998 resultados para Schedules, School


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Special investigation of the Washington Community School District for the period June 1, 2003 through October 31, 2006

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Monthly newsletter produced by Iowa Department of Education

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Monthly newsletter produced by Iowa Department of Education

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Monthly newsletter produced by Iowa Department of Education

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Audit report on Mid-Iowa School Improvement Consortium, Carlisle, Iowa for the year ended June 30, 2006

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Reaudit report on the Des Moines Independent Community School District for the period July 1, 2004 through June 30, 2005

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Audit report on the Iowa Braille and Sight Saving School, Vinton, Iowa, for the year ended June 30, 2006

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Reaudit report on the Collins-Maxwell Community School District for the period July 1, 2005 through June 30, 2006

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Audit report on the Iowa School for the Deaf, Council Bluffs, Iowa for the year ended June 30, 2006

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Two main school choice mechanisms have attracted the attention in the literature: Boston and deferred acceptance (DA). The question arises on the ex-ante welfareimplications when the game is played by participants that vary in terms of their strategicsophistication. Abdulkadiroglu, Che and Yasuda (2011) have shown that the chances ofnaive participants getting into a good school are higher under the Boston mechanism thanunder DA, and some naive participants are actually better off. In this note we show thatthese results can be extended to show that, under the veil of ignorance, i.e. students not yetknowing their utility values, all naive students may prefer to adopt the Boston mechanism.