Yes, it’s the economy, stupid, but is it demand or supply? CEPS Commentary, 24 January 2014

Paul De Grauwe writes in this new CEPS Commentary that the recent and surprising conversion of François Hollande to supply-side economics completes the victory of the northern European policy-makers who believe that insufficient aggregate demand should be fought exclusively by supply-side measures. In his view, however, it is not the first time in post-war history that economists and policy-makers apply the wrong medicine; or to put it differently, it's akin to some generals who fight a new war by applying the strategies developed for the previous war.

British Balance of Competence Reviews, Part III: More reform than renegotiation or repatriation. EPIN [Working] Paper No. 42/December 2014. [see Abstract for I and II]

This paper, the third in a series for a CEPS project on the ‘The British Question’, is pegged on an ambitious exercise by the British government to review all the competences of the European Union on the basis of evidence submitted by independent stakeholders. The reviews considered in this paper cover the following EU policies: the single market for services, financial markets, the free movement of people, cohesion, energy, agriculture, fisheries, competition, social and employment policies, and fundamental rights. The declared objective of Prime Minister Cameron is to secure a ‘new settlement’ between the UK and the EU. From political speeches in the UK one can identify three different types of possible demand: reform of EU policies, renegotiation of the UK’s specific terms of membership, and repatriation of competences from the EU back to the member states. As most of the reviews are now complete, three points are becoming increasingly clear: i) The reform agenda – past, present or future - concerns virtually every branch of EU policy, including several cases reviewed here that are central to stated UK economic interests. The argument that the EU is ‘unreformable’ is shown to be a myth. ii) The highly sensitive cases of immigration from the EU and social policies may translate into requests for renegotiation of specific conditions for the UK, but further large-scale opt-outs, as in the case of the euro and justice and home affairs, are implausible. iii) While demands for repatriation of EU competences are voiced in general terms in public debate in the UK, no specific proposals emerge from the evidence as regards competences at the level at which they are identified in the treaties, and there is no chance of achieving consensus for such ideas among member states. Michael Emerson and Steven Blockmans, “British Balance of Competence Reviews, Part I: ‘Competences about right, so far’”, CEPS/EPIN Working Paper No. 35, October 2013 (www.ceps.eu/book/british-balance-competence-reviews-part-i-%E2%80%98competences-about-right-so-far%E2%80%99)(http://aei.pitt.edu/45599/); Michael Emerson, Steven Blockmans, Steve Peers and Michael Wriglesworth, “British Balance of Competence Reviews, Part II: Again, a huge contradiction between the evidence and Eurosceptic populism”, CEPS/EPIN Working Paper No. 40, June 2014 (www.ceps.eu/book/british-balance-competence-reviews-part-ii-again-huge-contradiction-between-evidence-and-eurosc)(http://aei.pitt.edu/52452/).

Euro 2012 – Ukraine’s wasted opportunity? OSW Commentary 80, 2012-06.08

Ukraine saw hosting the European Football Championship as an important project in terms of image-building and modernisation from the very beginning. The country’s government assumed, during the presidency of Viktor Yushchenko and Viktor Yanukovych alike, that Euro 2012 would provide a major impulse for economic development and show that the young Ukrainian state was capable of successfully preparing one of the most important sport tournaments in the world. Although UEFA’s decision raised eyebrows both in the West and in Ukraine, after initial delays the work gained momentum and, shortly before the championship, Ukraine’s progress could be evaluated as being satisfactory at the least. As part of the preparations, four stadiums were built or modernised, four airports in the host cities were developed and 1,600 km of roads were repaired or built from the ground up. The investments have doubtlessly contributed to an improvement of the infrastructure in Ukraine, but it would be rather inaccurate to say that Euro 2012 has brought about a real modernisation of the country. The funds allocated for the preparations were relatively modest, and part of them was spent in a non-transparent way, which gives rise to suspicions of corruption. The chance to improve Ukraine’s perception in the West has been to a great extent lost due to the trial of the former prime minister, Yulia Tymoshenko, who was sentenced to seven years in prison in October 2011. Over the past few weeks, Euro 2012 as a sports event has been overshadowed by discussions among Western politicians and in the Western media about rising authoritarian tendencies in Ukraine. In turn, football is currently treated as a minor issue in Ukraine’s internal politics. The government has so far not used Euro 2012 to improve its popularity although hosting it is supported by a clear majority of the Ukrainian public. It is still an open question as to whether the Ukrainian government will try to capitalise politically on this sports event; this is especially significant as parliamentary elections are approaching.

The Criminalisation of Irregular Migration in the European Union. CEPS Liberty and Security in Europe No. 80/2015

This paper offers an academic examination of the legal regimes surrounding the criminalisation of irregular migrants in the EU and of acts of solidarity with irregular migrants, such as assisting irregular migrants to enter or remain in the EU, and other behaviour that is motivated by humanitarian instincts. The research analyses EU law and its relationship with national provisions regarding the criminalisation of irregular migration and of acts of solidarity vis-á-vis irregular migrants. A comparative analysis was made of the laws of the UK, France and Italy, supplemented by an analysis of the laws of Germany, the Netherlands and Spain. By considering the role of public trust in fostering compliance with the law, the paper explores the impact of criminalisation measures on institutions’ authority to compel individuals to comply with the law (institutional legitimacy). The study finds that certain indicators question institutional legitimacy and reveals the varied nature and extent of penalties imposed by different member states. The paper concludes that there is an important role for public trust in immigration law compliance, not just in measures directed towards irregular migrants but also towards those acting in solidarity with irregular migrants.

Building a Capital Markets Union….or designing a financial system for the euro area? CEPS Commentary, 2 June 2015

In this CEPS Commentary, economists Anton Brender, Florence Pisani and Daniel Gros challenge the foundation on which the European Commission launched a key debate earlier this year on the development of the EU’s financial system, with publication of its Green Paper "Building a Capital Markets Union". While acknowledging that a single capital market could be useful in the European Union, they argue that it is extremely dangerous to conduct one and the same monetary policy in an area with broadly varying financial practices and structures – as the first 15 years of the euro area's history have vividly shown. They conclude that financial integration of the countries in EMU must receive top priority in a process that the rest of the European Union may then subsequently join.

Cameron’s ‘renegotiations’ (or Russian roulette) with the EU: An interim assessment. CEPS Working Document No. 413/September 2015

Since the May 2015 general election when the Tory Party gained an absolute majority in the House of Commons, Prime Minister Cameron has put his campaign into high gear to get a ‘new settlement’ with the EU and invested much personal diplomacy to try to advance his objective. “What does he really want?” is still heard from other EU leaders, yet his agenda is taking rough shape with calls for results under four headings: “competitiveness, sovereignty, social security and economic governance”. These are only code words, however, for a mixed bag of more specific desiderata, which overall seem to be moderate. Impossible demands have been quietly dropped. Some items will still be tricky to negotiate while others can be placed on the agenda for ongoing EU ‘reform’ that can be widely supported. The Brussels side of the affair thus seems manageable, but the wild cards at home in the UK remain or are becoming even wilder. The standard hazards of the referendum instrument are now exacerbated by the unknown quantity of the new Labour leadership alongside the aggressively Eurosceptic majority of Tory MPs and the great migration crisis, which is translating now into a negative factor for the EU in UK opinion polls. This ostensibly very democratic process is looking more and more like a deadly serious game of Russian roulette.

Searching for harm or harming search? A look at the European Commission’s antitrust investigation against Google. CEPS Special Report No. 118/September 2015

As the European Commission’s antitrust investigation against Google approaches its final stages, its contours and likely outcome remain obscure and blurred by a plethora of nonantitrust-related arguments. At the same time, the initial focus on search neutrality as an antitrust principle seems to have been abandoned by the European Commission, in favour of a more standard allegation of ‘exclusionary abuse’, likely to generate anticompetitive foreclosure of Google’s rivals. This paper discusses search neutrality as an antitrust principle, and then comments on the current investigation based on publicly available information. The paper provides a critical assessment of the likely tests that will be used for the definition of the relevant product market, the criteria for the finding of dominance, the anticompetitive foreclosure test and the possible remedies that the European Commission might choose. Overall, and regardless of the outcome of the Google case, the paper argues that the current treatment of exclusionary abuses in Internet markets is in urgent need of a number of important clarifications, and has been in this condition for more than a decade. The hope is that the European Commission will resist the temptation to imbue the antitrust case with an emphasis and meaning that have nothing to do with antitrust (from industrial policy motives to privacy, copyright or media law arguments) and that, on the contrary, the Commission will devote its efforts to sharpening its understanding of dynamic competition in cyberspace, and the tools that should be applied in the analysis of these peculiar, fast-changing and often elusive settings.

Regulation on ‘cross-border portability’ of online content services: Roaming for Netflix or the end of copyright territoriality? CEPS Commentary, 15 February 2016

In a communication to the Parliament and the Council entitled “Towards a modern, more European copyright framework” and dated 9 December 2015,1 the European Commission confirmed its intention to progressively remove the main obstacles to the functioning of the Digital Single Market for copyrighted works. The first step of this long-term plan, which was first announced in Juncker’s Political Guidelines2 and the Communication on “A Digital Single Market strategy for Europe”,3 is a proposal for a regulation aimed at ensuring the so-called ‘cross-border portability’ of online services giving access to content such as music, games, films and sporting events.4 In a nutshell, the proposed regulation seeks to enable consumers with legal access to such online content services in their country of residence to use the same services also when they are in another member state for a limited period of time. On the one hand, this legislative proposal has the full potential to resolve the (limited) issue of portability, which stems from the national dimension of copyright and the persisting territorial licensing and distribution of copyright content.5 On the other hand, as this commentary shows, the ambiguity of certain important provisions in the proposed regulation might affect its scope and effectiveness and contribute to the erosion of the principle of copyright territoriality.

Britain’s Future in Europe: The known Plan A to remain or the unknown Plan B to leave. CEPS Paperback 2nd Ed., March 2016

Following the agreement made by Prime Minister David Cameron with the EU on 18-19 February 2016, the day for the referendum for the UK to remain in or leave the EU is set for 23 June 2016. This will be the most important decision taken by the British people in half a century, and whose consequences will live on for another half century. The first edition of this book, published in March 2015, laid the foundations for any objective assessment of the workings of the EU and the UK’s place in it. It was widely acclaimed and rated as “a myth-breaking exercise of the best kind”. This second edition adds a substantial new chapter following Cameron’s agreement with the EU and announcement of the referendum. It reviews both the ‘Plan A’, namely the status quo for the UK in the EU as amended by the new agreement, and three variants of a ‘Plan B’ for secession. The key point is that the ‘leave’ camp have not done their homework or ‘due diligence’ to specify the post-secession scenario, or how the British government would face up to the challenges that this would bring. The authors therefore do the ‘leave’ camp’s homework for them, setting out three Plan Bs more concretely and in more depth than the ‘leave’ camp have been able or wanted to do, or any other source has done. The book is therefore unique and essential reading for anyone concerned with the fateful choice that lies soon ahead.

Europe's Sustainability Strategy - A Casualty of the Euro Crisis or an Ambition Restart? Bertelsmann Policy Brief #2013/06, 30.11.2013

Europe’s economy should not just grow, it should also target social inclusion and the responsible use of resources. The goal of sustainability may be embedded in the Treaty on European Union and the EU’s economic strategies, but the emphasis on GDP growth and competitiveness in battling the crisis threatens to undermine efforts to establish a common approach for sustainable economic activity. This may be unavoidable during an acute crisis. But in the long term, the EU must show the way forward.

Thrombolysis in Patients Aged over 80 Years Is Equally Effective and Safe

BACKGROUND: Despite stroke's high prevalence in the elderly, intravenous thrombolysis is licensed in Europe only for patients younger than 80 years old. We aimed to compare the functional outcomes and complication rates in patients older versus younger than 80 years old treated with intravenous thrombolysis. METHODS: A retrospective observational study of patients who received intravenous thrombolysis in a stroke unit between January 1, 2009, and June 30, 2012, was conducted. Variables were compared between 2 subgroups (≤80 and >80 years). RESULTS: Overall, 512 patients underwent intravenous thrombolysis, of which 13.1% were over 80 years. The mean age was 65.4 years in the younger subgroup and 82.9 years in the older subgroup. Prior independence rates did not differ between the subgroups. Prevalence of atrial fibrillation and cardioembolic stroke was higher in the older subgroup (P = .004 and .026). Only 3% of the elderly with atrial fibrillation were taking oral anticoagulants. Symptoms-to-needle time was lower in the older subgroup (P = .048). Stroke severity was higher in patients over 80 years (P = .026). There was significant improvement in the National Institutes of Health Stroke Scale score 7 days after intravenous thrombolysis (P < .001) in both subgroups. The proportion of patients with 3 months' favorable outcome and independence, hemorrhagic transformation, and mortality rates were similar in both subgroups. CONCLUSIONS: Elderly patients' benefits and outcomes from intravenous thrombolysis treatment were identical to the younger subgroup without excess hemorrhagic transformation or mortality. These results favor the use of intravenous thrombolysis in patients over 80 years.

Mice deficient in interleukin-4 (IL-4) or IL-4 receptor alpha have higher resistance to sporozoite infection with Plasmodium berghei (ANKA) than do naive wild-type mice

BALB/c interleukin-4 (IL-4(-/-)) or IL-4 receptor-alpha (IL-4ralpha(-/-)) knockout (KO) mice were used to assess the roles of the IL-4 and IL-13 pathways during infections with the blood or liver stages of plasmodium in murine malaria. Intraperitoneal infection with the blood-stage erythrocytes of Plasmodium berghei (ANKA) resulted in 100% mortality within 24 days in BALB/c mice, as well as in the mutant mouse strains. However, when infected intravenously with the sporozoite liver stage, 60 to 80% of IL-4(-/-) and IL-4ralpha(-/-) mice survived, whereas all BALB/c mice succumbed with high parasitemia. Compared to infected BALB/c controls, the surviving KO mice showed increased NK cell numbers and expression of inducible nitric oxide synthase (iNOS) in the liver and were able to eliminate parasites early during infection. In vivo blockade of NO resulted in 100% mortality of sporozoite-infected KO mice. In vivo depletion of NK cells also resulted in 80 to 100% mortality, with a significant reduction in gamma interferon (IFN-gamma) production in the liver. These results suggest that IFN-gamma-producing NK cells are critical in host resistance against the sporozoite liver stage by inducing NO production, an effective killing effector molecule against Plasmodium. The absence of IL-4-mediated functions increases the protective innate immune mechanism identified above, which results in immunity against P. berghei infection in these mice, with no major role for IL-13.

(Table 1) Total organic carbon, calcium carbonate and nitrogen at DSDP Holes 80-559 and 80-550B

Concentrations of organic and inorganic nitrogen have been measured on Leg 80 sediments. The inorganic nitrogen content is relatively constant, 0.02-0.03 wt.%. Because most of the inorganic nitrogen occurs as NH3 or (NH4)+ fixed on clays, clay-poor sediments have lower inorganic nitrogen contents. Organic nitrogen content depends upon both the type and the quantity of organic matter present. In Leg 80 sediments, woody kerogens contain much less organic nitrogen than do kerogens of algal origin. Furthermore, pelagic samples of low organic carbon content have less organic nitrogen than predicted, because of loss during diagenesis. DSDP shipboard analytical procedures do not distinguish between organic and inorganic nitrogen. Great caution must therefore be exercised in interpreting C/N ratios.

Organic geochemistry at DSDP Leg 80 Holes

The four sites drilled on the Irish continental margin (Goban Spur) yielded sediments ranging in age from Holocene to Barremian. Most of the sediments were deposited in well oxygenated waters, and the small amounts of organic matter they contain are highly oxidized. During a few time intervals from the Cenomanian to earliest Turonian, however, the oxygen content of the bottom waters reached very low levels, resulting in the deposition of homogeneous or laminated black sediments containing from 0.5 to 11% total organic carbon (TOC). The original organic matter was of mixed marine and terrestrial origin. The oxidizing-reducing cycles represented by interbedded black and light sediments are probably a result of changes in both circulation and productivity. The black sediments at Sites 550, 551, and 549 were probably deposited near the lower end, middle, and upper end, respectively, of an expanded oxygen-minimum layer. The oil and gas source potential of the laminated black sediments is very good to excellent. The organic-carbon-lean sediments deposited under oxidizing conditions have no oil or gas source potential. The thermal maturity of all sediments is low.