Short-time behaviour of demand and price viewed through an exactly solvable model for heterogeneous interacting market agents

We introduce a stochastic heterogeneous interacting-agent model for the short-time non-equilibrium evolution of excess demand and price in a stylized asset market. We consider a combination of social interaction within peer groups and individually heterogeneous fundamentalist trading decisions which take into account the market price and the perceived fundamental value of the asset. The resulting excess demand is coupled to the market price. Rigorous analysis reveals that this feedback may lead to price oscillations, a single bounce, or monotonic price behaviour. The model is a rare example of an analytically tractable interacting-agent model which allows LIS to deduce in detail the origin of these different collective patterns. For a natural choice of initial distribution, the results are independent of the graph structure that models the peer network of agents whose decisions influence each other. (C) 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Compositional Model Repositories via Dynamic Constraint Satisfaction with Order-of-Magnitude Preferences

The predominant knowledge-based approach to automated model construction, compositional modelling, employs a set of models of particular functional components. Its inference mechanism takes a scenario describing the constituent interacting components of a system and translates it into a useful mathematical model. This paper presents a novel compositional modelling approach aimed at building model repositories. It furthers the field in two respects. Firstly, it expands the application domain of compositional modelling to systems that can not be easily described in terms of interacting functional components, such as ecological systems. Secondly, it enables the incorporation of user preferences into the model selection process. These features are achieved by casting the compositional modelling problem as an activity-based dynamic preference constraint satisfaction problem, where the dynamic constraints describe the restrictions imposed over the composition of partial models and the preferences correspond to those of the user of the automated modeller. In addition, the preference levels are represented through the use of symbolic values that differ in orders of magnitude.

Characterization of the Wheat Grain PKABA1-Interacting Protein TaWD40

Abscisic acid (ABA)-mediated gene expression is a critical component of plant responses to this important hormone, which affects plant growth, development, and responses to environmental stresses. Plant responses to ABA are mediated by a number of factors including PKABA1, an ABA induced protein kinase involved in ABA-suppressed gene expression in cereal grains, and TaWD40, which has previously been shown to physically interact with PKABA1. A full-length 1.9 kb TaWD40 cDNA, CK210682, was sequenced as part of this project. Based on the deduced protein sequence, it is thought that TaWD40 may belong to the family of E3 ubiquitin ligases, possibly targeting PKABA1 for destruction. Construction of expression plasmids for overproduction of the TaWD40 polypeptide in E. coli is currently underway. The TaWD40 cDNA has been successfully amplified from the source plasmid and inserted into an intermediate plasmid, pCR2.1. The TaWD40 cDNA is currently being cloned from the pCR2.1 intermediate plasmid into two different expression vectors, pRSET-A and pMAL-c2x, for future protein production and purification.

The inequality curse: constraints and political discretion

We live in an unjust world characterized by economic inequality. No liberal theory of justice is able to justify it. Inequality is not “solved” with equality of opportunity or meritocracy. Nor by the socialist and republican critique. The poor will have to count with them and with democracy to make social progress reality. In their political struggle, they will face one economic constraint: the expected profit rate must remain attractive to business investors. Yet, giving that technological progress in increasingly capital-saving, this economic constraint does not obstruct that wages grow above the productivity rate and inequality is reduced. What really is an obstacle to social justice in the rich countries is, on one hand, the power that capitalist rentiers retain and financists acquired, and, on the other, the competition originated in low wage countries.

Endogenous debt constraints in collateralized economies with default penalties

In infinite horizon financial markets economies, competitive equilibria fail to exist if one does not impose restrictions on agents' trades that rule out Ponzi schemes. When there is limited commitment and collateral repossession is the unique default punishment, Araujo, Páscoa and Torres-Martínez (2002) proved that Ponzi schemes are ruled out without imposing any exogenous/endogenous debt constraints on agents' trades. Recently Páscoa and Seghir (2009) have shown that this positive result is not robust to the presence of additional default punishments. They provide several examples showing that, in the absence of debt constraints, harsh default penalties may induce agents to run Ponzi schemes that jeopardize equilibrium existence. The objective of this paper is to close a theoretical gap in the literature by identifying endogenous borrowing constraints that rule out Ponzi schemes and ensure existence of equilibria in a model with limited commitment and (possible) default. We appropriately modify the definition of finitely effective debt constraints, introduced by Levine and Zame (1996) (see also Levine and Zame (2002)), to encompass models with limited commitment, default penalties and collateral. Along this line, we introduce in the setting of Araujo, Páscoa and Torres-Martínez (2002), Kubler and Schmedders (2003) and Páscoa and Seghir (2009) the concept of actions with finite equivalent payoffs. We show that, independently of the level of default penalties, restricting plans to have finite equivalent payoffs rules out Ponzi schemes and guarantees the existence of an equilibrium that is compatible with the minimal ability to borrow and lend that we expect in our model. An interesting feature of our debt constraints is that they give rise to budget sets that coincide with the standard budget sets of economies having a collateral structure but no penalties (as defined in Araujo, Páscoa and Torres-Martínez (2002)). This illustrates the hidden relation between finitely effective debt constraints and collateral requirements.

Credit borrowing constraints in a DSGE framework: income vs. housing

Credit market in Brazil distinguishes from advanced economies in many aspects. One of them is related to collaterals for households borrowing. This work proposes a DSGE framework, based on Gerali et al.(2010), to analyse one pecularity of Brazillian credit market: payroll-deducted personal loans. To original model, we added the possibility to households contract long term debt and compare to differents types of credit constrains: one based on housing and other based on future income. We callibrate and estimate the model to Brazil, using Bayesian technique. Results show that, in a economy where credit constraints are based on income, responses to shocks appear to be stronger, at first, but dissipate faster. This occurs because income responds quickly to shock than housing prices, so does amount available to loans. In order to smooth consumption, agents compensate lower income and borrowing by increasing working hours, restoring loans and debt in a shorter time.