Endogenous Credit Cycles and Financial Dampening in an Adverse Selection Economy

We propose an adverse selection framework in which the financial sector has a dual role. It amplifies or dampens exogenous shocks and also generates endogenous fluctuations. We fully characterize constrained optimal contracts in a setting in which entrepreneurs need to borrow and are privately informed about the quality of their projects. Our characterization is novel in analyzing pooling and separating allocations in a context of multi-dimensional screening: specifically, the amounts of investment undertaken and of entrepreneurial net worth are used to screen projects. We then embed these results in a dynamic competitive economy. First, we show how endogenous regime switches in financial contracts may generate fluctuations in an economy that exhibits no dynamics under full information. Unlike previous models of endogenous cycles, our result does not rely on entrepreneurial net worth being counter-cyclical or inconsequential for determining investment. Secondly, the model shows the different implications of adverse selection as opposed to pure moral hazard. In particular, and contrary to standard results in the macroeconomic literature, the financial system may dampen exogenous shocks in the presence of adverse selection.

Adverse Selection, Credit, and Efficiency: the Case of the Missing Market

We analyze a standard environment of adverse selection in credit markets. In our envi- ronment, entrepreneurs who are privately informed about the quality of their projects need to borrow from banks. As is generally the case in economies with adverse selection, the competitive equilibrium of our economy is shown to be ine¢ cient. Under adverse selection, the choices made by one type of agents limit what can be o¤ered to other types in an incentive-compatible manner. This gives rise to an externality, which cannot be internalized in a competitive equilibrium. We show that, in this type of environment, the ine¢ ciency associated to adverse selection is the consequence of one implicit assumption: entrepreneurs can only borrow from banks. If an additional market is added (say, a .security market.), in which entrepreneurs can obtain funds beyond those o¤ered by banks, we show that the e¢ cient allocation is an equilibrium of the economy. In such an equilibrium, all entrepreneurs borrow at a pooling rate in the security market. When they apply to bank loans, though, only entrepreneurs with good projects pledge these additional funds as collateral. This equilibrium thus simultaneously entails cross- subsidization and separation between di¤erent types of entrepreneurs.

Adverse selection, credit, and efficiency: the case of the missing market

We analyze a standard environment of adverse selection in credit markets. In our environment, entrepreneurs who are privately informed about the quality of their projects need to borrow in order to invest. Conventional wisdom says that, in this class of economies, the competitive equilibrium is typically inefficient. We show that this conventional wisdom rests on one implicit assumption: entrepreneurs can only access monitored lending. If a new set of markets is added to provide entrepreneurs with additional funds, efficiency can be attained in equilibrium. An important characteristic of these additional markets is that lending in them must be unmonitored, in the sense that it does not condition total borrowing or investment by entrepreneurs. This makes it possible to attain efficiency by pooling all entrepreneurs in the new markets while separating them in the markets for monitored loans.

Firm-Specific Investment, Sticky Prices, and the Taylor Principle

According to the Taylor principle a central bank should adjust the nominal interest rate by more than one-for-one in response to changes in current inflation. Most of the existing literature supports the view that by following this simple recommendation a central bank can avoid being a source of unnecessary fluctuations in economic activity. The present paper shows that this conclusion is not robust with respect to the modelling of capital accumulation. We use our insights to discuss the desirability of alternative interest rate rules. Our results suggest a reinterpretation of monetary policy under Volcker and Greenspan: The empirically plausible characterization of monetary policy can explain the stabilization of macroeconomic outcomes observed in the early eighties for the US economy. The Taylor principle in itself cannot.

Optimal Contracts, Adverse Selection, and Social Preferences: An Experiment

It has long been standard in agency theory to search for incentive-compatible mechanisms on the assumption that people care only about their own material wealth. However, this assumption is clearly refuted by numerous experiments, and we feel that it may be useful to consider nonpecuniary utility in mechanism design and contract theory. Accordingly, we devise an experiment to explore optimal contracts in an adverse-selection context. A principal proposes one of three contract menus, each of which offers a choice of two incentive-compatible contracts, to two agents whose types are unknown to the principal. The agents know the set of possible menus, and choose to either accept one of the two contracts offered in the proposed menu or to reject the menu altogether; a rejection by either agent leads to lower (and equal) reservation payoffs for all parties. While all three possible menus favor the principal, they do so to varying degrees. We observe numerous rejections of the more lopsided menus, and approach an equilibrium where one of the more equitable contract menus (which one depends on the reservation payoffs) is proposed and agents accept a contract, selecting actions according to their types. Behavior is largely consistent with all recent models of social preferences, strongly suggesting there is value in considering nonpecuniary utility in agency theory.

Monoclonal antibodies to carcinoembryonic antigen: ionic strength as a factor in the selection of antibodies for immunoscintigraphy.

As part of an ongoing effort to improve the technique of immunoscintigraphy for the detection of human carcinomas with radiolabeled monoclonal antibodies (MABs) to carcinoembryonic antigen (CEA), we have developed a series of MABs to CEA and have studied the effects of low- and physiological molarity buffers on their CEA binding and affinity, as well as their cross-reactivity with granulocyte glycoprotein(s). These in vitro results in different buffer systems were then correlated with the use of these MABs to CEA in the detection of human colon carcinoma grafts in nude mice. Our results show that the binding of CEA by some MABs is influenced by ionic strength and that this may be an important factor in their successful use for the immunolocalization of carcinomas in vivo.

Downsizing, Job Insecurity, and Firm Reputation

This paper studies how firms make layoff decisions in the presence of adverse shocks. In this uncertain environment, workers' expectations about their job security affect their on-the-job performance. This productivity effect on job insecurity forces firms to strike a balance between laying off redundant workers and maintaining survivors' commitment when deciding on the amount and timing of downsizing. This framework offers an explanation of conservative employment practices (such as zero or reduced layoffs) based on firms having private information about their future profits. High retention rates and wages can signal that the firm has a bright future, boosting workers' confidence. Moreover, the model provides clear predictions about when waves of downsizing will occur as opposed to one-time massive cuts.

A Model of Collateral, Investment, and Adverse Selection

This paper characterizes the relationship between entrepreneurial wealth and aggregate investment under adverse selection. Its main finding is that such a relationship need not be monotonic. In particular, three results emerge from the analysis: (i) pooling equilibria, in which investment is independent of entrepreneurial wealth, are more likely to arise when entrepreneurial wealth is relatively low; (ii) separating equilibria, in which investment is increasing in entrepreneurial wealth, are most likely to arise when entrepreneurial wealth is relatively high and; (iii) for a given interest rate, an increase in entrepreneurial wealth may generate a discontinuous fall in investment.

Time Series Input Selection using Multiple Kernel Learning

In this paper we study the relevance of multiple kernel learning (MKL) for the automatic selection of time series inputs. Recently, MKL has gained great attention in the machine learning community due to its flexibility in modelling complex patterns and performing feature selection. In general, MKL constructs the kernel as a weighted linear combination of basis kernels, exploiting different sources of information. An efficient algorithm wrapping a Support Vector Regression model for optimizing the MKL weights, named SimpleMKL, is used for the analysis. In this sense, MKL performs feature selection by discarding inputs/kernels with low or null weights. The approach proposed is tested with simulated linear and nonlinear time series (AutoRegressive, Henon and Lorenz series).

Myocardial flow reserve by Rb-82 cardiac PET improves the selection of patients eligible for invasive coronary angiography

Aim: We asked whether myocardial flow reserve (MFR) by Rb-82 cardiac PET improve the selection of patients eligible for invasive coronary angiography (ICA). Material and Methods: We enrolled 26 consecutive patients with suspected or known coronary artery disease who performed dynamic Rb-82 PET/CT and (ICA) within 60 days; 4 patients who underwent revascularization or had any cardiovascular events between PET and ICA were excluded. Myocardial blood flow at rest (rMBF), at stress with adenosine (sMBF) and myocardial flow reserve (MFR=sMBF/rMBF) were estimated using the 1-compartment Lortie model (FlowQuant) for each coronary arteries territories. Stenosis severity was assessed using computer-based automated edge detection (QCA). MFR was divided in 3 groups: G1:MFR<1.5, G2:1.5≤MFR<2 and G3:2≤MFR. Stenosis severity was graded as non-significant (<50% or FFR ≥0.8), intermediate (50%≤stenosis<70%) and severe (≥70%). Correlation between MFR and percentage of stenosis were assessed using a non-parametric Spearman test. Results: In G1 (44 vessels), 17 vessels (39%) had a severe stenosis, 11 (25%) an intermediate one, and 16 (36%) no significant stenosis. In G2 (13 vessels), 2 (15%) vessels presented a severe stenosis, 7 (54%) an intermediate one, and 4 (31%) no significant stenosis. In G3 (9 vessels), 0 vessel presented a severe stenosis, 1 (11%) an intermediate one, and 8 (89%) no significant stenosis. Of note, among 11 patients with 3-vessel low MFR<1.5 (G1), 9/11 (82%) had at least one severe stenosis and 2/11 (18%) had at least one intermediate stenosis. There was a significant inverse correlation between stenosis severity and MFR among all 66 territories analyzed (rho= -0.38, p=0.002). Conclusion: Patients with MFR>2 could avoid ICA. Low MFR (G1, G2) on a vessel-based analysis seems to be a poor predictor of severe stenosis severity. Patients with 3-vessel low MFR would benefit from ICA as they are likely to present a significant stenosis in at least one vessel.

Genetic team composition and level of selection in the evolution of cooperation

In cooperative multiagent systems, agents interac to solve tasks. Global dynamics of multiagent teams result from local agent interactions, and are complex and difficult to predict. Evolutionary computation has proven a promising approach to the design of such teams. The majority of current studies use teams composed of agents with identical control rules ("geneti- cally homogeneous teams") and select behavior at the team level ("team-level selection"). Here we extend current approaches to include four combinations of genetic team composition and level of selection. We compare the performance of genetically homo- geneous teams evolved with individual-level selection, genetically homogeneous teams evolved with team-level selection, genetically heterogeneous teams evolved with individual-level selection, and genetically heterogeneous teams evolved with team-level selection. We use a simulated foraging task to show that the optimal combination depends on the amount of cooperation required by the task. Accordingly, we distinguish between three types of cooperative tasks and suggest guidelines for the optimal choice of genetic team composition and level of selection

On the distribution of income and worker assignment under intra-firm spillovers, with an application to ideas and networks

We study the earnings structure and the equilibrium assignment of workers when workers exert intra-firm spillovers on each other.We allow for arbitrary spillovers provided output depends on some aggregate index of workers' skill. Despite the possibility of increasing returns to skills, equilibrium typically exists. We show that equilibrium will typically be segregated; that the skill space can be partitioned into a set of segments and any firm hires from only one segment. Next, we apply the model to analyze the effect of information technology on segmentation and the distribution of income. There are two types of human capital, productivity and creativity, i.e. the ability to produce ideas that may be duplicated over a network. Under plausible assumptions, inequality rises and then falls when network size increases, and the poorest workers cannot lose. We also analyze the impact of an improvement in worker quality and of an increased international mobility of ideas.

Intellectual property rights and efficient firm organization

I show that intellectual property rights yield static efficiency gains, irrespective oftheir dynamic role in fostering innovation. I develop a property-rights model of firmorganization with two dimensions of non-contractible investment. In equilibrium, thefirst best is attained if and only if ownership of tangible and intangible assets is equallyprotected. If IP rights are weaker, firm structure is distorted and efficiency declines:the entrepreneur must either integrate her suppliers, which prompts a decline in theirinvestment; or else risk their defection, which entails a waste of her human capital. Mymodel predicts greater prevalence of vertical integration where IP rights are weaker,and a switch from integration to outsourcing over the product cycle. Both empiricalpredictions are consistent with evidence on multinational companies. As a normativeimplication, I find that IP rights should be strong but narrowly defined, to protect abusiness without holding up its potential spin-offs.