Carta pastoral colectiva de los Ilmos. y Rmos. Sres. Doctores D. Próspero M. Alarcón, Arzobispo de México, D. Perfecto Amézquita, Obispo de Puebla, D. Ramón Ybarra, Obispo de Chilapa... ...sobre los ayunos y abstinencia

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Primera carta pastoral que el Obispo de Tabasco José Perfecto Amezquita y Gutiérrez, dirige el venerable clero y fieles de su diócesis en el día de su consagración episcopal

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Segunda carta pastoral que el Obispo de Tabasco José Perfecto Amezquita y Gutierrez dirige al venerable clero y fieles de su diócesis sobre la fundación del seminario

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Primera carta pastoral que el Ilmo. Sr. Obispo de Puebla Dr. D. José Perfecto Amézquita y Gutierrez dirige al Ilmo. y V. Sr. Dean y Cabildo de la Sta. I. Catedral al V. Clero Secular y Regular y a los fieles de la diocesis al tomar y regular y a los fieles de la diocesis al tomar posesión de la sede episcopal

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Guanajuato y sus hijos : recuerdo dedicado al ilustrisimo Sr. Obispo de Tabasco D. José Perfecto Amezquita y Gutierrez

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El director perfecto y el dirigido santo, correspondencia epistolar del B. Diego José de Cadiz con el V. P. maestro Francisco Javier González y viceverza

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Asymptotic Distribution of a Simple Linear Estimator for VARMA Models in Echelon Form

In this paper, we study the asymptotic distribution of a simple two-stage (Hannan-Rissanen-type) linear estimator for stationary invertible vector autoregressive moving average (VARMA) models in the echelon form representation. General conditions for consistency and asymptotic normality are given. A consistent estimator of the asymptotic covariance matrix of the estimator is also provided, so that tests and confidence intervals can easily be constructed.

Arte explicativo y grámatico perfecto dividido en tres partes...

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The Basle Accord: A Review and a Simple Model.

Rapport de recherche

Gnomonique graphique ou : methode simple et facile pour tracer lescadrans solaires sur toute sorte de plans en ne faisant usage que de laregle et du compas; suivie de la fnomonique analytique...

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Flippable Pairs and Subset Comparisons in Comparative Probability Orderings and Related Simple Games

We show that every additively representable comparative probability order on n atoms is determined by at least n - 1 binary subset comparisons. We show that there are many orders of this kind, not just the lexicographic order. These results provide answers to two questions of Fishburn et al (2002). We also study the flip relation on the class of all comparative probability orders introduced by Maclagan. We generalise an important theorem of Fishburn, Peke?c and Reeds, by showing that in any minimal set of comparisons that determine a comparative probability order, all comparisons are flippable. By calculating the characteristics of the flip relation for n = 6 we discover that the regions in the corresponding hyperplane arrangement can have no more than 13 faces and that there are 20 regions with 13 faces. All the neighbours of the 20 comparative probability orders which correspond to those regions are representable. Finally we define a class of simple games with complete desirability relation for which its strong desirability relation is acyclic, and show that the flip relation carries all the information about these games. We show that for n = 6 these games are weighted majority games.

Monetary Policy by Committee:Consensus, Chairman Dominance or Simple Majority?

This paper studies the theoretical and empirical implications of monetary policy making by committee under three different voting protocols. The protocols are a consensus model, where super-majority is required for a policy change; an agenda-setting model, where the chairman controls the agenda; and a simple majority model, where policy is determined by the median member. These protocols give preeminence to different aspects of the actual decision making process and capture the observed heterogeneity in formal procedures across central banks. The models are estimated by Maximum Likehood using interest rate decisions by the committees of five central banks, namely the Bank of Canada, the Bank of England, the European Central Bank, the Swedish Riksbank, and the U.S. Federal Reserve. For all central banks, results indicate that the consensus model is statically superior to the alternative models. This suggests that despite institutionnal differences, committees share unwritten rules and informal procedures that deliver observationally equivalent policy decisions.

Eclesiástico perfecto

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