Vaccine strategies against schistosomiasis

Schistosomiasis, the second major parasitic disease in the world after malaria affects at least 200 million people, 500 million being exposed to the risk of infection. It is widely agreed that a vaccine strategy wich could lead to the induction of effector mechanisms reducing the level of reinfection and ideally parasite fecundity would deeply affect the incidence of pathological manifestations as well as the parasite transmission potentialities. Extensive studies performed in the rat model have allowed the identification of novel effector mechanisms involving IgE antibodies and various inflammatory cell populations (eosinophils, macrophages and platelets) whereas regulation of immune response by blocking antibodies has been evidencial. Recent epidemiological studies have now entirely confirmed in human populations the the role of IgE antibodies in the acquisition of resistance and the association of IgG4 blocking antibodies with increased susceptibility. On the basis of these concepts, several schistosome glutathion S-transferase (Sm 28 GST) appears as a pronising vaccine candidate. Immunization experiments have shown that two complementary goals can be achieved: (a) a partial but significant reduction of the worm population (up to 60//in rats); (b) a significant reduction of parasite fecundity (up in the mice and 85//in cattle) and egg viability (up to 80//). At least two distinct immunological mechanisms account for these two effects. IgE antibodies appear as a major humoral component of acquired resistance whereas IgA antibodies appear as a major humoral factor affecting parasite fecundity. These studies seem to represent a parasite diseases through the identification of potentially protective antigens and of the components of the immune response which vaccination should aim at inducing.

Interactive Epistemology and Reasoning: On the Foundations of Game Theory

Game theory describes and analyzes strategic interaction. It is usually distinguished between static games, which are strategic situations in which the players choose only once as well as simultaneously, and dynamic games, which are strategic situations involving sequential choices. In addition, dynamic games can be further classified according to perfect and imperfect information. Indeed, a dynamic game is said to exhibit perfect information, whenever at any point of the game every player has full informational access to all choices that have been conducted so far. However, in the case of imperfect information some players are not fully informed about some choices. Game-theoretic analysis proceeds in two steps. Firstly, games are modelled by so-called form structures which extract and formalize the significant parts of the underlying strategic interaction. The basic and most commonly used models of games are the normal form, which rather sparsely describes a game merely in terms of the players' strategy sets and utilities, and the extensive form, which models a game in a more detailed way as a tree. In fact, it is standard to formalize static games with the normal form and dynamic games with the extensive form. Secondly, solution concepts are developed to solve models of games in the sense of identifying the choices that should be taken by rational players. Indeed, the ultimate objective of the classical approach to game theory, which is of normative character, is the development of a solution concept that is capable of identifying a unique choice for every player in an arbitrary game. However, given the large variety of games, it is not at all certain whether it is possible to device a solution concept with such universal capability. Alternatively, interactive epistemology provides an epistemic approach to game theory of descriptive character. This rather recent discipline analyzes the relation between knowledge, belief and choice of game-playing agents in an epistemic framework. The description of the players' choices in a given game relative to various epistemic assumptions constitutes the fundamental problem addressed by an epistemic approach to game theory. In a general sense, the objective of interactive epistemology consists in characterizing existing game-theoretic solution concepts in terms of epistemic assumptions as well as in proposing novel solution concepts by studying the game-theoretic implications of refined or new epistemic hypotheses. Intuitively, an epistemic model of a game can be interpreted as representing the reasoning of the players. Indeed, before making a decision in a game, the players reason about the game and their respective opponents, given their knowledge and beliefs. Precisely these epistemic mental states on which players base their decisions are explicitly expressible in an epistemic framework. In this PhD thesis, we consider an epistemic approach to game theory from a foundational point of view. In Chapter 1, basic game-theoretic notions as well as Aumann's epistemic framework for games are expounded and illustrated. Also, Aumann's sufficient conditions for backward induction are presented and his conceptual views discussed. In Chapter 2, Aumann's interactive epistemology is conceptually analyzed. In Chapter 3, which is based on joint work with Conrad Heilmann, a three-stage account for dynamic games is introduced and a type-based epistemic model is extended with a notion of agent connectedness. Then, sufficient conditions for backward induction are derived. In Chapter 4, which is based on joint work with Jérémie Cabessa, a topological approach to interactive epistemology is initiated. In particular, the epistemic-topological operator limit knowledge is defined and some implications for games considered. In Chapter 5, which is based on joint work with Jérémie Cabessa and Andrés Perea, Aumann's impossibility theorem on agreeing to disagree is revisited and weakened in the sense that possible contexts are provided in which agents can indeed agree to disagree.

Dynamic stackelberg game with risk-averse players: optimal risk-sharing under asymmetric information

The objective of this paper is to clarify the interactive nature of the leader-follower relationship when both players are endogenously risk-averse. The analysis is placed in the context of a dynamic closed-loop Stackelberg game with private information. The case of a risk-neutral leader, very often discussed in the literature, is only a borderline possibility in the present study. Each player in the game is characterized by a risk-averse type which is unknown to his opponent. The goal of the leader is to implement an optimal incentive compatible risk-sharing contract. The proposed approach provides a qualitative analysis of adaptive risk behavior profiles for asymmetrically informed players in the context of dynamic strategic interactions modelled as incentive Stackelberg games.

The Multiple-partners assignment game with heterogeneous sales and multi-unit demands: competitive equilibria

A multiple-partners assignment game with heterogeneous sales and multiunit demands consists of a set of sellers that own a given number of indivisible units of (potentially many different) goods and a set of buyers who value those units and want to buy at most an exogenously fixed number of units. We define a competitive equilibrium for this generalized assignment game and prove its existence by using only linear programming. In particular, we show how to compute equilibrium price vectors from the solutions of the dual linear program associated to the primal linear program defined to find optimal assignments. Using only linear programming tools, we also show (i) that the set of competitive equilibria (pairs of price vectors and assignments) has a Cartesian product structure: each equilibrium price vector is part of a competitive equilibrium with all optimal assignments, and vice versa; (ii) that the set of (restricted) equilibrium price vectors has a natural lattice structure; and (iii) how this structure is translated into the set of agents' utilities that are attainable at equilibrium.

On Cooperative solutions of a generalized assignment game: limit theorems to the set of competitive equilibria

We study two cooperative solutions of a market with indivisible goods modeled as a generalized assignment game: Set-wise stability and Core. We first establish that the Set-wise stable set is contained in the Core and it contains the non-empty set of competitive equilibrium payoffs. We then state and prove three limit results for replicated markets. First, the sequence of Cores of replicated markets converges to the set of competitive equilibrium payoffs when the number of replicas tends to infinity. Second, the Set-wise stable set of a two-fold replicated market already coincides with the set of competitive equilibrium payoffs. Third, for any number of replicas there is a market with a Core payoff that is not a competitive equilibrium payoff.

Motion compensation strategies in magnetic resonance imaging.

Image quality in magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) is considerably affected by motion. Therefore, motion is one of the most common sources of artifacts in contemporary cardiovascular MRI. Such artifacts in turn may easily lead to misinterpretations in the images and a subsequent loss in diagnostic quality. Hence, there is considerable research interest in strategies that help to overcome these limitations at minimal cost in time, spatial resolution, temporal resolution, and signal-to-noise ratio. This review summarizes and discusses the three principal sources of motion: the beating heart, the breathing lungs, and bulk patient movement. This is followed by a comprehensive overview of commonly used compensation strategies for these different types of motion. Finally, a summary and an outlook are provided.

Withdrawal, "serosorting" and "strategic positioning": use of risk reduction strategies with casual sex partners in men who have sex with men (MSM) in Switzerland, 2007

Introduction: 1) Withdrawal before ejaculation, "serosorting" (to choose a partner of same serostatus) and "strategic positioning" (only insertive vs. only receptive role in anal sex according to serostatus) are known to be used by MSM as alternatives to condom use. 2) Despite their questionable levels of effectiveness they are collectively labelled as "risk reduction strategies" (RRS). Objectives: The aim of this study is to estimate the prevalence and factors related to RRS in men who report unprotected anal intercourse (UAI) with occasional partners in the last 12 months. Methods: 1) In 2007, a module on RRS was included in a repeated national survey conducted among readers of gay newspapers, members of gay organizations and visitors of gay websites (N=2953). 2) Using an anonymous self-completed questionnaire, participants were asked whether, with the aim of avoiding HIV infection, RRS were used with occasional partners. Analysis: 1) Prevalences were calculated in participants who reported UAI with occasional partners in the last 12 months (n=416). 2) A logistic regression was performed, using "at least one RRS" as dependent variable. Number of partners in the last 12 months, HIV-status and usual socio-demographic characteristics were used as independent factors. Result : 1) 70% (292/416) of the participants reporting UAI used at least one RRS when they had unprotected sex with casual partners in the last 12 months (Table 1). 2) Withrawal before ejaculation was the most frequently reported strategy, followed by serosorting and strategic positioning (Table 1). 3) Participants who reported at least one RRS were more likely to be over 30 years and to belong to a gay organisation. HIV-positive and non-tested participants were less likely to report RRS than HIV-negative participants (Table 2). Conclusions: 1) The majority of MSM who reported UAI in the last 12 months tried to reduce risk of HIV transmission by using specific strategies (withdrawal, serosorting, strategic positioning). It is not known, however, to what extent the use of these strategies was systematic. 2) It is necessary to provide MSM with balanced information on these strategies and their respective level of effectiveness. 3) It is important to monitor the use of RRS in HIV behavioural surveillance surveys in MSM.

Detection of nandrolone metabolites in urine after a football game in professional and amateur players: a Bayesian comparison.

Nandrolone (19-nortestosterone) is a widely used anabolic steroid in sports where strength plays an essential role. Once nandrolone has been metabolised, two major metabolites are excreted in urine, 19-norandrosterone (NA) and 19-noretiocholanolone (NE). In 1997, in France, quite a few sportsmen had concentrations of 19-norandrosterone very close to the IOC cut off limit (2ng/ml). At that time, a debate took place about the capability of the human male body to produce by itself these metabolites without any intake of nandrolone or related compounds. The International Football Federation (FIFA) was very concerned with this problematic, especially because the World Cup was about to start in France. In this respect, a statistical study was held with all football players from the first and second divisions of the Swiss Football National League. All players gave a urine sample after effort and around 6% of them showed traces of 19-norandrosterone. These results were compared with amateur football players (control group) and around 6% of them had very small amounts of 19-norandrosterone and/or 19-noretiocholanolone in urine after effort, whereas none of them had detectable traces of one or the other metabolite before effort. The origin of these compounds in urine after a strenuous physical activity is still unknown, but three hypotheses can be put forward. First, an endogenous production of nandrolone metabolites takes place. Second, nandrolone metabolites are released from the fatty tissues after an intake of nandrolone, some related compounds or some contaminated nutritive supplements. Finally, the sportsmen may have taken something during or just before the football game.

Teacher strategies to elicit knowledge from students in the CLIL classroom: the purpose of questions in controlled patterns of teacher-student interaction

This Master Dissertation comprises two parts: a personal reflection and an empirical study. The personal reflection reviews the process of professionalization undergone by its author throughout the Master. The empirical study tackles teacher strategies to elicit knowledge from students in the CLIL classroom and more specifically the purpose of questions in controlled patterns of teacher-student interaction. The theories of relevant authors such as Vigotsky, Mercer and Tsui are used as a framework to analyze the data presented. The analysis shows the different strategies to elicit knowledge used by the teacher and the appropriateness of her questions in the analyzed interaction

The Rio de Janeiro HIV Vaccine Site: I. Recruitment Strategies and Socio-demographic Data of a HIV Negative Homosexual and Bisexual Male Cohort in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil

The initial effort of the Brazilian Ministry of Health to be an active partner in the world effort in the preparation of future accurate human immune deficiency virus (HIV) efficacy trials was the establishment of a multi-centered cohort of homosexual and bisexual men. An open cohort was established to determine the HIV incidence and the socio-behavioral aspects involved in Rio de Janeiro. A total of 318 potential participants, originated from multiple sources (health units, public information, snowball recruitment), were screened and recruitment became effective through the direct involvement of target communities (with the support of Non Governmental Organizations) and the population. Among this group, seropositivity for sexually transmitted diseases was high with 23, 32 and 46% for HIV, syphilis and hepatitis B, respectively. The socio-demographic data from the first 200 participants of this HIV negative cohort suggests that the cohort volunteers are an appropriate sample of the general male population of the State of Rio de Janeiro

Complementarities between mathematical and computational modeling: the case of the repeated Prisoners' Dilemma

We study the properties of the well known Replicator Dynamics when applied to a finitely repeated version of the Prisoners' Dilemma game. We characterize the behavior of such dynamics under strongly simplifying assumptions (i.e. only 3 strategies are available) and show that the basin of attraction of defection shrinks as the number of repetitions increases. After discussing the difficulties involved in trying to relax the 'strongly simplifying assumptions' above, we approach the same model by means of simulations based on genetic algorithms. The resulting simulations describe a behavior of the system very close to the one predicted by the replicator dynamics without imposing any of the assumptions of the mathematical model. Our main conclusion is that mathematical and computational models are good complements for research in social sciences. Indeed, while computational models are extremely useful to extend the scope of the analysis to complex scenarios hard to analyze mathematically, formal models can be useful to verify and to explain the outcomes of computational models.