Incentive structures in economic experiments : a neuroeconomic analysis of decision making under risk

Magdeburg, Univ., Fak. für Wirtschaftswiss., Diss., 2013

Sugar and sugar making / by James B. McNair, Asst. Curator of Economic Botany.

no.13(1927)

The Tinguian; social, religious, and economic life of a Philippine tribe / by Fay-Cooper Cole -- with a chapter on music by Albert Gale, 83 plates and 26 text-figures -- Berthold Laufer --

v.14:no.2(1922)

Ecological and Economic Impacts within the Environmental Input-Output Framework

The environmental input-output approach reveals the channels through which the environmental burdens of production activities are transmitted throughout the economy. This paper uses the input-output framework and analyses the changes in Spanish emission multipliers during the period 1995-2000. By decomposing the global changes in multipliers into different components, it is possible to evaluate separately the economic and ecological impacts captured by the environmental input-output model. Specifically, in this study we distinguish between the effects on multipliers caused by changes in emission coefficients (the ecological impacts) and the effects on multipliers caused by changes in technical coefficients (the economic impacts). Our results show a significant improvement in the ecological impacts of production activities, which contributed negatively to changes in emission multipliers. They also show a deterioration in the economic impacts, which contributed positively to changes in emission multipliers. Together, these two effects lead to a small reduction in global multipliers during the period of analysis. Our results also show significant differences in the individual behaviour of different sectors in terms of their contribution to multiplier changes. Since there are considerable differences in the way individual sectors affect the changes in emission levels, and in the intensity of these effects, this means that the final effects will basically depend on the activity considered. Keywords: emission multipliers, multipliers' changes, ecological impacts, economic impacts.

The making of international environmental agreements

We examine in this paper the formation and the stability of international environmental agreements when cooperation means to commit to a minimum abatement level. Each country decides whether to ratify the agreement and this latter enters into force only if it is ratified by a number of countries at least equal to some ratification threshold. We analyze the role played by ratification threshold rules and provide conditions for international environmental agreements to enter into force. We show that a large typology of agreements can enter into force among the one constituted by the grand coalition.

An ordinal shapley value for economic environments (Revised version)

We propose a new solution concept to address the problem of sharing a surplus among the agents generating it. The problem is formulated in the preferences-endowments space. The solution is defined recursively, incorporating notions of consistency and fairness and relying on properties satisfied by the Shapley value for Transferable Utility (TU) games. We show a solution exists, and call it the Ordinal Shapley value (OSV). We characterize the OSV using the notion of coalitional dividends, and furthermore show it is monotone and anonymous. Finally, similarly to the weighted Shapely value for TU games, we construct a weighted OSV as well.

Corrigendum to "On randomized matching mechanisms" [Economic Theory 8(1996)377-381]

Ma (1996) studied the random order mechanism, a matching mechanism suggested by Roth and Vande Vate (1990) for marriage markets. By means of an example he showed that the random order mechanism does not always reach all stable matchings. Although Ma's (1996) result is true, we show that the probability distribution he presented - and therefore the proof of his Claim 2 - is not correct. The mistake in the calculations by Ma (1996) is due to the fact that even though the example looks very symmetric, some of the calculations are not as ''symmetric.''

On dictatorship, economic development and stability

This paper aims to account for varying economic performances and political stability under dictatorship. We argue that economic welfare and social order are the contemporary relevant factors of political regimes' stability. Societies with low natural level of social order tend to tolerate predatory behavior from dictators in exchange of a provision of civil peace. The fear of anarchy may explain why populations are locked in the worst dictatorships. In contrast, in societies enjoying a relative natural civil peace, dictatorship is less likely to be predatory because low economic welfare may destabilize it.

Sharing the surplus: a just and efficient proposal for environments with externalities

Economic activities, both on the macro and micro level, often entail wide-spread externalities. This in turn leads to disputes regarding the compensation levels to the various parties affected. We propose a general, yet simple, method of deciding upon the distribution of the gains (costs) of cooperation in the presence of externalities. This method is shown to be the unique one satisfying several desirable properties. Furthermore, we illustrate the use of this method to resolve the sharing of benefits generated by international climate control agreements.