can foster credit booms. The global credit boom of the last decade led to large capital flows across the world, including large movements of resources from the northern countries of the euro area towards the southern part. Since the start of the crisis and more markedly after 2009, these flows have suddenly stopped, creating severe adjustment pressure. At this point the common monetary policy can only try to mitigate the unavoidable adjustment by maintaining overall financial stability. The challenge is to strike a delicate balance between providing liquidity for solvent institutions while keeping the overall pressure on for a rapid correction of the imbalances.

The role of competition and state aid policy in financial and monetary law

During the financial crisis, companies and lenders found themselves in distressed situations. Competition authorities across the globe had to deal with controversial issues such as the application of the failing firm defence in merger transactions as well as assessment of emergency aid granted by states. This article considers competition policy in periods of crisis, in particular the failing firm defence in merger control and its state aid policy.

International financial centres, office market rents and volatility

Despite continuing developments in information technology and the growing economic significance of the emerging Eastern European, South American and Asian economies, international financial activity remains strongly concentrated in a relatively small number of international financial centres. That concentration of financial activity requires a critical mass of office occupation and creates demand for high specification, high cost space. The demand for that space is increasingly linked to the fortunes of global capital markets. That linkage has been emphasised by developments in real estate markets, notably the development of global real estate investment, innovation in property investment vehicles and the growth of debt securitisation. The resultant interlinking of occupier, asset, debt and development markets within and across global financial centres is a source of potential volatility and risk. The paper sets out a broad conceptual model of the linkages and their implications for systemic market risk and presents preliminary empirical results that provide support for the model proposed.

IS capabilities for supporting post crisis regulatory compliance

The financial crisis of 2007-2009, has precipitated large scale regulatory change. Financial organizations are faced with implementing new regulations of considerable breadth and depth. Firms are faced with engaging in complex and costly change management programs at a time when profits are diminished. Furthermore, investors are becoming increasingly focused on compliance are seeking to ensure that organizations can demonstrate robust compliance practices as part of their due diligence process .The role of IS in underpinning stable, is paramount. IS allows the stable and consistent controls for meeting regulations in order to ensure long term effective compliance. Consequently, our study explores the IS capabilities which support the post crisis regulatory landscape. We identify eight key capabilities: Managing Internal Controls, Measuring Monitoring and Reporting Transactions, IS Development and Procurement, Managing Third Parties, Sharing and Selecting Best Practice, IS Leadership, Data Management and Enabling Cultural Change.