Counter-reforms in times of prosperity. OSW Point of View, September 2006

In 2000, Vladimir Putin came to power after nearly a decade of the rule of the first Russian president, Boris Yeltsin. As prime minister, and later as a candidate for president, Putin announced that he would reform the state. The main assumptions of this reform were presented during a congress of the pro-Kremlin Unity movement, in Putin's address entitled 'Russia at the turn of the millennium' which was delivered on 29 December 1999, and later in a open letter to voters published on 25 February 2000. Both declarations were rather general, but they gave a clear picture of the principal directions of and priority areas for the future president's efforts: they outlined Russia's development path as pro-market and democratic. Nearly seven years have passed since Vladimir Putin came to power, a time for a summary of his achievements. In a way, Vladimir Putin has partially delivered on his initial declarations; indeed, Russia has undergone a deep transformation. However, when seen in the light of the president’s initial promises, the changes appear to be no more than 'counter-reforms', because instead of putting into practice the policy he outlined seven years ago, they have largely followed a different, if not entirely opposite direction.

A new balance of power in the Council? Yes, but not yet… CEPS Commentary, 19 December 2014

On the 1st of November, the double majority system established by the Lisbon Treaty for qualified majority voting (QMV) in the Council entered into force. The shift in the balance of power, however, will not be effective before April 2017, given the possibility for member states to invoke the Nice rules until that date. While acknowledging that the new voting system in the Council promises to do away with the difficult negotiations of the past among member states to reallocate voting weights, this commentary finds that it is questionable whether it will achieve its ultimate aim to substantially improve democratic legitimacy and efficiency.

Agriculture, Food and the TTIP: Possibilities and Pitfalls. CEPS Special Report No. 99/December 2014. TTIP Series No. 3 and Paper No. 1 in the CEPS-CTR project “TTIP in the balance’’

Progress in agriculture and food issues in the TTIP talks will largely be determined by the level of ambition in the negotiations as a whole. If ambitions are modest, a low-level agreement could probably be reached that includes some limited commitments on agricultural market access and food regulations. These could include promises of mutual support in the area of opening up agricultural markets through the WTO and of further Transatlantic cooperation in trying to resolve conflicts over food regulations. Bolder ambitions would allow more scope for tackling the difficult problems, though at the cost of time. It would be unfortunate if the opportunity were not taken to make some significant progress in removing some longstanding irritants in the area of agricultural policy and food regulations: this is where the economic gains are likely to be significant and the spill-overs useful. This paper argues the case that it is worthwhile making the effort to secure a constructive and imaginative agreement on agriculture and food regulations in the TTIP. A fairly detailed suggestive list of potential sub-deals in agro-food, supported by the analysis in the paper, is the most concrete one of a series of policy conclusions

Ideas and Policy: The European Union considers social policy futures. ACES Cases No. 2010.2

The European Union’s social policy perspectives have changed quite dramatically over the last several decades. Now EU’s social policy discourse often promises to “invest in people,” sometimes “to invest in children,” and always to pay particular attention to youth. This paper argues that the tools of historical institutionalism can lead to understanding the ideational roots of this social investment perspective so distant from the “European social model.” Coming out of social movements, and with collective identities shaped both by those movement roots and national experiences, activists have effectively focused their practices on altering the social representations of European social solidarity through their interest group interventions, their participation in policy forums, and their mobilization within civil society at the European and sub-European levels. They have been able to make common cause with several epistemic communities that themselves revamped their ideas in the face of new institutional constraints, in order to advance their interests in promoting particular directions for social policy. The paper documents that “ideas” are not a variable and discourse “sometimes important” but that the ideas carried by movements and in epistemic communities are integral to the very definition of their interests that they promote within and with institutions.

An Assessment of the Penalties System for Infringements of EU Competition Law: Can Personal Sanctions be the Missing Piece of the Puzzle? IES WORKING PAPER 6/2013

Competition law seeks to protect competition on the market as a means of enhancing consumer welfare and of ensuring an efficient allocation of resources. In order to be successful, therefore, competition authorities should be adequately equipped and have at their disposal all necessary enforcement tools. However, at the EU level the current enforcement system of competition rules allows only for the imposition of administrative fines by the European Commission to liable undertakings. The main objectives, in turn, of an enforcement policy based on financial penalties are two fold: to impose sanctions on infringing undertakings which reflect the seriousness of the violation, and to ensure that the risk of penalties will deter both the infringing undertakings (often referred to as 'specific deterrence') and other undertakings that may be considering anti-competitive activities from engaging in them (often referred to as 'general deterrence'). In all circumstances, it is important to ensure that pecuniary sanctions imposed on infringing undertakings are proportionate and not excessive. Although pecuniary sanctions against infringing undertakings are a crucial part of the arsenal needed to deter competition law violations, they may not be sufficient. One alternative option in that regard is the strategic use of sanctions against the individuals involved in, or responsible for, the infringements. Sanctions against individuals are documented to focus the minds of directors and employees to comply with competition rules as they themselves, in addition to the undertakings in which they are employed, are at risk of infringements. Individual criminal penalties, including custodial sanctions, have been in fact adopted by almost half of the EU Member States. This is a powerful tool but is also limited in scope and hard to implement in practice mostly due to the high standards of proof required and the political consensus that needs first to be built. Administrative sanctions for individuals, on the other hand, promise to deliver up to a certain extent the same beneficial results as criminal sanctions whilst at the same time their adoption is not likely to meet strong opposition and their implementation in practice can be both efficient and effective. Directors’ disqualification, in particular, provides a strong individual incentive for each member, or prospective member, of the Board as well as other senior executives, to take compliance with competition law seriously. It is a flexible and promising tool that if added to the arsenal of the European Commission could bring balance to the current sanctioning system and that, in turn, would in all likelihood make the enforcement of EU competition rules more effective. Therefore, it is submitted that a competition law regime in order to be effective should be able to deliver policy objectives through a variety of tools, not simply by imposing significant pecuniary sanctions to infringing undertakings. It is also clear that individual sanctions, mostly of an administrative nature, are likely to play an increasingly important role as they focus the minds of those in business who might otherwise be inclined to regard infringing the law as a matter of corporate risk rather than of personal risk. At the EU level, in particular, the adoption of directors’ disqualification promises to deliver more effective compliance and greater overall economic impact.

Will this time be different for Greece? How to assess its ability to deliver on the reform agenda. CEPS Commentary, 13 March 2015

Taking its inspiration from the ongoing debate on whether this time will be different for Greece and whether Syriza will deliver on its reform promises to the European partners, this Commentary expresses bemusement that the public debate on such an important issue as well as internal discussions among senior policy-makers frequently resort to ‘gut feelings’ or simple stereotypes. To counteract this tendency, the author presents a simple analytical framework that can be used to assess the likelihood that a government will deliver on its reform agenda. Its purpose is not to allow for a precise probabilistic calculation, but to enable better structuring of the knowledge we have. It emphasises that the change depends NOT only on the capacity of the state to design and deliver policies, but even more crucially on state autonomy from both illegitimate and legitimate interests and cognitive models used by policy-makers to make sense of the world.

Greece back on centre stage: the results of a déjà vu summit. EPC Post-Summit Analysis, 23 March 2015

The March 2015 European Council might not enter history books, but the outcome of an informal ‘mini summit’ between seven EU leaders has the potential to prepare the grounds for a breakthrough in the negotiations between Athens and its lenders. In this post-summit analysis, Janis A. Emmanouilidis argues that the search for a compromise promises to be a cumbersome, time-consuming and nerveracking exercise. But a solution now seems possible, proving all those doomsayers who have been predicting a ‘Grexit’ or ‘Graccident’ wrong. On other topics, EU leaders committed their countries to build an Energy Union, although questions remain about whether member states will agree to cede sovereignty on a number of significant points. This analysis looks also at the economic issues dealt with at the Spring Summit, with a focus on the perspectives for the European Semester and the Juncker Investment Plan. It ends with a summary of decisions taken on a number of other topics, including relations with Russia and Ukraine, the upcoming Eastern Partnership summit, developments in Libya and in Tunisia, and the endorsement of the Council’s new Secretary General.

Why Greece declined a euro holiday. CEPS Commentary, 6 August 2015

In a new CEPS Commentary, Daniel Gros speculates on why the Greek government suddenly turned an about-face on July 13th and conceded to terms that not only controverted its own promises, but also closely resembled those that voters had overwhelmingly rejected in a popular referendum barely a week earlier?

Financial regulation in the European Union: A research agenda. CES Papers - Open Forum #10, 2012

Over the past two decades, the European Union (EU) has become a central actor in financial regulation and developed complex institutions to fulfill its roles. Pre-financial crisis scholarship has provided key insights into the functioning of this institutional cobweb and its evolution over time. However, the financial crisis has highlighted four facets of EU financial regulation (EUFR) that deserve more scholarly attention than they have received so far: (1) the permissive pre-crisis consensus on the merits of financial liberalization and integration, (2) the embeddedness of financial regulation in the political economy of EU integration at large, (3) preference formation of public and private stakeholders in EUFR, and (4) the global economic and regulatory context of EUFR. This paper presents the key scholarly challenges across these four areas. Addressing them promises not only academic insights but also promotes the relevance of EUFR research for real-world policy dilemmas.

Odessa Oblast: Governor Saakashvili’s superficial changes. OSW COMMENTARY NUMBER 196|February 2016

Two years after the Revolution of Dignity, Odessa Oblast, one of Ukraine’s key regions in economic and political terms, is still strongly polarised as regards its residents’ views on the future of their country. The political circles rooted in the Party of Regions have maintained their influence to a great extent due to increasing dissatisfaction with the central government’s activity and with the economic crisis which has strongly affected the public. Politicians linked to the ancien régime remain the most important political players. Some pro-Ukrainian circles had pinned their hopes for change in the region on the nomination of the former Georgian president, Mikheil Saakashvili, for governor of Odessa Oblast on 30 May 2015. At the beginning of his rule this politician made widely publicised promises to combat corruption, to improve the quality of the administration services, to develop infrastructure and to attract foreign capital. However, more than half a year has passed since he assumed office, and it is difficult to speak about any spectacular successes in reforming the region. Saakashvili has above all become a player on the national forum, supporting the presidential camp in their struggle with Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk and the oligarch Ihor Kolomoyskyi, among others. However, his nomination has made Odessa Oblast more important for Ukraine, above all in political and symbolic terms. This is because Odessa Oblast is the best manifestation of the condition of the Ukrainian state two years since the Revolution of Dignity – rudimentary reforms or no reforms at all, strong resistance to any changes from the administration, strong local political-business connections, the lack of consolidation among post-Maidan groups and corruption inherent in the system.

Europe's refugee/migrant crisis: can 'illiberal' Turkey save 'liberal Europe' while helping Syrian refugees? EPC Policy Brief, 19 February 2016

Turkish democracy today has lost much of its shine. As the Turkish government continues to backtrack on reforms and infringe on basic freedoms, the country is beginning to look more and more like an ‘illiberal democracy’ at best. Ironically, as one of the most important destination and transit countries for Syrian refugees, it is also still uniquely positioned to help the EU deal with the current refugee crisis. In November 2015, the EU and Turkey signed a Joint Action Plan to better manage the situation, but both parties have fallen short of their promises. German Chancellor Angela Merkel, one of the biggest supporters of closer EU-Turkey cooperation, had hoped that this would allow for the refugees to be admitted into Europe in a more controlled and orderly manner. But it seems she is standing alone in a Europe that is becoming increasingly more hostile towards newcomers, drifting further and further from the liberal values it stands for. In this Policy Brief, Kemal Kirişci discusses the ways in which Turkey, Germany and the EU in general could all benefit from closer cooperation on this issue: “With the right frame of mind and will, the current ‘illiberal Turkey’ could indeed help ‘liberal Europe’. In the long run this would be a ‘win-win’ for Germany, Turkey, and the EU – but most importantly, for the Syrian refugees.”

Modi's Reform Agenda: Change You Can Believe In? Asia Policy Brief 2015/04, November 2015

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi entered office with a historic political mandate. For the first time in thirty years, a single party won a majority of seats in the lower house of Parliament (Lok Sabha). However, Modi faces skyhigh expectations to fulfill his campaign promises of getting India’s economy back on track. Eighteen months into his government’s term and in the wake of electoral defeats in the states of Delhi and Bihar, questions are being raised about its economic performance. While the Modi government has stabilized India’s macroeconomy and announced a series of incremental economic reforms, more sweeping changes have fallen victim to India’s nettlesome domestic politics, including roadblocks within the ruling alliance.

Detrital zircon geochronology data, petrographic point count data and paleocurrent indicator data of Triassic turbidites in the Nanpanjiang Basin, South China

Triassic turbidites of the Nanpanjiang basin of south China represent the most expansive and voluminous siliciclastic turbidite accumulation in south China. The Nanpanjiang basin occurs at a critical junction between the southern margin of the south China plate and the Indochina, Siamo and Sibumasu plates to the south and southwest. The Triassic Yangtze carbonate shelf and isolated carbonated platforms in the basin have been extensively studied, but silicilastic turbidites in the basin have received relatively little attention. Deciphering the facies, paleocurrent indicators and provenance of the Triassic turbidites is important for several reasons: it promises to help resolve the timing of plate collisions along suture zones bordering the basin to the south and southwest, it will enable evaluation of which suture zones and Precambrian massifs were source areas, and it will allow an evaluation of the impact of the siliciclastic flux on carbonate platform evolution within the basin. Turbidites in the basin include the Early Triassic Shipao Formation and the Middle-Late Triassic Baifeng, Xinyuan, Lanmu Bianyang and Laishike formations. Each ranges upward of 700 m and the thickest is nearly 3 km. The turbidites contain very-fine sand in the northern part of the basin whereas the central and southern parts of the basin also commonly contain fine and rarely medium sand size. Coarser sand sizes occur where paleocurrents are from the south, and in this area some turbidites exhibit complete bouma sequences with graded A divisions. Successions contain numerous alternations between mud-rich and sand-rich intervals with thickness trends corresponding to proximal/ distal fan components. Spectacularly preserved sedimentary structures enable robust evaluation of turbidite systems and paleocurrent analyses. Analysis of paleocurrent measurements indicates two major directions of sediment fill. The northern part of the basin was sourced primarily by the Jiangnan massif in the northeast, and the central and southern parts of the basin were sourced primarily from suture zones and the Yunkai massif to the south and southeast respectively. Sandstones of the Lower Triassic Shipao Fm. have volcaniclastic composition including embayed quartz and glass shards. Middle Triassic sandstones are moderately mature, matrix-rich, lithic wackes. The average QFL ratio from all point count samples is 54.1/18.1/27.8% and the QmFLt ratio is 37.8/ 18.1/ 44.1%. Lithic fragments are dominantly claystone and siltstone clasts and metasedimentary clasts such as quartz mica tectonite. Volcanic lithics are rare. Most samples fall in the recycled orogen field of QmFLt plots, indicating a relatively quartz and lithic rich composition consistent with derivation from Precambrian massifs such as the Jiangnan, and Yunkai. A few samples from the southwest part of the basin fall into the dissected arc field, indicating a somewhat more lithic and feldspar-rich composition consistent with derivation from a suture zone Analysis of detrial zircon populations from 17 samples collected across the basin indicate: (1) Several samples contain zircons with concordant ages greater than 3000 Ma, (2) there are widespread peaks across the basin at 1800 Ma and 2500, (3) a widespread 900 Ma population, (3) a widespread population of zircons at 440 Ma, and (5) a larger population of younger zircons about 250 Ma in the southwestern part which is replaced to the north and northwest by a somewhat older population around 260-290 Ma. The 900 Ma provenance fits derivation from the Jiangnan Massif, the 2500, 1800, and 440 Ma provenance fits the Yunkai massif, and the 250 Ma is consistent with convergence and arc development in suture zones bordering the basin on the south or southwest. Early siliciclastic turbidite flux, proximal to source areas impacted carbonate platform evolution by infilling the basin, reducing accommodation space, stabilizing carbonate platform margins and promoting margin progradation. Late arrival, in areas far from source areas caused margin aggradation over a starved basin, development of high relief aggradational escarpments and unstable scalloped margins.

... Jusqu'au Rhin; avec 32 cartes.

On cover:... Jusqu'qu Rhin; les terres meurtries et les terres promises.

Historical law-tracts.

"The discourses relate, each of them, to subjects common to the law of England and of Scotland."--Pref.