Economies of Transport Density and Industrial Agglomeration

This paper develops a model of a spatial economy in which interregional trade patterns and the structure of the transport network are determined endogenously as a result of the interaction between industrial location behavior and increasing returns in transportation, in particular, economies of transport density. The traditional models assume either the structure of the transport network or industrial location patterns, and hence, they are unable to explain the interdependence of the two. It is shown that economies of transport density can be the primary source of industrial localization.

Political conditions for fair elections

Democracy is not necessarily consolidated simply by the introduction of formal democratic institutions. It is often observed in new democracies that democratic institutions are neglected and eroded in actual practice. Particularly, electoral fraud committed by a ruler is one of the main problems in this regard. This paper deals with two questions, (1) under what conditions does a ruler have an incentive to hold fair elections (or to rig elections), and (2) what makes a ruler prefer to establish an independent election governing institution? Assuming that a ruler prefers to maintain her power, basically she has an incentive to rig elections in order to be victorious in the political competition. A ruler, however, faces the risk of losing power if the opposition stages successful protests on a sufficiently large scale. If opponents are able to pose a credible threat to a ruler, she will have an incentive to hold fair elections. The problem is that information on electoral fraud is not shared by every player in the game. For the opposition, imperfect information deepens their coordination problems. Imperfect information, on the other hand, in some cases causes a problem for a ruler. If the opposition is sufficiently cohesive and have little tolerance of cheating, even unverified suspicions of fraud may trigger menacing protests. In such a case, a ruler has an incentive to establish an independent election commission to avoid unnecessary collisions by revealing the nature of the elections.

Perfecting the Catching-up: The Case of Taiwan's Motorcycle Industry

The final stage of the catching-up process has formidable hurdles. This paper examines the case of Taiwan’s motorcycle industry and shows how latecomers overcame the hurdles. In the early 1990s, the two largest motorcycle makers in Taiwan, Sanyang and Kwang Yang, had completed the catching-up process and became independent from Honda, on which they had technologically depended since the early 1960s. The requisite for independence was acquiring the capacity for product innovation. The two assemblers could cultivate technological capacity by investing abundant resources, which they accumulated in the protected market. It should be noted that although the market was protected and highly concentrated, it was also very competitive. Another condition was the solid local suppliers of parts and components. The local suppliers had also grown under the government’s industrial policies. However, their development beyond imitators can be attributed to their own initiatives.

Trade Coefficients and the Role of Elasticity in a Spatial CGE Model Based on the Armington Assumption

The Armington Assumption in the context of multi-regional CGE models is commonly interpreted as follows: Same commodities with different origins are imperfect substitutes for each other. In this paper, a static spatial CGE model that is compatible with this assumption and explicitly considers the transport sector and regional price differentials is formulated. Trade coefficients, which are derived endogenously from the optimization behaviors of firms and households, are shown to take the form of a potential function. To investigate how the elasticity of substitutions affects equilibrium solutions, a simpler version of the model that incorporates three regions and two sectors (besides the transport sector) is introduced. Results indicate: (1) if commodities produced in different regions are perfect substitutes, regional economies will be either autarkic or completely symmetric and (2) if they are imperfect substitutes, the impact of elasticity on the price equilibrium system as well as trade coefficients will be nonlinear and sometimes very sensitive.

Market Access and Intermediate Goods Trade

The role of importer access to the finished goods market in intermediate goods trade is examined by estimating the gravity-like equation derived from the NEG model. Importer access to demand for finished goods is calculated by using the estimates in the gravity equation for finished goods trade, and then intermediate goods trade is regressed on the importer access. Results indicate that imports of intermediate goods are sensitive not only to the magnitude of importer demand for finished goods but also to the demand of neighboring countries. Using results of the regression, the impact of US finished goods market expansion on intermediate goods trade in each country is simulated.

Inferring the Effects of Vertical Integration from Entry Games : An Analysis of the Generic Pharmaceutical Industry

This paper introduces a novel method for examining the effects of vertical integration. The basic idea is to estimate the parameters of a vertical entry game. By carefully specifying firms' payoff equations and constructing appropriate tests, it is possible to use estimates on rival profit effects to make inferences about the existence of vertical foreclosure. I estimate the vertical entry model using data from the US generic pharmaceutical industry. The estimates indicate that vertical integration is unlikely to generate anticompetitive foreclosure effects. On the other hand, significant efficiency effects are found to arise from vertical integration. I use the parameter estimates to simulate a policy that bans vertically integrated entry. The simulation results suggest that such a ban is counterproductive; it is likely to reduce entry into smaller markets.

Chapter 1 Market Access and Intermediate Goods Trade

This paper examines a distinctive feature of intermediate goods trade which the traditional gravity equation fails to capture, i.e., intermediate goods trade is positively related not only to the importing country's demand for finished goods but also to its neighbors' demand for finished goods. We regress a gravity equation for finished goods trade in the first step. Then, introducing the importing country's access to the total demand for finished goods which is calculated by using the estimates in the first step, we regress our gravity equation for trade in intermediate goods. Our regression results confirm such a feature of intermediate goods trade. Using the results of the regression, we simulate how the rise of US consumers' demand for finished goods affects the total imports and exports of intermediate goods in each country.

Chapter 2 Equilibrium locations of upstream and downstream firms

This paper explores the interaction between upstream firms and downstream firms in a two-region general equilibrium model. In many countries, lower tariff rates are set for intermediate manufactured goods and higher tariff rates are set for final manufactured goods. The derived results imply that such settings of tariff rates tend to preserve a symmetric spread of upstream and downstream firms, and continuing tariff reduction may cause core-periphery structures. In the case in which the circular causality between upstream and downstream firms is focused as agglomeration forces, the present model is fully solved. Thus, we find that (1) the present model displays, at most, three interior steady states, (2) when the asymmetric steady-states exist, they are unstable and (3) location displays hysteresis when the transport costs of intermediate manufactured goods are sufficiently high.

Chapter 5 Product Differentiation versus Geographical Differentiation: Evidence from the Pork Processing Industry in China

This chapter attempts to identify whether product differentiation or geographical differentiation is the main source of profit for firms in developing economies by employing a simple idea from the recently developed method of empirical industrial organization. Theoretically, location choice and product choice have been considered as analogues in differentiation, but in the real world, which of these strategies is chosen will result in an immense difference in firm behavior and in the development process of the industry. Development of the technique of empirical industrial organization enabled us to identify market outcomes with endogeneity. A typical case is the market outcome with differentiation, where price or product choice is endogenously determined. Our original survey contains data on market location, differences in product types, and price. The results show that product differentiation rather than geographical differentiation mitigates pressure on price competition, but 70 per cent secures geographical monopoly.

Strategic trade policy and non-linear subsidy : in the case of price competition

In a strategic trade policy, it is assumed, in this paper, that a government changes disbursement or levy method so that the reaction function of home firm approaches infinitely close to that of foreign firm. In the framework of Bertrand-Nash equilibrium, Eaton and Grossman[1986] showed that export tax is preferable to export subsidy. In this paper, it is shown that export subsidy is preferable to export tax in some cases in the framework of Bertrand-Nash equilibrium, considering the uncertainty in demand. Historically, many economists mentioned non-linear subsidy or tax. However, optimum solution of it has not yet been shown. The optimum solution is shown in this paper.

Multiplant strategy under core-periphery structure

A typical implicit assumption on monopolistic competition models for trade and economic geography is that firms can produce and sell only at one place. This paper fallows endogenous determination of the number of plants in a new economic geography model and examine the stable outcomes of organization choice between single-plant and multi-plant in two regions. We explicitly consider the firms' trade-off between larger economies of scale under single plant configuration and the saving in interregional transport costs under multi-plant configuration. We show that organization change arises under decreasing transportation costs and observe several organization configurations under a generalized cost function.

Export platform foreign direct investment : theory and evidence

This paper proposes a model that accounts for “export platform” FDI – a form of FDI that is common in the data but rarely discussed in the theoretical literature. Unlike the previous literature, this paper’s theory nests all the typical modes of supply, including exports, horizontal and vertical FDI, horizontal and vertical export platform FDI. The theory yields the testable hypothesis that a decrease in either inter-regional or intra-regional trade costs induces firms to choose export platform FDI. The empirical analysis provides descriptive statistics which point to large proportions of third country exports of US FDI, and an econometric analysis, whose results are in line with the model’s predictions. The last section suggests policy implications for nations seeking to attract FDI.

Parameterization of applied general equilibrium models with flexible trade specifications based on the Armington, Krugman, and Melitz models

This paper explains how the Armington-Krugman-Melitz supermodel developed by Dixon and Rimmer can be parameterized, and demonstrates that only two kinds of additional information are required in order to extend a standard trade model to include Melitz-type monopolistic competition and heterogeneous firms. Further, it is shown how specifying too much additional information leads to violations of the model constraints, necessitating adjustment and reconciliation of the data. Once a Melitz-type model is parameterized, a Krugman-type model can also be parameterized using the calibrated values in the Melitz-type model without any additional data. Sample code for the General Algebraic Modeling System (GAMS) has also been prepared to promote the innovative supermodel in the AGE community.

Did the least developed countries benefit from duty-free quota-free access to the Japanese market?

Countries classified as least developed countries (LDCs) were granted duty-free quota-free (DFQF) access to the Japanese market. This study examines the impact of that access and finds that, in general, it did not benefit the LDCs. The construction of concordance tables for Japan's 9 digit tariff line codes enables analysis at the tariff line level, which overcomes a possible aggregation bias. The exogenous nature of DFQF access mitigates the endogeneity problem. Various estimation models, including the triple difference estimator, show that in general the LDCs did not benefit from DFQF access to the Japanese market. The total value of imports from LDCs has been increasing, but the imports granted both zero tariffs and substantial preference margins over non-LDC countries were not successful. These findings suggest that for LDCs the tariff barrier is a relatively small obstacle: Trade is affected more strongly by other factors, such as infrastructure, nontariff barriers, geographic distance, and cultural differences.

Neutrality in the choice of number of firms or level of fixed costs in calibrating an Armington-Krugman-Melitz encompassing module for applied general equilibrium models

This paper shows how an Armington-Krugman-Melitz encompassing module based on Dixon and Rimmer (2012) can be calibrated, and clarifies the choice of initial levels for two kinds of number of firms, or parameter values for two kinds of fixed costs, that enter a Melitz-type specification can be set freely to any preferred value, just as the cases we derive quantities from given value data assuming some of the initial prices to be unity. In consequence, only one kind of additional information, which is on the shape parameter related to productivity, just is required in order to incorporate Melitz-type monopolistic competition and heterogeneous firms into a standard applied general equilibrium model. To be a Krugman-type, nothing is needed. This enables model builders in applied economics to fully enjoy the featured properties of the theoretical models invented by Krugman (1980) and Melitz (2003) in practical policy simulations at low cost.