O direito eleitoral e a liberdade de expressão: política, palavra e paixão

O presente estudo tem por objetivo oferecer uma contribuição inicial para a revitalização do direito eleitoral, por meio da releitura de seus institutos, regras, princípios e lógica estruturante à luz do sistema constitucional da liberdade de expressão. Seu ponto de partida é a constatação de que o direito eleitoral brasileiro não confere à liberdade de expressão a sua devida dimensão de peso. No contexto das campanhas, as liberdades de expressão, informação e imprensa têm sido demasiadamente sacrificadas. O arcabouço teórico do direito eleitoral, ao invés de se estruturar em torno da necessidade de garantir um debate públicodesinibido, robusto e aberto, parece organizar-se exatamente no sentido oposto, buscando limitar o fluxo e a contraposição de informações, ideias e opiniões. O trabalho identifica duas causas principais deste cenário. Em primeiro lugar, e de modo geral, isso se dá porque a cultura da liberdade de expressão não criou raízes no país. Em segundo lugar, e mais especificamente, porque a dogmática do direito eleitoral padece de grave subdesenvolvimento teórico, que se reflete em três principais deficiências: (i) na inexistência de identificação e sistematização consistente dos princípios substantivos norteadores do direito eleitoral e seus respectivos conteúdos, (i) na construção da disciplina sob fundamentos teóricos inconsistentes e contraditórios como o ideal democrático, e (iii) na regulação excessiva, assistemática e casuísta, instituída à margem do sistema de direitos fundamentais. Para a superação dessas deficiências, propõe-se, em primeiro lugar, um marco teórico para a liberdade de expressão, capaz de fornecer o instrumental necessário para a regulação eleitoral.Em seguida, apresenta-se um panorama do tratamento atual da liberdade de expressão no direito eleitoral, procedendo-se à filtragem de grande parte da regulação das campanhas eleitorais à luz do sistema constitucional da liberdade de expressão, incluindo o regramento da propaganda política, o acesso aos meios de comunicação durante o pleito, e as regras de financiamento de campanha.

Wykładnia funkcjonalna a zmiana społeczno-polityczna. Studium teoretycznoprawne

Wydział Prawa i Administracji: Katedra Teorii i Filozofii Prawa

An empirical examination of risk equalisation in a regulated community rated health insurance market

Despite universal access entitlements to the public healthcare system in Ireland, over half the population is covered by voluntary private health insurance. The market operates on the basis of community rating, open enrolment and lifetime cover. A set of minimum benefits also exists, and two risk equalisation schemes have been put in place but neither was implemented. These schemes have proved highly controversial. To date, the debate has primarily consisted of qualitative arguments. This study adds a quantitative element by analysing a number of pertinent issues. A model of a community rated insurance market is developed, which shows that community rating can only be maintained in a competitive market if all insurers in the market have the same risk profile as the market overall. This has relevance to the Irish market in the aftermath of a Supreme Court decision to set aside risk equalisation. Two reasons why insurers’ risk profiles might differ are adverse selection and risk selection. Evidence is found of the existence of both forms of selection in the Irish market. A move from single rate community rating to lifetime community rating in Australia had significant consequences for take-up rates and the age profile of the insured population. A similar move has been proposed in Ireland. It is found that, although this might improve the stability of community rating in the short term, it would not negate the need for risk equalisation. If community rating were to collapse then risk rating might result. A comparison of the Irish, Australian and UK health insurance markets suggests that community rating encourages higher take-up among older consumers than risk rating. Analysis of Irish hospital discharge figures suggests that this yields significant savings for the Irish public healthcare system. This thesis has implications for government policy towards private health insurance in Ireland.

‘The Judiciary and Political Change in Africa: Developing Transitional Jurisprudence in Nigeria’

At a time of increased evaluations of law, human rights, and the rise of judicial power all over the globe, the work of most African judiciaries and the principles of the jurisprudence they espouse in promoting social justice remain an unlikely focus of comparative legal scholarship. This ought not to be so in view of the considerable activities of the courts on the continent in the dawn of the third wave of democratization. This article explores the work of the Nigerian Supreme Court in the political transition to democracy since 1999. Utilizing insights from the work of Ruti Teitel, it attempts to outline some of the major constitutional and extraconstitutional principles adopted by the Court in mediating intergovernmental contestations in the turbulent transition away from almost three decades of authoritarian military rule. It emerges that the task of fostering social transformation through the “weakest” branch seriously tasks the institutional integrity of the judiciary.

'Robes on Tight Ropes: The Judicialisation of Politics in Nigeria'

This account of judicialised politics in the Nigerian transition experience examines the regulation of the judiciary of the political space, through the resolution of intergovernmental contestations in a dysfunctional federation. It analyses the judicialisation of elite power disputes which have resonance for due process and the rule of law in particular and governance in general. A study of the role of the judiciary in stabilising the country, itself a pivot in the West Africa region in particular and Africa in general, is important. This is especially in view of its classification as a ‘weak state,’ despite its enormous human and natural resources. The analyses here suggest the Supreme Court has taken a strategic position in the task of democratic institutional building and the reinstitution of the rule of law in the country. This strategic measure has received the acclaim of the public. However, the account also discloses that the judiciary, in the course of its numerous interventions, has been drawn into overly political disputes that overreach its jurisprudential preferences. Of even more significance, it demonstrates that the judiciary is itself still challenged by institutional dysfunctions constituting part of the legacies of the authoritarian era. The situation leads back to the need for closer scrutiny of the judicial function in transitional societies.

So mechanical or routine: The not original in Feist

The United States Supreme Court case of 1991, Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Service Co., continues to be highly significant for property in data and databases, but remains poorly understood. The approach taken in this article contrasts with previous studies. It focuses upon the “not original” rather than the original. The delineation of the absence of a modicum of creativity in selection, coordination, and arrangement of data as a component of the not original forms a pivotal point in the Supreme Court decision. The author also aims at elucidation rather than critique, using close textual exegesis of the Supreme Court decision. The results of the exegesis are translated into a more formal logical form to enhance clarity and rigor.


The insufficiently creative is initially characterized as “so mechanical or routine.” Mechanical and routine are understood in their ordinary discourse senses, as a conjunction or as connected by AND, and as the central clause. Subsequent clauses amplify the senses of mechanical and routine without disturbing their conjunction.


The delineation of the absence of a modicum of creativity can be correlated with classic conceptions of computability. The insufficiently creative can then be understood as a routine selection, coordination, or arrangement produced by an automatic mechanical procedure or algorithm. An understanding of a modicum of creativity and of copyright law is also indicated.


The value of the exegesis and interpretation is identified as its final simplicity, clarity, comprehensiveness, and potential practical utility.

The absence of creativity in Feist and the computational process

The decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in 1991 in Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Service Co. affirmed originality as a constitutional requirement for copyright. Originality has a specific sense and is constituted by a minimal degree of creativity and independent creation. The not original is the more developed concept within the decision. It includes the absence of a minimal degree of creativity as a major constituent. Different levels of absence of creativity also are distinguished, from the extreme absence of creativity to insufficient creativity. There is a gestalt effect of analogy between the delineation of the not original and the concept of computability. More specific correlations can be found within the extreme absence of creativity. "[S]o mechanical" in the decision can be correlated with an automatic mechanical procedure and clauses with a historical resonance with understandings of computability as what would naturally be regarded as computable. The routine within the extreme absence of creativity can be regarded as the product of a computational process. The concern of this article is with rigorously establishing an understanding of the extreme absence of creativity, primarily through the correlations with aspects of computability. The understanding established is consistent with the other elements of the not original. It also revealed as testable under real-world conditions. The possibilities for understanding insufficient creativity, a minimal degree of creativity, and originality, from the understanding developed of the extreme absence of creativity, are indicated. 

Multiculturalism, freedom of religion, equality, and the British constitution: The JFS case considered

In the JFS case, the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom held that the admissions policy of a Jewish faith school constituted unlawful racial discrimination because it used the Orthodox Jewish interpretation of who is Jewish as a criterion for determining admission to the school. A detailed discussion of the case is located in the context of two broader debates in Britain, which are characterized as constitutional in character or, at least, as possessing constitutional properties. The first is the debate concerning the treatment of minority groups, multiculturalism, and the changing perceptions in public policy of the role of race and religion in national life. It is suggested that this debate has become imbued with strong elements of what has been termed “post-multiculturalism”. The second debate is broader still, and pertains to shifting approaches to “constitutionalism” in Britain. It is suggested that, with the arrival of the European Convention on Human Rights and EU law, the U.K. has seen a shift from a pragmatic approach to constitutional thinking, in which legislative compromise played a key part, to the recognition of certain quasi-constitutional principles, allowing the judiciary greatly to expand its role in protecting individual rights while requiring the judges, at the same time, to articulate a principled basis for doing so. In both these debates, the principle of equality plays an important role. The JFS case is an important illustration of some of the implications of these developments.

Two Views of ‘Subordination’: the Personal Scope of Employment Discrimination Law in Jivraj v Hashwani

In Jivraj v Hashwani, the Supreme Court considered what requirements are necessary for a relationship to be considered as an employment relationship for the purposes of determining the scope of domestic employment discrimination law. The Court held that an element of subordination was necessary for the relationship to be considered employment under a contract personally to do work. This article discusses what the Court in Jivraj meant by this requirement, contrasting two differing views of subordination. It examines some implications of the decision for the relationship between employment law and anti-discrimination law, and for recent debates on the scope of employment law more generally.

Creativity for Feist

This paper develops an understanding of creativity to meet the requirements of the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Feist v. Rural (1991). The inclusion of creativity in originality, in a minimal degree of creativity, and in a creative spark below the level required for originality, is first established. Conditions for creativity are simultaneously derived. Clauses negatively implying creativity are then identified and considered.

The clauses which imply creativity can be extensively correlated with conceptions of computability. The negative of creativity is then understood as an automatic mechanical or computational procedure or a so routine process which results in a highly routine product. Conversely, creativity invariantly involves a not mechanical procedure. The not mechanical is then populated by meaning, in accord with accepted distinctions, drawing on a range of discourses. Meaning is understood as a different level of analysis to the syntactic or mechanical and also as involving direct human engagement with meaning. As direct engagement with meaning, it can be connected to classic concepts of creativity, through the association of dissimilars. Creativity is finally understood as not mechanical human activity above a certain level of routinicity.

Creativity is then integrated with a minimal degree of creativity and with originality. The level of creativity required for a minimal degree is identified as intellectual. The combination of an intellectual level with a sufficient amount of creativity can be read from the exchange values connected with the product of creative activity. Humanly created bibliographic records and indexes are then possible correlates to or constituents of a minimal degree of creativity. A four stage discriminatory process for determining originality is then specified. Finally, the strength and value of the argument are considered.

Finally, the strength and value of the argument are considered.

Unveiling Fairness for the Consumer:The Law, Economics and Justice of Expanded Arbitration

In recent years, the US Supreme Court has rather controversially extended the ambit of the Federal Arbitration Act to extend arbitration’s reach into, inter alia¸ consumer matters, with the consequence that consumers are often (and unbeknownst to them) denied remedies which would otherwise be available. Such denied remedies include recourse to class action proceedings, effective denial of punitive damages, access to discovery and the ability to resolve the matter in a convenient forum.

The court’s extension of arbitration’s ambit is controversial. Attempts to overturn this extension have been made in Congress, but to no avail. In contrast to American law, European consumer law looks at pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate directed at consumers with extreme suspicion, and does so on the grounds of fairness. In contrast, some argue that pre-dispute agreements in consumer (and employment) matters are consumer welfare enhancing: they decrease the costs of doing business, which is then passed on to the consumer. This Article examines these latter claims from both an economic and normative perspective.

The economic analysis of these arguments shows that their assumptions do not hold. Rather than being productive of consumer surplus, the use of arbitration is likely to have the opposite effect. The industries from which the recent Supreme Court cases originated not only do not exhibit the industrial structure assumed by the proponents of expanded arbitration, but are also industries which exhibit features that facilitate consumer welfare reducing collusion.

The normative analysis addresses the fairness concerns. It is explicitly based upon John Rawls’ notion of “justice as fairness,” which can provide a lens to evaluate social institutions. This Rawlsian analysis considers the use of extended arbitration in consumer matters in the light of the earlier economic results. It suggests that the asymmetries present in the contractual allocation of rights serve as prima facie evidence that such arbitration–induced exclusions are prima facie unjust/unfair. However, as asymmetry is only a prima facie test, a generalized criticism of the arbitration exclusions (of the sort found in Congress and underlying the European regime) is overbroad.

Analogies to semantic and syntactic mental labour in the Feist decision

The Supreme Court of the United States in Feist v. Rural (Feist, 1991) specified that compilations or databases, and other works, must have a minimal degree of creativity to be copyrightable. The significance and global diffusion of the decision is only matched by the difficulties it has posed for interpretation. The judgment does not specify what is to be understood by creativity, although it does give a full account of the negative of creativity, as ‘so mechanical or routine as to require no creativity whatsoever’ (Feist, 1991, p.362). The negative of creativity as highly mechanical has particularly diffused globally.

A recent interpretation has correlated ‘so mechanical’ (Feist, 1991) with an automatic mechanical procedure or computational process, using a rigorous exegesis fully to correlate the two uses of mechanical. The negative of creativity is then understood as an automatic computation and as a highly routine process. Creativity is itself is conversely understood as non-computational activity, above a certain level of routinicity (Warner, 2013).

The distinction between the negative of creativity and creativity is strongly analogous to an independently developed distinction between forms of mental labour, between semantic and syntactic labour. Semantic labour is understood as human labour motivated by considerations of meaning and syntactic labour as concerned solely with patterns. Semantic labour is distinctively human while syntactic labour can be directly humanly conducted or delegated to machine, as an automatic computational process (Warner, 2005; 2010, pp.33-41).

The value of the analogy is to greatly increase the intersubjective scope of the distinction between semantic and syntactic mental labour. The global diffusion of the standard for extreme absence of copyrightability embodied in the judgment also indicates the possibility that the distinction fully captures the current transformation in the distribution of mental labour, where syntactic tasks which were previously humanly performed are now increasingly conducted by machine.

The paper has substantive and methodological relevance to the conference themes. Substantively, it is concerned with human creativity, with rationality as not reducible to computation, and has relevance to the language myth, through its indirect endorsement of a non-computable or not mechanical semantics. These themes are supported by the underlying idea of technology as a human construction. Methodologically, it is rooted in the humanities and conducts critical thinking through exegesis and empirically tested theoretical development

References

Feist. (1991). Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Service Co., Inc. 499 U.S. 340.

Warner, J. (2005). Labor in information systems. Annual Review of Information Science and Technology. 39, 2005, pp.551-573.

Warner, J. (2010). Human Information Retrieval (History and Foundations of Information Science Series). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Warner, J. (2013). Creativity for Feist. Journal of the American Society for Information Science and Technology. 64, 6, 2013, pp.1173-1192.

Transnational Culture Wars

The well-known ‘culture wars’ clash in the United States between civil society actors has now gone transnational. Political science scholarship has long detailed how liberal human rights non-governmental organizations NGOs engage in extensive transnational activity in support of their ideals. More recently, US conservative groups (including faith-based NGOs) have begun to emulate these strategies, promoting their convictions by engaging in transnational advocacy. NGOs thus face off against each other politically across the globe. Less well known is the extent to which these culture wars are conducted in courts, using conflicting interpretations of human rights law. Many of the same protagonists, particularly NGOs that find themselves against each other in US courts, now find new litigation opportunities abroad in which to fight their battles. These developments, and their implications, are the focus of this article. In particular, the extent to which US faith-based NGOs have leveraged the experience gained transnationally to use international and foreign jurisprudence in interventions before the US Supreme Court is assessed.

Recent Developments in the Law of Torts in Northern Ireland Annual Conference of the Irish Association of Law Teachers

This paper reviews decisions from the Northern Ireland and England and Wales High Courts and Courts of Appeal as well as the UK Supreme Court relating to tort and principally to the tort of negligence in the past 12 months or so.

In structure, the paper will be presented in four parts. First, three preliminary points relating to contemporary features of the NI civil courts: personal litigants – Devine v McAteer [2012] NICA 30 (7 September 2012); pre-action protocols – Monaghan v Graham [2013] NIQB 53 (3 May 2013); and the rise of alternative dispute resolution. On the last named issue, the recent decision of PGF II SA v OMFS Company 1 Ltd [2013] EWCA Civ 1288 (23 October 2013) on unreasonable refusal to mediate, will be discussed.

Second, the paper moves to consider the law of negligence generally and case law from the NI High Court reiterating Lord Hoffmann’s view in Tomlinson v Congleton Borough Council [2004] 1 AC 46 that no duty of care arises from obvious risks of injury. In this, reference will be made to the application of the above “Hoffmann principle” in West Sussex County Council v Pierce [2013] EWCA Civ 1230 (16 October 2013), which concerned an accident sustained by a child at school. A similar set of facts was presented recently to the UK Supreme Court in Woodland v Essex County Council [2013] UKSC 66 (23 October 2013). The decision there, on non-delegable duties of care, will have a significant impact for schools in the provision of extracurricular activities.

Third, I will review a NI case of note on the duty of care of solicitors in the context of professional negligence in the context of conflicting advice by counsel.

Fourth, I will examine a series of cases on employer liability and including issues such as the duty of care towards the volunteer worker; tort and safety at work principles generally; and, more specifically, the duty of care of the employer towards an employee who suffers psychiatric illness as a result of stress and/or harassment at work. On the issue of workplace stress, the NI courts have made extensive reference to the Hale LJ principles found in the Court of Appeal decision of Hatton v Sutherland [2002] 1 All ER 1 and applied to those who have suffered trauma in reporting on or policing “the troubles” in Northern Ireland. On the issue of statutory harassment at work, the paper will also mention the UK Supreme Court’s decision in Hayes v Willoughby [2013] UKSC 17 (20 March 2013).