The changing politics of preference formation in international trade negotiations: the European Union in the Doha Round

This research seeks to provide an explanation for variations of “politics” of preference formation in international trade negotiations. Building on the ‘policy determines politics’ argument, I hypothesize the existence of a causal relationship between issue-characteristics and their variations with politics dynamics and their variations. More specifically, this study seeks to integrate into a single analytical framework two dimensions along which variations in the “politics of preference formation” can be organized: configurations of power relationships among the relevant actors in the structures within which they interact as well as the logic and the motivations of the actors involved in the policy making process. To do so, I first construct a four-cell typology of ‘politics of preference formation’ and, then, I proceed by specifying that the type of state-society configurations as well as the type of actors’ motivations in the “politics of preference formation” depend, respectively, on the degree to which a policy issue is perceived as politically salient and on the extent to which the distributional implications of such an issue can be calculated by the relevant stakeholders in the policy making process. The empirical yardstick against which the validity of the theoretical argument proposed is tested is drawn from evidence concerning the European Union’s negotiating strategy in four negotiating areas in the context of the so-called WTO’s Doha Development Round of multilateral trade negotiations: agriculture, competition, environment and technical assistance and capacity building.

European Union Meets South Korea: Bureaucratic Interests, Exporter Discrimination and the Negotiations of Trade Agreements

Who in the European Union drives the process of pursuing bilateral trade negotiations? In contrast to societal explanations, this article develops a novel argument as to how the European Commission manages the process and uses its position in strategic ways to pursue its interests. Rooted in principal–agent theory, the article discusses agent preferences and theorizes the conditions under which the agent sets specific focal points and interacts strategically with principals and third parties. The argument is discussed with case study evidence drawn from the first trade agreement concluded and ratified since the EU Commission announced its new strategy in 2006: the EU–South Korea trade agreement

Nitrogen fertilizer rate management as a nitrous oxide mitigation strategy: Development of a nitrous oxide emission reduction protocol (NERP)

Nitrous oxide (N2O) is a potent agricultural greenhouse gas (GHG). More than 50% of the global anthropogenic N2O flux is attributable to emissions from soil, primarily due to large fertilizer nitrogen (N) applications to corn and other non-leguminous crops. Quantification of the trade–offs between N2O emissions, fertilizer N rate, and crop yield is an essential requirement for informing management strategies aiming to reduce the agricultural sector GHG burden, without compromising productivity and producer livelihood. There is currently great interest in developing and implementing agricultural GHG reduction offset projects for inclusion within carbon offset markets. Nitrous oxide, with a global warming potential (GWP) of 298, is a major target for these endeavours due to the high payback associated with its emission prevention. In this paper we use robust quantitative relationships between fertilizer N rate and N2O emissions, along with a recently developed approach for determining economically profitable N rates for optimized crop yield, to propose a simple, transparent, and robust N2O emission reduction protocol (NERP) for generating agricultural GHG emission reduction credits. This NERP has the advantage of providing an economic and environmental incentive for producers and other stakeholders, necessary requirements in the implementation of agricultural offset projects.

Biological monitoring and Biological Limit Values (BLV): the strategy of the European Union

Occupational standards concerning allowable concentrations of chemical compounds in the ambient air of workplaces have been established in several countries worldwide. With the integration of the European Union (EU), there has been a need of establishing harmonised Occupational Exposure Limits (OEL). The European Commission Directive 95/320/EC of 12 July 1995 has given the tasks to a Scientific Committee for Occupational Exposure Limits (SCOEL) to propose, based on scientific data and where appropriate, occupational limit values which may include the 8-h time-weighted average (TWA), short-term limits/excursion limits (STEL) and Biological Limit Values (BLVs). In 2000, the European Union issued a list of 62 chemical substances with Occupational Exposure Limits. Of these, 25 substances received a "skin" notation, indicating that toxicologically significant amounts may be taken up via the skin. For such substances, monitoring of concentrations in ambient air may not be sufficient, and biological monitoring strategies appear of potential importance in the medical surveillance of exposed workers. Recent progress has been made with respect to formulation of a strategy related to health-based BLVs.

The Diminishing Returns to Trade Policy in the European Union

The notion that the EU is a trade power is central to studies of the Union’s international presence. Credible threats to withhold access to Europe’s markets are said to provide the Union with leverage in respect of other trade partners. This paper queries the continuing ability of the European Union to act effectively this way. The current Doha malaise is a symptom of deeper changes in the international trade system. As emerging markets become more affluent and participate in foreign direct investment, their interest in market access per se become less important relative to other areas of regulation.