Risk pricing practices in finance, insurance and construction

A review of current risk pricing practices in the financial, insurance and construction sectors is conducted through a comprehensive literature review. The purpose was to inform a study on risk and price in the tendering processes of contractors: specifically, how contractors take account of risk when they are calculating their bids for construction work. The reference to mainstream literature was in view of construction management research as a field of application rather than a fundamental academic discipline. Analytical models are used for risk pricing in the financial sector. Certain mathematical laws and principles of insurance are used to price risk in the insurance sector. construction contractors and practitioners are described to traditionally price allowances for project risk using mechanisms such as intuition and experience. Project risk analysis models have proliferated in recent years. However, they are rarely used because of problems practitioners face when confronted with them. A discussion of practices across the three sectors shows that the construction industry does not approach risk according to the sophisticated mechanisms of the two other sectors. This is not a poor situation in itself. However, knowledge transfer from finance and insurance can help construction practitioners. But also, formal risk models for contractors should be informed by the commercial exigencies and unique characteristics of the construction sector.

Principal-agent issues in asset acquisition: UK institutions and their investment agents

This paper explores principal���agent issues in the stock selection processes of institutional property investors. Drawing upon an interview survey of fund managers and acquisition professionals, it focuses on the relationships between principals and external agents as they engage in property transactions. The research investigated the extent to which the presence of outcome���based remuneration structures could lead to biased advice, overbidding and/or poor asset selection. It is concluded that institutional property buyers are aware of incentives for opportunistic behaviour by external agents, often have sufficient expertise to robustly evaluate agents��� advice and that these incentives are counter���balanced by a number of important controls on potential opportunistic behaviour. There are strong counter���incentives in the need for the agents to establish personal relationships and trust between themselves and institutional buyers, to generate repeat and related business and to preserve or generate a good reputation in the market.

American option valuation: implied calibration of GARCH pricing models

This study analyzes the issue of American option valuation when the underlying exhibits a GARCH-type volatility process. We propose the usage of Rubinstein's Edgeworth binomial tree (EBT) in contrast to simulation-based methods being considered in previous studies. The EBT-based valuation approach makes an implied calibration of the pricing model feasible. By empirically analyzing the pricing performance of American index and equity options, we illustrate the superiority of the proposed approach.