Natural disaster accounting bias and its equivalence across genetic resource stocks

Two sources of bias arise in conventional loss predictions in the wake of natural disasters. One source of bias stems from neglect of accounting for animal genetic resource loss. A second source of bias stems from failure to identify, in addition to the direct effects of such loss, the indirect effects arising from implications impacting animal-human interactions. We argue that, in some contexts, the magnitude of bias imputed by neglecting animal genetic resource stocks is substantial. We show, in addition, and contrary to popular belief, that the biases attributable to losses in distinct genetic resource stocks are very likely to be the same. We derive the formal equivalence across the distinct resource stocks by deriving an envelope result in a model that forms the mainstay of enquiry in subsistence farming and we validate the theory, empirically, in a World-Society-for-the-Protection-of-Animals application

Privatisation, empowerment and accountability: What are the policy implications for establishing effective farmer organisations?

Weak institutional development and information flows have constrained the extent to which the small-holder farming sector in developing countries can significantly drive growth and poverty reduction. Thisis despite widely implemented economic liberalisation policies focussing on market efficiency. Farmerorganisations are viewed as a potential means of addressing public and private institutional failure but thishas frequently been limited by inequalities in access to power and information. This article investigatestwo issues that have received little research attention to date: what role downward accountability plays inenabling farmer organisations to improve services and markets, and what influences the extent to whichdownward accountability is achieved. Kenya Tea Development Agency (KTDA), one of the largest farmerorganisations in the world (>400,000 farmers) is examined alongside wider literature. Mixed methodswere used including key informant interviews, and eight months of participant observation followedby a questionnaire survey. The article concludes that without effective downward accountability farmerorganisations can become characterised by institutions and mechanisms that favour elites, restrictedweak coordination and regulation, and manipulated information flows. This in turn reduces individuals’incentives to invest. If farmer organisations are to realise their potential as a means of enabling the small-holder sector to significantly contribute to economic growth and poverty reduction, policy and researchneeds to address key factors which influence accountability including: how to ensure initial processes information of farmer organisations establish appropriate structures and rules; strong state regulation toenhance corporate accountability; transparent information provision regarding actions of farmer organi-sation leaders; and the role independent non-government organisations can play. Consequently attentionneeds to focus on developing means of legitimising rights, building poor people’s capacity to challengeexclusion, and moving from rights to obligations regarding information provision.

Circles of support and accountability: criminal justice volunteers as the 'Deliberative public'

This paper provides a review of the role played by volunteers within one particular offender management and reintegration scheme in the United Kingdom. Circles of Support and Accountability (COSA) draw on the expertise of volunteer members of the public to create supportive monitoring frameworks around sex offenders following their release from prison. The paper presents evidence as to the motivations of these volunteers, and argues that they play a crucial role in the success of the scheme, as they provide an instrumentally-useful form of reintegrative social contact to a socially-excluded offender population, and perform a symbolically important role as representatives of the wider community in taking ownership of offender management practices on behalf of the wider society. This is particularly significant in grounding those processes in the communicative practices of the social sphere, providing powerful reasons for intervention that reinforce the work that COSA do.

Strengthening citizen agency and accountability through ICT

We investigated the role of Information and Communication Technologies (ICT, namely mobile phones) in support of citizen agency and its potential in calling authorities to account. We focused on Eastern Africa and we used a mixed methodology, which allowed us to explore the current uses of ICT to strengthen accountability and to forecast the growth of mobile phones' adaption in that region. Evidence from both analyses suggests that there are two main areas where citizen agency and ICT can reinforce each other in bottom–up and horizontal processes: participation and engagement of citizens, and the diffusion of information.

Separating real incentives and accountability

In experimental investigations of the effect of real incentives, accountability—the implicit or explicit expectation of a decision maker that she may have to justify her decisions in front of somebody else—is often confounded with the incentives themselves. This confounding of accountability with incentives makes causal attributions of any effects found problematic. We separate accountability and incentives, and find different effects. Accountability is found to reduce preference reversals between frames, for which incentives have no effect. Incentives on the other hand are found to reduce risk seeking for losses, where accountability has no effect. In a choice task between simple and compound events, accountability increases the preference for the simple event, while incentives have a weaker effect going in the opposite direction. It is thus shown that the confounding of accountability and incentives is relevant for studies on the effect of the latter, and that existing conclusions on the effect of incentives need to be reconsidered in light of this issue.

Presidents, assemblies, and accountability

Much research has explored the relationship between economics and elections, and scholars have begun to explore how institutions mediate that link. However, the relationship between presidential institutions and electoral accountability remains largely unexplored in comparative politics. Because voters in presidential systems can cast votes for executive and legislative elections separately, we have good reasons to suspect that the institutions of presidentialism might generate different forms or degrees of accountability than parliamentarism. Powell and Whitten (1993) suggest that the partisan or institutional “clarity of responsibility” might mediate the relationship between economics and elections: when responsibility for outcomes is clear, the relationship should be strong, and vice-versa. I develop this notion for use in presidential systems, and explore executive and legislative elections in 24 countries. The results indicate that economics always influences the incumbent vote in executive elections, regardless of the partisan or institutional clarity of responsibility. Economics also affects vote swings in legislative elections, but the institutional clarity of responsibility does mediate this relationship: legislative accountability for national economic outcomes is lowest when clarity of responsibility is highest, a situation that arises when the president is relatively more powerful and the bases for electing legislators and the president differ. By providing an empirical basis for a discussion of accountability under presidentialism, these findings contribute to important debates in comparative politics.

The new era of carbon accounting: issues and implications for Latin American and Caribbean exports

Includes Bibliography

Reformas del esquema de gestión de la CEPAL: delegación de autoridad y rendición de cuentas = Reform of the ECLAC management scheme: delegation of authority and accountability = Réforme du mécanisme de gestion de la CEPALC: délégation de pouvoirs et justification de l'emploi des fonds

Incluye Bibliografía