Firm Size and Geographical Aggregation: An Empirical Appraisal in Industrial Location

This paper assesses empirically the importance of size discrimination and disaggregate data for deciding where to locate a start-up concern. We compare three econometric specifications using Catalan data: a multinomial logit with 4 and 41 alternatives (provinces and comarques, respectively) in which firm size is the main covariate; a conditional logit with 4 and 41 alternatives including attributes of the sites as well as size-site interactions; and a Poisson model on the comarques and the full spatial choice set (942 municipalities) with site-specific variables. Our results suggest that if these two issues are ignored, conclusions may be misleading. We provide evidence that large and small firms behave differently and conclude that Catalan firms tend to choose between comarques rather than between municipalities. Moreover, labour-intensive firms seem more likely to be located in the city of Barcelona. Keywords: Catalonia, industrial location, multinomial response model. JEL: C250, E30, R00, R12

Trade disclosure and price dispersion

This paper determines the effects of post-trade opaqueness on market performance. We find that the degree of market transparency has important effects on market equilibria. In particular, we show that dealers operating in a transparent structure set regret-free prices at each period making zero expected profits in each of the two trading rounds, whereas in the opaque market dealers invest in acquiring information at the beginning of the trading day. Moreover, we obtain that if there is no trading activity in the first period, then market makers only change their quotes in the opaque market. Additionally, we show that trade disclosure increases the informational efficiency of transaction prices and reduces volatility. Finally, concerning welfare of market participants, we obtain ambiguous results. Keywords: Market microstructure, Post-trade transparency, Price experimentation, Price dispersion.

Should fiscal authorities cooperate in a monetary union with public deficit targets?

In this paper we analyse the setting of optimal policies in a monetary union with one monetary authority and various fiscal authorities that have a public deficit target. We will show that fiscal cooperation among the fiscal authorities, in the presence of positive supply shocks, ends up producing higher public deficits than in a non-cooperative regime. JEL No. E61, E63, F33, H0. Keywords: monetary union, fiscal policy coordination.

The Determinants of Entry are not Independent of Start-up Size: Some evidence from Spanish manufacturing

In this paper we explore the determinants of firm start-up size of Spanish manufacturing industries. The industries' barriers to entry affect the ability of potential entrants to enter the markets and the size range at which they decide to enter. In order to examine the relationships between barriers to entry and size we applied the quantile regression techniques. Our results indicate that the variables that characterize the structure of the market, the variables that are related to the behaviour of the incumbent firms and the rate of growth of the industries generate different barriers depending on the initial size of the entrants. Keywords: Entry, regression quantiles, start-up size. JEL classification: L110, L600

Delegation and information sharing in oligopoly

Information sharing in oligopoly has been analyzed by assuming that firms behave as a sole economic agent. In this paper I assume that ownership and management are separated. Managers are allowed to falsely report their costs to owners and rivals. Under such circumstances, if owners want to achieve information sharing they must use managerial contracts that implement truthful cost reporting by managers as a dominant strategy. I show that, contrary to the classical result, without the inclusion of message-dependent payments in managerial contracts there will be no information sharing. On the other hand, with the inclusion of such publicly observable payments and credible ex-ante commitment by owners not to modify these payments, there will be perfect information sharing without the need for third parties. Keywords: Information sharing, Delegation, Managerial contracts. JEL classification numbers: D21, D82, L13, L21

A territorial approach to firm entry: The effect of city size

This paper concerns the effects of territorial factors on the processes involved in the creation of manufacturing firms in Spanish cities. Most contributions have focused on regional factors rather than urban ones. Here we assume that it is possible to identify certain urban factors that attract new firms. We use data for the entry of firms in Spanish manufacturing industries between 1994 and 2002. This paper contributes to the existing literature on market entry. Key words: cities, regions, firm entry and Spanish economy. JEL: R0, R12, L60

Firm Size and Short-Term Dynamics in Aggregate Entry and Exit

Much of the research on industry dynamics focuses on the interdependence between the sectorial rates of entry and exit. This paper argues that the size of firms and the reaction-adjustment period are important conditions missed in this literature. I illustrate the effects of this omission using data from the Spanish manufacturing industries between 1994 and 2001. Estimates from systems of equations models provide evidence of a conical revolving door phenomenon and of partial adjustments in the replacement-displacement of large firms. KEYWORDS: aggregation, industry dynamics, panel data, symmetry, simultaneity. JEL CLASSIFICATION: C33, C52, L60, L11

Testing Cayley graph densities

We present a computer-assisted analysis of combinatorial properties of the Cayley graphs of certain finitely generated groups: Given a group with a finite set of generators, we study the density of the corresponding Cayley graph, that is, the least upper bound for the average vertex degree (= number of adjacent edges) of any finite subgraph. It is known that an m-generated group is amenable if and only if the density of the corresponding Cayley graph equals to 2m. We test amenable and non-amenable groups, and also groups for which amenability is unknown. In the latter class we focus on Richard Thompson’s group F.

Informe de la estancia realizada en la división de neurociencias de la facultad de ciencias experimentales del Centro Andaluz de Biología del Desarrollo. Universidad Pablo de Olavide. Sevilla.

Investigación producida a partir de una estancia en la Universidad Pablo de Olavide de Sevilla entre los meses de mayo a julio del 2005. Con el objetivo de investigar la influencia de los factores neurotróficos en la patofisiología de los trastornos de ansiedad, se realizó un protocolo experimental de electrofisiología in vivo para caracterizar la formación de LTP en el hipocampo de un modelo murino de sobrexpresión del gen NTRK3. Para ello se fabricaron electrodos que fueron implantados en el cerebro de ratones mediante cirugía estereotáxica. Posteriormente se experimentó la habituación, condicionamiento y extinción de un estímulo sonoro, de un grupo de 12 ratones transgénicos NTRK3 y de 12 ratones controles durante varias sesiones. El análisis de las respuestas condicionadas reveló un problema en el aprendizaje en los ratones TgNTRK3.

Síntesi en fase sólida d'oligosacàrids cardioactius

Estudi aproximatiu a la síntesi en fase sòlida de la part glicosídica de la digitoxina, essencial per l’activitat biològica com a reguladora de les propietats farmacocinètiques, i per tant molt important per l’avenç de la química mèdica i bioinorgànica. La metodologia que s’ha seguit inclou: síntesi de la pentosa de partença adequada, a partir de la qual, es van obtindre les unitats de 2,6- didesoxiglicósids; síntesi dels suports polimèrics necessaris per la síntesi en fase sòlida dels compostos objectiu; estudi de diferent tipus de glicosil dadors i activador de tioglicosids, lactols i tricloroacetimidats per la reacció de glicosilació amb el linker. S’ha assolit comprensió i coneixement de la tecnologia associada a la síntesi en fase sòlida, que requereix procediment diferenciat de la síntesi en solució convencional.

Retribution in a cheap-talk experiment

We use a two-person 3-stage game to investigate whether people choose to punish or reward another player by sacrificing money to increase or decrease the other person’s payoff. One player sends a message indicating an intended play, which is either favorable or unfavorable to the other player in the game. After the message, the sender and the receiver play a simultaneous 2x2 game. A deceptive message may be made, in an effort to induce the receiver to make a play favorable to the sender. Our focus is on whether receivers’ rates of monetary sacrifice depend on the process and the perceived sender’s intention, as is suggested by the literature on deception and procedural satisfaction. Models such as Rabin (1993), Sen (1997), and Charness and Rabin (1999) also permit rates of sacrifice to be sensitive to the sender’s perceived intention, while outcome-based models such as Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Bolton and Ockenfels (1997) predict otherwise. We find that deception substantially increases the punishment rate as a response to an action that is unfavorable to the receiver. We also find that a small but significant percentage of subjects choose to reward a favorable action choice made by the sender.

Dynamic matching and bargaining: the role of deadlines

We consider a dynamic model where traders in each period are matched randomly into pairs who then bargain about the division of a fixed surplus. When agreement is reached the traders leave the market. Traders who do not come to an agreement return next period in which they will be matched again, as long as their deadline has not expired yet. New traders enter exogenously in each period. We assume that traders within a pair know each other's deadline. We define and characterize the stationary equilibrium configurations. Traders with longer deadlines fare better than traders with short deadlines. It is shown that the heterogeneity of deadlines may cause delay. It is then shown that a centralized mechanism that controls the matching protocol, but does not interfere with the bargaining, eliminates all delay. Even though this efficient centralized mechanism is not as good for traders with long deadlines, it is shown that in a model where all traders can choose which mechanism to

Invoking a cartesian product structure on social states: new resolutions of Sen's and Gibbard's impossibility theorems

The purpose of this article is to introduce a Cartesian product structure into the social choice theoretical framework and to examine if new possibility results to Gibbard's and Sen's paradoxes can be developed thanks to it. We believe that a Cartesian product structure is a pertinent way to describe individual rights in the social choice theory since it discriminates the personal features comprised in each social state. First we define some conceptual and formal tools related to the Cartesian product structure. We then apply these notions to Gibbard's paradox and to Sen's impossibility of a Paretian liberal. Finally we compare the advantages of our approach to other solutions proposed in the literature for both impossibility theorems.