The market manipulation regime in the European Union

Market manipulation is an illegal practice that enables a person can profit from practices that artificially raise or lower the prices of an instrument in the financial markets. Its prohibition is based on the 2003 Market Abuse Directive in the EU. The current market manipulation regime was broadly considered as a big success except for enforcement and supervisory inconsistencies in the Member States at the initial. A review of the market manipulation regime began at the end of 2007, which became quickly incorporated into the wider EU crisis-era reform program. A number of weaknesses of current regime have been identified, which include regulatory gaps caused by the development of trading venues and financial products, regulatory gaps concerning cross-border and cross-markets manipulation (particular commodity markets), legal uncertainty as a result of various implementation, and inefficient supervision and enforcement. On 12 June 2014, a new regulatory package of market abuse, Market Abuse Regulation and Directive on criminal sanctions for market abuse, has been adopted. And several changes will be made concerning the EU market manipulation regime. A wider scope of the regime and a new prohibition of attempted market manipulation will ensure the prevention of market manipulation at large. The AMPs will be subject to strict scrutiny of ESMA to reduce divergences in implementation. In order to enhance efficiency of supervision and enforcement, powers of national competent authorities will be strengthened, ESMA is imposed more power to settle disagreement between national regulators, and the administrative and criminal sanctioning regimes are both further harmonized. In addition, the protection of fundamental rights is stressed by the new market manipulation regime, and some measures are provided to guarantee its realization. Further, the success EU market manipulation regime could be of significant reference to China, helping China to refine its immature regime.

European Union Trade Policy after Enlargement: Larger Crowds, Shifting Priorities and Informal Decision-Making

The article focuses on the effects of Eastern enlargement on EU trade policy-making. On interest constellation, the article makes a case that protectionist forces have been strengthened relative to liberal forces. This slight protectionist turn is mostly witnessed in the area of anti-dumping and with respect to the Doha trade round. On preference aggregation, guided by a principal–agent framework, it is argued that the growth in the number of actors (principals and interest groups) has not constrained the role of the European Commission (agent). However, it has led to an increase in informal processes and has empowered large trading nations vis-a`-vis smaller and less ‘comitology-experienced’ member states.

Harmonised monitoring of antimicrobial resistance in Salmonella and Campylobacter isolates from food animals in the European Union

Many Member States of the European Union (EU) currently monitor antimicrobial resistance in zoonotic agents, including Salmonella and Campylobacter. According to Directive 2003/99/EC, Member States shall ensure that the monitoring provides comparable data on the occurrence of antimicrobial resistance. The European Commission asked the European Food Safety Authority to prepare detailed specifications for harmonised schemes for monitoring antimicrobial resistance. The objective of these specifications is to lay down provisions for a monitoring and reporting scheme for Salmonella in fowl (Gallus gallus), turkeys and pigs, and for Campylobacter jejuni and Campylobacter coli in broiler chickens. The current specifications are considered to be a first step towards a gradual implementation of comprehensive antimicrobial resistance monitoring at the EU level. These specifications propose to test a common set of antimicrobial agents against available cut-off values and a specified concentration range to determine the susceptibility of Salmonella and Campylobacter. Using isolates collected through programmes in which the sampling frame covers all epidemiological units of the national production, the target number of Salmonella isolates to be included in the antimicrobial resistance monitoring per Member State per year is 170 for each study population (i.e., laying hens, broilers, turkeys and slaughter pigs). The target number of Campylobacter isolates to be included in the antimicrobial resistance monitoring per Member State per year is 170 for each study population (i.e., broilers). The results of the antimicrobial resistance monitoring are assessed and reported in the yearly national report on trends and sources of zoonoses, zoonotic agents and antimicrobial resistance.

European Union Meets South Korea: Bureaucratic Interests, Exporter Discrimination and the Negotiations of Trade Agreements

Who in the European Union drives the process of pursuing bilateral trade negotiations? In contrast to societal explanations, this article develops a novel argument as to how the European Commission manages the process and uses its position in strategic ways to pursue its interests. Rooted in principal–agent theory, the article discusses agent preferences and theorizes the conditions under which the agent sets specific focal points and interacts strategically with principals and third parties. The argument is discussed with case study evidence drawn from the first trade agreement concluded and ratified since the EU Commission announced its new strategy in 2006: the EU–South Korea trade agreement