The Mishongnovi ceremonies of the Snake and Antelope fraternities / by George A. Dorsey -- and H. R. Voth.

v.3:no.3(1902)

Junior Classology, undated

Handwritten copy of Junior Classology on two leaves of unlined paper, with two bars of music titled "Heathen Mythology" at the end. Student names and the phrase "High Go" are written in darker ink.

The Oraibi summer snake ceremony, by H. R. Voth -- The Stanley McCormick Hopi expedition -- George A. Dorsey --

v.3:no.4(1903)

C. Miscellaneous poems and compositions, undated

Assorted poems and compositions on topics like happiness, politics, and Greek mythology. It is unclear if these were written by Tudor or transcribed or translated from the works of other authors.

Letter from James Winthrop to William Bentley, 1784 May 17

Two octavo-sized leaves containing a two-and-a-half-page handwritten letter from Winthrop to Bentley discussing Alexander Pope and mythology, and a brief criticism of John Moore's A view of society and manners.

Letter from James Winthrop to William Bentley, 1784 June 12

Two folio-sized leaves containing a two-and-a-half-page handwritten letter from Winthrop to Bentley discussing mythology, a reference to the writing of David Hoar, and miscellaneous news.

Letter from James Winthrop to William Bentley, 1799 November 25

Two folio-sized leaves containing a one-and-a-half-page handwritten letter from Winthrop to Bentley discussing James Dallaway's Constantinople, Ancient and Modern, and Greek mythology.

E3+3 coercive diplomacy towards Iran: Do the economic sanctions add up? CEPS Policy Brief No. 292, 6 June 2013

More than ten years of international negotiations have brought no resolution to the nuclear dispute with Iran. In January 2012 the EU and US autonomously adopted an unprecedented sanctions package, mainly directed at the Iranian oil industry. Eighteen months later, figures show that the Iranian economy has been hit hard. Sanctions have not changed the regime’s calculus, however. Instead of further upping the pressure on Iran, the authors argue for a return to a more balanced dual-track approach so as to reinforce the moderate narrative within the Iranian ruling elite.

Does the key to a WMD-free Middle East lie in a nuclear Iran? CEPS Commentary, 10 June 2013

After the presidential elections on June 14th, the Iranian regime will continue its catch-me-if-you-can game with the international community until it has reached the nuclear threshold. Paradoxically, the key to a solution on the nuclear issue might just lie in discussions on a WMD-free Middle East, but only after Iran has obtained nuclear military capability. At that point, and in the context of a new arms race, both regional and international players may be persuaded that the Middle East has more to gain from negotiations on non-proliferation than from prolonged isolation and the prospect of intractable war.

Next steps toward a final deal with Iran. CEPS Policy Brief No. 316, 14 February 2014

On January 20th, the International Atomic Energy Agency confirmed that Iran had been implementing its commitments as part of the Joint Plan of Action (JPA) agreed with the so-called ‘E3+3’ in Geneva (also known as P5+1) on 24 November 2013. The forging of this interim deal, the successful start to its implementation and the temporary sanctions relief represent resounding success for international diplomacy but they should not be allowed to conceal the underlying issues. Reaching agreement on the JPA was achieved at the cost of clarity over what is to follow and it was decided to eschew a structured agreement in favour of a two-step process. The stated aim of the negotiating parties remains that of starting the implementation of a comprehensive solution by November 2014. If agreement is not reached on a comprehensive solution by the expiry of the JPA by July 20th, the action plan can be renewed by mutual consent. The latter might well be the likeliest outcome of the forthcoming negotiations. Apart from the large gap between the E3+3 and Iranian positions on the substance of a final deal, several domestic policy constraints will likely define the parameters of what is achievable in the future. This CEPS Policy Brief argues that the best hope for success lies in continued engagement and consistent incremental progress in the negotiations, with structured concessions on both sides. This should occur, however, not in a two- but a three-step framework based on lengthening Iran’s ‘breakout’ period while re-engaging with the country both politically and economically. The EU is in a unique position to lead this process. Having greater flexibility than either the US or Iran, its main tasks will be that of maintaining the negotiating momentum and broadening dialogue with Iran.

The fragile ‘reset’. The balance sheet and the prospects for changes in Russian-US relations. OSW Point of View (Policy Brief), April 2011

The ‘reset’ policy proposed by the USA has brought Russia a number of geopolitical, prestigious and economic benefits. The most important of those are: the resumption of arms control, the USA’s withdrawal from plans to locate elements of its strategic missile defence system in Poland and the Czech Republic, and the entry into force of the so-called 123 Agreement. In response, Russia has assisted the United States in resolving the Iranian crisis, and offered help with the Afghanistan operation, covering the transit of supplies and supporting the Afghan government. Moscow has also eased up on its anti-American rhetoric. The changes which have taken place in Russian-US relations are not durable. The two parties have not resolved their major disputes (for example, regarding missile defence), and any differences are hushed up for tactical reasons.

The war of nerves with Iran - consequences for the South Caucasus and Russia. OSW Commentary No. 75, 2012-04-25

Tensions over Iran’s nuclear programme have risen considerably in recent months. This has been visible in numerous threats of – and much speculation about – an imminent Israeli (and US) attack on Iran’s nuclear installations. In this context, the support for the attacks that the countries of the South Caucasus (and Azerbaijan in particular) could provide has been the subject of lively debate, as has been the prospect of a Russian political and military offensive in the Caucasus in response to the attacks on Iran. It seems that the ongoing war campaign in the media has been aimed primarily at putting pressure on Iran and the international community to find a political solution to the Iranian problem. This also applies to the Caucasus’s involvement in the campaign. Given the outcome of the Istanbul round of talks on a political solution to the Iranian issue (14 April), which warrants moderate optimism, the threat of a conflict now appears more distant and this also indirectly proves the effectiveness of the campaign. The war of nerves with Iran, however, is already now actually affecting the stability of the Southern Caucasus. While it seems that Azerbaijan is not Israel’s partner in the preparations to attacks, and that there is no real link between the Iranian problem and the ongoing and planned movements of Russian troops in the Caucasus, the tensions between Iran and Azerbaijan are indeed high. Moreover, the global image of the Caucasus is deteriorating, the USA’s position in the region is becoming more complicated, and Russia’s room for manoeuvre is expanding.

The consequences for Russia of the nuclear deal with Iran. OSW COMMENTARY NUMBER 177/03.08.2015

The five permanent members of the UN Security Council (the USA, the United Kingdom, China, France and Russia) plus Germany and the European Union signed a deal with Iran on 14 July in Vienna (a Plan of Action with five appendices, henceforth referred to as the Vienna Agreement). Under this agreement, Iran undertook to restrict its nuclear programme and to bring it under international scrutiny for 15 years in exchange for a gradual lifting of international sanctions (both those imposed between 2006 and 2010 by the UN Security Council and the unilateral US and EU sanctions). Even though Russia has officially reacted positively to this deal, the consequences it will have are rather ambiguous from Moscow’s point of view. Iran looks set to become stronger and will possibly normalise its relations with the West, and especially the United States. This, in political terms, is a disadvantage for Russia. The Kremlin’s ability to use its policy towards Iran as a bargaining chip in contacts with Washington will be reduced significantly. In turn, the benefits will include improving the perception of Russia in the West and the opening up of new opportunities for the geopolitical game in the region, both with Iran and its opponents in the Arab world. Similarly, in economic terms, the possible lifting of sanctions will offer Russia new opportunities to achieve immediate benefits owing to co-operation in the nuclear and military-technical areas. In the short term, the lifting of sanctions will not pose any threat to Russia’s position on the global energy markets. However, in the long term, the end of Iran’s international isolation may bring negative consequences for Russia, such as the dominant position of Western and/or Chinese companies in the Iranian upstream sector, rising exports of Iranian oil and gas to EU and Asian markets (which are essential for Russia) and the downward pressure on oil and gas prices.

Benthic foraminifera in surface sediments of the Persian Gulf

During "Meteor"cruise 1965 the author collected 134 samples of surface sediments from the Iranian part of the Persian Gulf. Benthic Foraminifera populations have been analysed for determining their depth zonation. These data are supposed to allow detailed depth interpretation of Pleistocene sediments found in cores. In addition, the ecological information might be usefull to reconstruct the depositional environment of fossil sediments in similar shallow epicontinental seas. The investigation is published in two parts: the present part 1 contains the catalogue of species with short discussions of taxonomic problems, notes on the distribution within the Persian Gulf and 11 plates, partly with scanning electron micrographs. The results of the statistical analysis are given in data tables which include number of species, percentages of 2 (and 5) ranked species, standing crop and foraminiferal numbers. The author used "species groups" to avoid ambiguities with species requiring additional taxonomic studies. However, species numbers within these units are estimated to yield applicable diversity information. - A total of 52 species and 7 "species groups" were separated, 2 new species were described.

Chips from a German workshop.

v.1 Recent essays and addresses -- v.2. Biographical essays -- v.3. Essays on language and literature -- v.4. Essays on mythology and folk-lore.