A political history of modern Europe : from the reformation to the present day

UANL

Principles of political economy

UANL

Lessons on political economy

UANL

The elements of political economy : with some applications to questions of the day

UANL

Breve reseña histórica de la reparación ritual del templo dedicado a la Santísima Virgen de Guadalupe en la ciudad de Querétaro...

UANL

Manual litúrgico ó sea breve exposición de las sagradas ceremonias que han de observarse en el santo sacrificio de la misa así privada como solemne en la exposición del ss. sacramento en las funciones más principales de entre año en la administración de los ss. sacramentos, bendicionesetc. del ritual romano y en la visita pastoral

UANL

Does IMF Induce Political Business Cycles? An Empirical Analysis on Latin America's Indebted Countries.

Rapport de recherche

On the Political Economy of Sequential Reforms

This paper proposes an explanation for why efficient reforms are not carried out when losers have the power to block their implementation, even though compensating them is feasible. We construct a signaling model with two-sided incomplete information in which a government faces the task of sequentially implementing two reforms by bargaining with interest groups. The organization of interest groups is endogenous. Compensations are distortionary and government types differ in the concern about distortions. We show that, when compensations are allowed to be informative about the government’s type, there is a bias against the payment of compensations and the implementation of reforms. This is because paying high compensations today provides incentives for some interest groups to organize and oppose subsequent reforms with the only purpose of receiving a transfer. By paying lower compensations, governments attempt to prevent such interest groups from organizing. However, this comes at the cost of reforms being blocked by interest groups with relatively high losses.

Political Influence, Economic Interests and Endogenous Tax Structure in a Computable Equilibrium Framework: with Applicatioon to the United States, 1973 and 1983

A full understanding of public affairs requires the ability to distinguish between the policies that voters would like the government to adopt, and the influence that different voters or group of voters actually exert in the democratic process. We consider the properties of a computable equilibrium model of a competitive political economy in which the economic interests of groups of voters and their effective influence on equilibrium policy outcomes can be explicitly distinguished and computed. The model incorporates an amended version of the GEMTAP tax model, and is calibrated to data for the United States for 1973 and 1983. Emphasis is placed on how the aggregation of GEMTAP households into groups within which economic and political behaviour is assumed homogeneous affects the numerical representation of interests and influence for representative members of each group. Experiments with the model suggest that the changes in both interests and influence are important parts of the story behind the evolution of U.S. tax policy in the decade after 1973.

ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL INIFICATION OF GERMANY: 1815-1871. PART 1: THE ZOLLVEREIN AND RAILWAYS..

Rapport de recherche

ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL UNIFICATION OF GERMANY: 1815-1871. PART 2: THE SHARE OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR IN THE ECONOMY..

Rapport de recherche

Toward a Political Theory of Environmental Policy.

This paper makes some steps toward a formal political economy of environmental policy. Economists' quasi-unanimous preferences for sophisticated incentive regulation is reconsidered. First, we recast the question of instrument choice in the general mechanism literature and provide an incomplete contract approach to political economy. Then, in various settings, we show why constitutional constraints on the instruments of environmental policy may be desirable, even though they appear inefficient from a purely standard economic viewpoint.

Évolution de la pratique et de la perception de l’excision au Burkina Faso entre 1998 et 2003

Entre 100 et 140 millions de femmes, de petites filles et d’adolescentes sont excisées (Andro et Lesclingrand, 2007). Les risques sanitaires de l’excision sont élevés et concernent la santé reproductive, physique et psychologique des femmes. Les nouvelles migrations et l’augmentation des pays qui légifèrent l’excision ont contribué à l’internationalisation de l’excision et à la modification de son processus. On constate actuellement une tendance de l’excision à devenir une pratique clandestine et une perte de sa signification rituelle. En même temps, les mouvements de lutte internationaux, régionaux autant que nationaux prennent de l’ampleur et connaissent une période de mutation afin de contrer la nouvelle figure de l’excision. Le Burkina Faso ne fait pas exception. Le gouvernement burkinabé s’est clairement positionné en faveur du mouvement de lutte contre l’excision et met en place de nombreux dispositifs juridiques, politiques et économiques afin d’en soutenir les initiatives. En 2003, 77 % des femmes burkinabè âgées de 15 à 49 ans se déclaraient excisées. Parallèlement, on assiste à une diminution de la pratique chez leurs filles entre 1998 et 2003 et à une augmentation du nombre de Burkinabè se déclarant contre la pratique. Pourtant en 2003, environ 40 % des femmes ont excisé ou souhaitent exciser leurs filles et environ 24 % des hommes et 26 % des femmes sont encore favorables à la perpétuation de l’excision. Ce mémoire s’intéresse d’abord aux changements de pratique, de connaissance et d’attitudes par rapport à l’excision entre 1998 et 2003. Il s’intéresse ensuite aux déterminants socioculturels, démographiques et économiques favorisant la persistance de cette pratique au sein de la société burkinabé et aux obstacles rencontrés par les intervenants pour combattre l’excision sur le terrain. Pour ce faire la recherche associe méthodes quantitatives et qualitatives. Elle combine analyses statistiques des données des enquêtes démographiques de santé de 2003 et de 1998 et analyse des données d’entretiens collectées auprès d’acteurs sur le terrain entre le premier et le 10 octobre 2005.

Perfectionism, Economic (dis)Incentives, and Political Coercion

May a government attempt to improve the lives of its citizens by promoting the activities it deems valuable and discouraging those it disvalues? May it engage in such a practice even when doing so is not a requirement of justice in some strict sense, and even when the judgments of value and disvalue in question are likely to be subject to controversy among its citizens? These questions have long stood at the center of debates between political perfectionists and political neutralists. In what follows I address a prominent cluster of arguments against political perfectionism—namely, arguments that focus on the coercive dimensions of state action. My main claim is simple: whatever concerns we might have about coercion, arguments from coercion fall short of supporting a thoroughgoing rejection of perfectionism, for the reason that perfectionist policies need not be coercive. Thlist challenges to this last claim.