What makes for peaceful post-conflict elections?

Elections play a crucial role in post-conflict peace and democratization processes as, among other factors, they provide an answer to the question of who is to legitimately rule the country. However, because of the competitiveness arising from their central role in allocating power they can also represent windows of vulnerability where deeply rooted societal conflicts can come to the surface. This working paper focuses on two post-conflict elections (Sierra Leone 2007; Nepal 2008) which, despite perceived high risks, did not result in widespread violence or a return to armed conflict. The aim of these case studies is to identify the factors and measures that may have played an important role in contributing to this outcome. Each of the two case studies first outlines the risks associated with the elections and then analyzes the violence and conflict preventing factors. The paper shows that that the context greatly influences the type of measures that can be taken in such situations, but that there are also some similarities in the two cases studied. In particular, it appears that that the credibility of the elections, largely attributable to a good electoral administration, was an important factor in both Nepal and Sierra Leone. Furthermore, the inclusion of all key stakeholders in decisions regarding key electoral institutions helped to diffuse potential conflict. The study also shows that in both cases the international community played an important role by providing financial, logistical and technical support and by pressuring certain important actors to comply with the rules.

Uncertainty, electoral incentives and political myopia

We study the determinants of political myopia in a rational model of electoral accountability where the key elements are informational frictions and uncertainty. We build aframework where political ability is ex-ante unknown and policy choices are not perfectlyobservable. On the one hand, elections improve accountability and allow to keep well-performing incumbents. On the other, politicians invest too little in costly policies withfuture returns in an attempt to signal high ability and increase their reelection probability.Contrary to the conventional wisdom, uncertainty reduces political myopia and may, undersome conditions, increase social welfare. We use the model to study how political rewardscan be set so as to maximise social welfare and the desirability of imposing a one-term limitto governments. The predictions of our theory are consistent with a number of stylised factsand with a new empirical observation documented in this paper: aggregate uncertainty, measured by economic volatility, is associated to better fiscal discipline in a panel of 20 OECDcountries.

A Carrot and Stick Approach to Agenda-Setting

This paper models a legislature in which the same agenda setter serves for two periods, showing how he can exploit a legislature (completely) in the first period by promising future benefits to legislators who support him. In equilibrium, a large majority of legislators vote for the first-period proposal because they thereby maintain the chance of belonging to the minimum winning coalition in the future. Legislators may therefore approve policies by large majorities, or even unanimously, that benefit few, or even none, of them. The results are robust; but institutional arrangements (such as entitlements) can reduce the agenda setter's power by reducing his discretion to reward and punish legislators, and rules (such as sequential voting) can increase a legislator's ability to resist exploitation. Keywords: Legislative bargaining, distributive politics, agenda-setting, proposal power. JEL C72, D72, D78.

On exiting after voting

We consider the problem of a society whose members must choose from a finite set of alternatives. After knowing the chosen alternative, members may reconsider their membership in the society by either staying or exiting. In turn, and as a consequence of the exit of some of its members, other members might now find undersirable to belong to the society as well. We analyze the voting behavior of members who take into account the effect of their votes not only on the chosen alternative, but also on the final composition of the society

Shrouded costs of government: The political economy of state and local public pensions

Why do public-sector workers receive so much of their compensation in the formof pensions and other benefits? This paper presents a political economy model inwhich politicians compete for taxpayers' and government employees' votes by promising compensation packages, but some voters cannot evaluate every aspect of promisedcompensation. If pension packages are "shrouded", so that public-sector workers better understand their value than ordinary taxpayers, then compensation will be highlyback-loaded. In equilibrium, the welfare of public-sector workers could be improved,holding total public-sector costs constant, if they received higher wages and lowerpensions. Centralizing pension determination has two offsetting effects on generosity:more state-level media attention helps taxpayers better understand pension costs, andthat reduces pension generosity; but a larger share of public-sector workers will votewithin the jurisdiction, which increases pension generosity. A short discussion of pensions in two decentralized states (California and Pennsylvania) and two centralizedstates (Massachusetts and Ohio) suggests that centralization appears to have modestlyreduced pensions, but, as the model suggests, this is unlikely to be universal.

Partisan targeting of inter-governmental transfers & state interference in local elections: evidence from Spain

[spa] En este trabajo examinamos si, en la asignación de transferencias, los gobernantes regionales discriminan a favor de los gobiernos locales controlados por el mismo partido político, y si las perspectivas electorales de los gobiernos locales mejoran si están políticamente alineados con el gobierno regional. Con una nueva base de datos que considera 3.000 municipios españoles durante el período 2000-07 y un diseño de discontinuidad en la regresión, documentamos un efecto robusto de importante magnitud: en elecciones ajustadas, los municipios alineados con el gobierno regional reciben, en media, un 83% más de transferencias per cápita y su gobernante obtiene un 10% más de votos en las elecciones locales. También demostramos que el efecto de la alineación política es mayor: (i) si las elecciones regionales y locales se celebran el mismo día, (ii) en regiones donde las elecciones regionales son menos competidas, y (iii) en regiones con más recursos presupuestarios.

Partisan targeting of inter-governmental transfers & state interference in local elections: evidence from Spain

[spa] En este trabajo examinamos si, en la asignación de transferencias, los gobernantes regionales discriminan a favor de los gobiernos locales controlados por el mismo partido político, y si las perspectivas electorales de los gobiernos locales mejoran si están políticamente alineados con el gobierno regional. Con una nueva base de datos que considera 3.000 municipios españoles durante el período 2000-07 y un diseño de discontinuidad en la regresión, documentamos un efecto robusto de importante magnitud: en elecciones ajustadas, los municipios alineados con el gobierno regional reciben, en media, un 83% más de transferencias per cápita y su gobernante obtiene un 10% más de votos en las elecciones locales. También demostramos que el efecto de la alineación política es mayor: (i) si las elecciones regionales y locales se celebran el mismo día, (ii) en regiones donde las elecciones regionales son menos competidas, y (iii) en regiones con más recursos presupuestarios.

EURECCA colorectal: multidisciplinary mission statement on better care for patients with colon and rectal cancer in Europe

Background: Care for patients with colon and rectal cancer has improved in the last twenty years however still considerable variation exists in cancer management and outcome between European countries. Therefore, EURECCA, which is the acronym of European Registration of cancer care, is aiming at defining core treatment strategies and developing a European audit structure in order to improve the quality of care for all patients with colon and rectal cancer. In December 2012 the first multidisciplinary consensus conference about colon and rectum was held looking for multidisciplinary consensus. The expert panel consisted of representatives of European scientific organisations involved in cancer care of patients with colon and rectal cancer and representatives of national colorectal registries. Methods: The expert panel had delegates of the European Society of Surgical Oncology (ESSO), European Society for Radiotherapy & Oncology (ESTRO), European Society of Pathology (ESP), European Society for Medical Oncology (ESMO), European Society of Radiology (ESR), European Society of Coloproctology (ESCP), European CanCer Organisation (ECCO), European Oncology Nursing Society (EONS) and the European Colorectal Cancer Patient Organisation (EuropaColon), as well as delegates from national registries or audits. Experts commented and voted on the two web-based online voting rounds before the meeting (between 4th and 25th October and between the 20th November and 3rd December 2012) as well as one online round after the meeting (4th20th March 2013) and were invited to lecture on the subjects during the meeting (13th15th December 2012). The sentences in the consensus document were available during the meeting and a televoting round during the conference by all participants was performed. All sentences that were voted on are available on the EURECCA website www.canceraudit.eu. The consensus document was divided in sections describing evidence based algorithms of diagnostics, pathology, surgery, medical oncology, radiotherapy, and follow-up where applicable for treatment of colon cancer, rectal cancer and stage IV separately. Consensus was achieved using the Delphi method. Results: The total number of the voted sentences was 465. All chapters were voted on by at least 75% of the experts. Of the 465 sentences, 84% achieved large consensus, 6% achieved moderate consensus, and 7% resulted in minimum consensus. Only 3% was disagreed by more than 50% of the members. Conclusions: It is feasible to achieve European Consensus on key diagnostic and treatment issues using the Delphi method. This consensus embodies the expertise of professionals from all disciplines involved in the care for patients with colon and rectal cancer. Diagnostic and treatment algorithms were developed to implement the current evidence and to define core treatment guidance for multidisciplinary team management of colon and rectal cancer throughout Europe.

Political centralization and government accountability

This paper studies fiscal federalism when regions differ in voters' ability to monitor publicofficials. We develop a model of political agency in which rent-seeking politicians providepublic goods to win support from heterogeneously informed voters. In equilibrium, voterinformation increases government accountability but displays decreasing returns. Therefore,political centralization reduces aggregate rent extraction when voter information varies acrossregions. It increases welfare as long as the central government is required to provide publicgoods uniformly across regions. The need for uniformity implies an endogenous trade off between reducing rents through centralization and matching idiosyncratic preferences throughdecentralization. We find that a federal structure with overlapping levels of government canbe optimal only if regional differences in accountability are sufficiently large. The modelpredicts that less informed regions should reap greater benefits when the central governmentsets a uniform policy. Consistent with our theory, we present empirical evidence that lessinformed states enjoyed faster declines in pollution after the 1970 Clean Air Act centralizedenvironmental policy at the federal level.

The class basis of the cleavage between the New Left and the radical right: An analysis for Austria, Denmark, Norway and Switzerland

This chapter argues that the electoral competition between the New Left and the Radical Right is best understood as a cultural divide anchored in different class constituencies. Based on individual-level data from the European Social Survey, we analyze the links between voters' class position, their economic and cultural preferences and their party choice for four small and affluent European countries. We find a striking similarity in the class pattern across countries. Everywhere, the New Left attracts disproportionate support from socio-cultural professionals and presents a clear-cut middle-class profile, whereas the Radical Right is most successful among production and service workers and receives least support from professionals. In general, the Radical Right depends on the votes of lowereducated men and older citizens and has turned into a new type of working-class party. However, its success within the working-class is not due to economic, but to cultural issues. The voters of the Radical Right collide with those of the New Left over a cultural conflict of identity and community - and not over questions of redistribution. A full-grown cleavage has thus emerged in the four countries under study, separating a libertarian-universalistic pole from an authoritarian-communitarian pole and going along with a process of class realignment.

EURECCA colorectal: multidisciplinary mission statement on better care for patients with colon and rectal cancer in Europe

Background: Care for patients with colon and rectal cancer has improved in the last twenty years however still considerable variation exists in cancer management and outcome between European countries. Therefore, EURECCA, which is the acronym of European Registration of cancer care, is aiming at defining core treatment strategies and developing a European audit structure in order to improve the quality of care for all patients with colon and rectal cancer. In December 2012 the first multidisciplinary consensus conference about colon and rectum was held looking for multidisciplinary consensus. The expert panel consisted of representatives of European scientific organisations involved in cancer care of patients with colon and rectal cancer and representatives of national colorectal registries. Methods: The expert panel had delegates of the European Society of Surgical Oncology (ESSO), European Society for Radiotherapy & Oncology (ESTRO), European Society of Pathology (ESP), European Society for Medical Oncology (ESMO), European Society of Radiology (ESR), European Society of Coloproctology (ESCP), European CanCer Organisation (ECCO), European Oncology Nursing Society (EONS) and the European Colorectal Cancer Patient Organisation (EuropaColon), as well as delegates from national registries or audits. Experts commented and voted on the two web-based online voting rounds before the meeting (between 4th and 25th October and between the 20th November and 3rd December 2012) as well as one online round after the meeting (4th-20th March 2013) and were invited to lecture on the subjects during the meeting (13th-15th December 2012). The sentences in the consensus document were available during the meeting and a televoting round during the conference by all participants was performed. All sentences that were voted on are available on the EURECCA website www.canceraudit.eu. The consensus document was divided in sections describing evidence based algorithms of diagnostics, pathology, surgery, medical oncology, radiotherapy, and follow-up where applicable for treatment of colon cancer, rectal cancer and stage IV separately. Consensus was achieved using the Delphi method. Results: The total number of the voted sentences was 465. All chapters were voted on by at least 75% of the experts. Of the 465 sentences, 84% achieved large consensus, 6% achieved moderate consensus, and 7% resulted in minimum consensus. Only 3% was disagreed by more than 50% of the members. Conclusions: It is feasible to achieve European Consensus on key diagnostic and treatment issues using the Delphi method. This consensus embodies the expertise of professionals from all disciplines involved in the care for patients with colon and rectal cancer. Diagnostic and treatment algorithms were developed to implement the current evidence and to define core treatment guidance for multidisciplinary team management of colon and rectal cancer throughout Europe.

Financing public education when altruistic agents have retirement concerns

[cat]El capital humà i, per tant, l’educació tenen un impacte en el benestar futur de la societat. En aquest treball s’estudia la connexió entre el suport dels votants per una educació pública i les preocupacions sobre la seva jubilació. Mostrem com els votants anticipen els efectes positius que té l’educació sobre les pensions futures. Així, el recolzament a un sistema educatiu públic s’incrementa si el sistema de pensions és més redistributiu, cosa que també es dóna entre els ciutadans que prefereixen una educació privada. També mostrem que el tipus d’equilibri “ends against the middle” pot ocórrer fins i tot quan la taxa impositiva preferida pels votants és decreixent amb la renda.

Welfare spending and ethnic heterogeneity. Evidence from a massive immigration wave

[spa] En este trabajo se analiza la relación entre la heterogeneidad étnica y la redistribución, utilizando la reciente y masiva llegada de inmigrantes a España. En concreto, se estudia el efecto de los cambios en la densidad de inmigrantes, observada entre 1998 y 2006, sobre los cambios en el gasto social municipal. La densidad de inmigrantes se instrumenta utilizando los patrones de establecimiento por país de origen para asignar los flujos predichos de inmigrantes a cada municipio. Los resultados evidencian que el gasto social incrementó menos en los municipios con mayores incrementos en la densidad de inmigrantes. También se proporciona evidencia de la existencia de una relación positiva entre la densidad de inmigrantes y el porcentaje de voto obtenidos por los partidos de derecha. Por tanto, estos resultados son consistentes con las teorías que predicen una relación negativa entre la heterogeneidad étnica y la redistribución.

Financing public education when altruistic agents have retirement concerns

[cat]El capital humà i, per tant, l’educació tenen un impacte en el benestar futur de la societat. En aquest treball s’estudia la connexió entre el suport dels votants per una educació pública i les preocupacions sobre la seva jubilació. Mostrem com els votants anticipen els efectes positius que té l’educació sobre les pensions futures. Així, el recolzament a un sistema educatiu públic s’incrementa si el sistema de pensions és més redistributiu, cosa que també es dóna entre els ciutadans que prefereixen una educació privada. També mostrem que el tipus d’equilibri “ends against the middle” pot ocórrer fins i tot quan la taxa impositiva preferida pels votants és decreixent amb la renda.

Welfare spending and ethnic heterogeneity. Evidence from a massive immigration wave

[spa] En este trabajo se analiza la relación entre la heterogeneidad étnica y la redistribución, utilizando la reciente y masiva llegada de inmigrantes a España. En concreto, se estudia el efecto de los cambios en la densidad de inmigrantes, observada entre 1998 y 2006, sobre los cambios en el gasto social municipal. La densidad de inmigrantes se instrumenta utilizando los patrones de establecimiento por país de origen para asignar los flujos predichos de inmigrantes a cada municipio. Los resultados evidencian que el gasto social incrementó menos en los municipios con mayores incrementos en la densidad de inmigrantes. También se proporciona evidencia de la existencia de una relación positiva entre la densidad de inmigrantes y el porcentaje de voto obtenidos por los partidos de derecha. Por tanto, estos resultados son consistentes con las teorías que predicen una relación negativa entre la heterogeneidad étnica y la redistribución.