Predictors of knowledge creation performance. A quantitative qualitative comparative study of European doctorandi

Aquesta tesi forma part d'un projecte destinat a predir el rendiment acadèmic dels estudiants de doctorat portat a terme per l'INSOC (International Network on Social Capital and Performance). El grup de recerca INSOC està format per les universitats de Girona (Espanya), Ljubljana (Eslovènia), Giessen (Alemanya) i Ghent (Bèlgica). El primer objectiu d'aquesta tesi és desenvolupar anàlisis quantitatius comparatius sobre el rendiment acadèmic dels estudiants de doctorat entre Espanya, Eslovènia i Alemanya a partir dels resultats individuals del rendiment acadèmic obtinguts de cada una de les universitats. La naturalesa internacional del grup de recerca implica la recerca comparativa. Vam utilitzar variables personal, actitudinals i de xarxa per predir el rendiment. El segon objectiu d'aquesta tesi és entendre de manera qualitativa perquè les variables de xarxa no ajuden quantitativament a predir el rendiment a la universitat de Girona (Espanya). En el capítol 1, definim conceptes relacionats amb el rendiment i donam un llistat de cada una de les variables independents (variables de xarxa, personals i actitudinals), resumint la lliteratura. Finalment, explicam com s'organitzen els estudis de doctorat a cada un dels diferents països. A partir d'aquestes definicions teòriques, en els pròxims capítols, primer presentarem els qüestionaris utilitzats a Espanya, Eslovènia i Alemanya per mesurar aquests diferents tipus de variables. Després, compararem les variables que són relevants per predir el rendiment dels estudiants de doctorat a cada país. Després d'això, fixarem diferents models de regressió per predir el rendiment entre països. En tots aquests models les variables de xarxa fallen a predir el rendiment a la Universitat de Girona. Finalment, utilitzem estudis qualitatius per entendre aquests resultats inesperats. En el capítol 2, expliquem com hem dissenyat i conduït els qüestionaris en els diferents països amb l'objectiu d'explicar el rendiment dels estudiants de doctorat obtinguts a Espanya, Eslovènia i Alemanya. En el capítol 3, cream indicadors comparables però apareixen problemes de comparabilitat en preguntes particulars a Espanya, Eslovènia i Alemanya. En aquest capítol expliquem com utilitzem les variables dels tres països per crear indicadors comparables. Aquest pas és molt important perquè el principal objectiu del grup de recerca INSOC és comparar el rendiment dels estudiants de doctorat entre els diferents països. En el capítol 4 comparem models de regressió obtinguts de predir el rendiment dels estudiants de doctorat a les universitats de Girona (Espanya) i Eslovènia. Les variables són característiques dels grups de recerca dels estudiants de doctorat enteses com una xarxa social egocèntrica, característiques personals i actitudinals dels estudiants de doctorat i algunes carecterístiques dels directors. Vam trobar que les variables de xarxa egocèntriques no predien el rendiment a la Universitat de Girona. En el capítol 5, comparem dades eslovenes, espanyoles i alemnayes, seguint la metodologia del capítol 4. Concluïm que el cas alemany és molt diferent. El poder predictiu de les variables de xarxa no millora. En el capítol 6 el grup de recerca dels estudiants de doctorat és entès com una xarxa duocèntrica (Coromina et al., 2008), amb l'objectiu d'obtendre informació de la relació mútua entre els estudiants i els seus directors i els contactes d'ambdós amb els altres de la xarxa. La inclusió de la xarxa duocèntrica no millora el poder predictiu del model de regressió utilitzant les variales egocèntriques de xarxa. El capítol 7 pretèn entendre perquè les variables de xarxa no predeixen el rendiment a la Universitat de Girona. Utilitzem el mètode mixte, esperant que l'estudi qualitatiu pugui cobrir les raons de perquè la qualitat de la xarxa falla en la qualitat del treball dels estudiants. Per recollir dades per l'estudi qualitatiu utilitzem entrevistes en profunditat.

Following the creation of active gold nanocatalysts from phosphine-stabilized molecular clusters

The phosphine-stabilised gold cluster [Au6(Ph2P-o-tolyl)6](NO3)2 is converted into an active nanocatalyst for the oxidation of benzyl alcohol through low-temperature peroxide-assisted removal of the phosphines, avoiding the high-temperature calcination process. The process was monitored using in-situ X-ray absorption spectroscopy, which revealed that after a certain period of the reaction with tertiary butyl hydrogen peroxide, the phosphine ligands are removed to form nanoparticles of gold which matches with the induction period seen in the catalytic reaction. Density functional theory calculations show that the energies required to remove the ligands from the [Au6Ln]2+ increase significantly with successive removal steps, suggesting that the process does not occur at once but sequentially. The calculations also reveal that ligand removal is accompanied by dramatic re-arrangements in the topology of the cluster core.

Memórias de uma Escola Isolada Rural: estudo de um Livro de Visitas (1928-1948)

Cet article étudie le livre de visites de l'ancienne école mixte de la Fazenda Ponte Alta/Bela Vista, liée au groupe scolaire de la ville de Bariri, dans l'état de São Paulo (SP). À partir des registres de vingt ans d'activités (1928-1948), nous retraçons les exigences des inspecteurs primaires et si ces exigences provenaient (ou non) de professeurs et de la communauté paysanne pour ébaucher un cadre socio-historique de l'enseignement des premières lettres dans la zone rurale de l'intérieur de l'état de São Paulo. Il en résulte que le discours qui défendait l'égalité de chances pour les populations urbaines et rurales négligeait généralement le besoin de promouvoir l'égalité de conditions pour que la communauté rurale puisse profiter des chances qui lui étaient promises.

Ambiguity in the evaluation of the effective action on the cone

An ambiguity in the computation of the one-loop effective action for fields living on a cone is illustrated. It is shown that the ambiguity arises due to the noncommutativity of the regularization of ultraviolet and (conical) boundary divergencies. ©1999 The American Physical Society.

Processamento e propriedades magnéticas de manganitas multiferróicas = Mise en forme et propriétés magnétiques de manganites multiferróïques

Pós-graduação em Ciência e Tecnologia de Materiais - FC

Concilier les données qualitatives et quantitatives: un défi pour les recherches en acquisition du langage

What is the role of qualitative data? How should mixed approaches be considered? Is it necessary to complement the quantitative approach by the qualitative approach (Maziére et al., 2010) or the opposite? How can these two approaches be combined in a Language Acquisition research? What are the possibilities of generalization that these approaches provide? Besides those necessary theoretical discussions, our starting point is a qualitative research on the acquisition of the plural morpheme in Brazilian Portuguese (BP) in children between 1 year 11 months old and 2 years 7 months old (Hilário, 2012), whose linguistic production is intrinsically connected to their dialogic aspect (Bakhtin & Vološinov, 1973) and to the interaction among interlocutors (Bruner, 2004; Vygotsky, 1986). In this research through the usage of a computational tool (CLAN) it is expected to have more visibility of the quantitative results even if they are in a qualitative approach. Although, it should be taken into account the fact that each approach can achieve valid and relevant results (Valsiner 2000), i.e., with any given method it is possible to reach a kind of generalization (statistical or analytical).

Phase Transition for the Ising Model on the Critical Lorentzian Triangulation

The ferromagnetic Ising model without external field on an infinite Lorentzian triangulation sampled from the uniform distribution is considered. We prove uniqueness of the Gibbs measure in the high temperature region and coexistence of at least two Gibbs measures at low temperature. The proofs are based on the disagreement percolation method and on a variant of the Peierls contour method. The critical temperature is shown to be constant a.s.

Source of funding in experimental studies of mobile phone use on health: Update of systematic review

A previous review showed that among 59 studies published in 1995–2005, industry-funded studies were least likely to report effects of controlled exposure to mobile phone radiation on health-related outcomes. We updated literature searches in 2005–2009 and extracted data on funding, conflicts of interest and results. Of 75 additional studies 12% were industry-funded, 44% had public and 19% mixed funding; funding was unclear in 25%. Previous findings were confirmed: industry-sponsored studies were least likely to report results suggesting effects. Interestingly, the proportion of studies indicating effects declined in 1995–2009, regardless of funding source. Source of funding and conflicts of interest are important in this field of research.

Théorie des jeux expérimentale & action motrice

How do sportspeople succeed in a non-collaborative game? An illustration of a perverse side effect of altruism Are team sports specialists predisposed to collaboration? The scientific literature on this topic is divided. The present article attempts to end this debate by applying experimental game theory. We constituted three groups of volunteers (all students aged around 20): 25 team sports specialists; 23 individual sports specialists (gymnasts, track & field athletes and swimmers) and a control group of 24 non-sportspeople. Each subgroup was divided into 3 teams that played against each other in turn (and not against teams from other subgroups). The teams played a game based on the well-known Prisoner's Dilemma (Tucker, 1950) - the paradoxical "Bluegill Sunbass Game" (Binmore, 1999) with three Nash equilibria (two suboptimal equilibria with a pure strategy and an optimal equilibrium with a mixed, egotistical strategy (p= 1/2)). This game also features a Harsanyi equilibrium (based on constant compliance with a moral code and altruism by empathy: "do not unto others that which you would not have them do unto you"). How, then, was the game played? Two teams of 8 competed on a handball court. Each team wore a distinctive jersey. The game lasted 15 minutes and the players were allowed to touch the handball ball with their feet or hands. After each goal, each team had to return to its own half of the court. Players were allowed to score in either goal and thus cooperate with their teammates or not, as they saw fit. A goal against the nominally opposing team (a "guardian" strategy, by analogy with the Bluegill Sunbass Game) earned a point for everyone in the team. For an own goal (a "sneaker" strategy), only the scorer earned a point - hence the paradox. If all the members of a team work together to score a goal, everyone is happy (the Harsanyi solution). However, the situation was not balanced in the Nashian sense: each player had a reason to be disloyal to his/her team at the merest opportunity. But if everyone adopts a "sneaker" strategy, the game becomes a free-for-all and the chances of scoring become much slimmer. In a context in which doubt reigns as to the honesty of team members and "legal betrayals", what type of sportsperson will score the most goals? By analogy with the Bluegill Sunbass Game, we recorded direct motor interactions (passes and shots) based on either a "guardian" tactic (i.e. collaboration within the team) or a "sneaker" tactic (shots and passes against the player's designated team). So, was the group of team sports specialist more collaborative than the other two groups? The answer was no. A statistical analysis (difference from chance in a logistic regression) enabled us to draw three conclusions: ?For the team sports specialists, the Nash equilibrium (1950) was stronger than the Harsanyi equilibrium (1977). ?The sporting principles of equilibrium and exclusivity are not appropriate in the Bluegill Sunbass Game and are quickly abandoned by the team sports specialists. The latter are opportunists who focus solely on winning and do well out of it. ?The most altruistic players are the main losers in the Bluegill Sunbass Game: they keep the game alive but contribute to their own defeat. In our experiment, the most altruistic players tended to be the females and the individual sports specialists

Théorie des jeux expérimentale & action motrice

How do sportspeople succeed in a non-collaborative game? An illustration of a perverse side effect of altruism Are team sports specialists predisposed to collaboration? The scientific literature on this topic is divided. The present article attempts to end this debate by applying experimental game theory. We constituted three groups of volunteers (all students aged around 20): 25 team sports specialists; 23 individual sports specialists (gymnasts, track & field athletes and swimmers) and a control group of 24 non-sportspeople. Each subgroup was divided into 3 teams that played against each other in turn (and not against teams from other subgroups). The teams played a game based on the well-known Prisoner's Dilemma (Tucker, 1950) - the paradoxical "Bluegill Sunbass Game" (Binmore, 1999) with three Nash equilibria (two suboptimal equilibria with a pure strategy and an optimal equilibrium with a mixed, egotistical strategy (p= 1/2)). This game also features a Harsanyi equilibrium (based on constant compliance with a moral code and altruism by empathy: "do not unto others that which you would not have them do unto you"). How, then, was the game played? Two teams of 8 competed on a handball court. Each team wore a distinctive jersey. The game lasted 15 minutes and the players were allowed to touch the handball ball with their feet or hands. After each goal, each team had to return to its own half of the court. Players were allowed to score in either goal and thus cooperate with their teammates or not, as they saw fit. A goal against the nominally opposing team (a "guardian" strategy, by analogy with the Bluegill Sunbass Game) earned a point for everyone in the team. For an own goal (a "sneaker" strategy), only the scorer earned a point - hence the paradox. If all the members of a team work together to score a goal, everyone is happy (the Harsanyi solution). However, the situation was not balanced in the Nashian sense: each player had a reason to be disloyal to his/her team at the merest opportunity. But if everyone adopts a "sneaker" strategy, the game becomes a free-for-all and the chances of scoring become much slimmer. In a context in which doubt reigns as to the honesty of team members and "legal betrayals", what type of sportsperson will score the most goals? By analogy with the Bluegill Sunbass Game, we recorded direct motor interactions (passes and shots) based on either a "guardian" tactic (i.e. collaboration within the team) or a "sneaker" tactic (shots and passes against the player's designated team). So, was the group of team sports specialist more collaborative than the other two groups? The answer was no. A statistical analysis (difference from chance in a logistic regression) enabled us to draw three conclusions: ?For the team sports specialists, the Nash equilibrium (1950) was stronger than the Harsanyi equilibrium (1977). ?The sporting principles of equilibrium and exclusivity are not appropriate in the Bluegill Sunbass Game and are quickly abandoned by the team sports specialists. The latter are opportunists who focus solely on winning and do well out of it. ?The most altruistic players are the main losers in the Bluegill Sunbass Game: they keep the game alive but contribute to their own defeat. In our experiment, the most altruistic players tended to be the females and the individual sports specialists

Théorie des jeux expérimentale & action motrice

How do sportspeople succeed in a non-collaborative game? An illustration of a perverse side effect of altruism Are team sports specialists predisposed to collaboration? The scientific literature on this topic is divided. The present article attempts to end this debate by applying experimental game theory. We constituted three groups of volunteers (all students aged around 20): 25 team sports specialists; 23 individual sports specialists (gymnasts, track & field athletes and swimmers) and a control group of 24 non-sportspeople. Each subgroup was divided into 3 teams that played against each other in turn (and not against teams from other subgroups). The teams played a game based on the well-known Prisoner's Dilemma (Tucker, 1950) - the paradoxical "Bluegill Sunbass Game" (Binmore, 1999) with three Nash equilibria (two suboptimal equilibria with a pure strategy and an optimal equilibrium with a mixed, egotistical strategy (p= 1/2)). This game also features a Harsanyi equilibrium (based on constant compliance with a moral code and altruism by empathy: "do not unto others that which you would not have them do unto you"). How, then, was the game played? Two teams of 8 competed on a handball court. Each team wore a distinctive jersey. The game lasted 15 minutes and the players were allowed to touch the handball ball with their feet or hands. After each goal, each team had to return to its own half of the court. Players were allowed to score in either goal and thus cooperate with their teammates or not, as they saw fit. A goal against the nominally opposing team (a "guardian" strategy, by analogy with the Bluegill Sunbass Game) earned a point for everyone in the team. For an own goal (a "sneaker" strategy), only the scorer earned a point - hence the paradox. If all the members of a team work together to score a goal, everyone is happy (the Harsanyi solution). However, the situation was not balanced in the Nashian sense: each player had a reason to be disloyal to his/her team at the merest opportunity. But if everyone adopts a "sneaker" strategy, the game becomes a free-for-all and the chances of scoring become much slimmer. In a context in which doubt reigns as to the honesty of team members and "legal betrayals", what type of sportsperson will score the most goals? By analogy with the Bluegill Sunbass Game, we recorded direct motor interactions (passes and shots) based on either a "guardian" tactic (i.e. collaboration within the team) or a "sneaker" tactic (shots and passes against the player's designated team). So, was the group of team sports specialist more collaborative than the other two groups? The answer was no. A statistical analysis (difference from chance in a logistic regression) enabled us to draw three conclusions: ?For the team sports specialists, the Nash equilibrium (1950) was stronger than the Harsanyi equilibrium (1977). ?The sporting principles of equilibrium and exclusivity are not appropriate in the Bluegill Sunbass Game and are quickly abandoned by the team sports specialists. The latter are opportunists who focus solely on winning and do well out of it. ?The most altruistic players are the main losers in the Bluegill Sunbass Game: they keep the game alive but contribute to their own defeat. In our experiment, the most altruistic players tended to be the females and the individual sports specialists