Environmental and international tariffs in a mixed duopoly

In this paper, we study the effects of environmental and trade policies in an international mixed duopoly serving two markets, in which the public firm maximizes the sum of consumer surplus and its profit. We also analyse the effects of privatization. The model has two stages. In the first stage, governments choose environmental taxes and import tariffs, simultaneously. Then, the firms engage in a Cournot competition, choosing output levels for the domestic market and to export. We compare the results obtained in the three different ways of moving on the decision make of the firms.

Multiple sequence alignment correction using constraints

Trabalho apresentado no âmbito do European Master in Computational Logics, como requisito parcial para obtenção do grau de Mestre em Computational Logics

Privatization and social welfare in an international mixed Stackelberg duopoly

Competition between public and private firms exists in a range of industries like telecommunications, electricity, natural gas, airlines industries, as weel as services including hospitals, banking and education. Some authors studied mixed oligopolies under Cournot competition (firms move simultaneously) and some others considered Stackelberg models (firms move sequentially). Tomaru [1] analyzed, in a Cournot model, how decision-making upon cost-reducing R&D investment by a domestic public firm is affected by privatization when competing in the domestic market with a foreign firm. He shows that privatization of the domestic public firm lowers productive efficiency and deteriorates domestic social welfare. In this paper, we examine the same question but in a Stackelberg formulation instead of Cournot. The model is a three-stage game. In the first stage, the domestic firm chooses the amount of cost-reducing R&D investment. Then, the firms compete à la Stackelberg. Two cases are considered: (i) The domestic firm is the leader; (ii) The foreign firm is the leader. We show that the results obtained in [1] for Cournot competition are robust in the sence that they are also true when firms move sequentially.

Sectors and routes in solid waste collection

Collecting and transporting solid waste is a constant problem for municipalities and populations in general. Waste management should take into account the preservation of the environment and the reduction of costs. The goal with this paper is to address a real-life solid waste problem. The case reveals some general and specific characteristics which are not rare, but are not widely addressed in the literature. Furthermore, new methods and models to deal with sectorization and routing are introduced, which can be extended to other applications. Sectorization and routing are tackled following a two-phase approach. In the first phase, a new method is described for sectorization based on electromagnetism and Coulomb’s Law. The second phase addresses the routing problems in each sector. The paper addresses not only territorial division, but also the frequency with which waste is collected, which is a critical issue in these types of applications. Special characteristics related to the number and type of deposition points were also a motivation for this work. A new model for a Mixed Capacitated Arc Routing Problem with Limited Multi-Landfills is proposed and tested in real instances. The computational results achieved confirm the effectiveness of the entire approach.

Intention recognition, commitment and their roles in the evolution of cooperation

Dissertação para obtenção do Grau de Doutor em Informática

Antioxidant, cytotoxic and UVB-absorbing activity of Maytenus guyanensis Klotzch. (Celastraceae) bark extracts

Maytenus guyanensis Klotzch. is an Amazonian medicinal tree species known in Brazil by the common name chichuá and in Peru and Colombia by the name chuchuhuasi. It is used in traditional medicine as stimulant, tonic, and muscle relaxant, for the relief of arthritis, rheumatism, hemorrhoids, swollen kidney, skin eruptions, and skin cancer prevention, among others. Initially, different extraction solvents and methods were applied to dried, ground bark which made possible the preparation of extracts having both significant lethality to brine shrimp larvae (Artemia franciscana Leach) as well as antioxidant activity in vitro based on tests involving reactions with 2,2,-diphenyl-1-picrylhydrazyl (DPPH). Analysis of fractions from serial extractions with solvents of increasing polarity supports the notion that antioxidant activity is associated with compounds of intermediate polarity and cytotoxicity is associated with compounds of low to intermediate polarity. Variation of extraction time and conditions revealed that hot, continuous ethanol extraction provided good yields of bark extract in several hours. Hot extraction also provided ethanol extracts having greater lethality to brine shrimp and antioxidant activity (compared to the flavonoid rutin in semi-quantitative methods based on DPPH) than extracts obtained from maceration at room temperature. Freeze-dried ethanol extracts were prepared by: 1) maceration at room temperature and 2) hot extraction (eight hours) on several hundred gram scales and the latter extract was shown to have partial screening effects on UVB light. In this work, cytotoxic, antioxidant and potential sun-screening activity are shown for the first time in M. guyanensis.

Polymicrobial interactions in infections: the case Pseudomonas aeruginosa and Candida albicans in ventilator-associated pneumonia

Dissertação de mestrado integrado em Engenharia Biomédica (área de especialização em Engenharia Clinica)

Equilibrium play and best response to (Stated) beliefs in constant sum games

We report experimental results on one-shot two person 3x3 constant sum games played by non-economists without previous experience in the laboratory. Although strategically our games are very similar to previous experiments in which game theory predictions fail dramatically, 80% of actions taken in our experiment coincided with the prediction of the unique Nash equilibrium in pure strategies and 73% of actions were best responses to elicited beliefs. We argue how social preferences, presentation effects and belief elicitation procedures may influence how subjects play in simple but non trivial games and explain the diferences we observe with respect to previous work.

Ecology of sandflies (Diptera: Psychodidae) in a restricted focus of cutaneous leishmaniasis en Northern Venezuela: I. Description of the study area, catching methods and species composition

A study on the ecology of phlebotomine sandfly fauna in a restricted focus of cutaneous leishmaniasis in northern Venezuela was undertaken in order to investigate the species responsible for the transmission. The study area and catching methods for phlebotomine sandflies are described. A total of 9,061 females and 1,662 males were collected during a year-term study. 12 species of Lutzomya and 1 species of Brumptomya sp. were identified. Absolute and relative abundance and ocurrence for each species were determined. The rel ative occurrence allowed to distinguish the common species, viz. L. panamensis, L. ovallesi, L. gomezi, L. tinidadensis, L. atroclavata, L. cayennensis, L. shannoni and L. olmeca bicolor from the rare species vis., L. punctigeniculata, L. rangeliana, L. evansi and L. dubitans. General comments on the species composition of the sandfly fauna in this locality are made.

Characterizations of Lojasiewicz inequalities and applications

The classical Lojasiewicz inequality and its extensions for partial differential equation problems (Simon) and to o-minimal structures (Kurdyka) have a considerable impact on the analysis of gradient-like methods and related problems: minimization methods, complexity theory, asymptotic analysis of dissipative partial differential equations, tame geometry. This paper provides alternative characterizations of this type of inequalities for nonsmooth lower semicontinuous functions defined on a metric or a real Hilbert space. In a metric context, we show that a generalized form of the Lojasiewicz inequality (hereby called the Kurdyka- Lojasiewicz inequality) relates to metric regularity and to the Lipschitz continuity of the sublevel mapping, yielding applications to discrete methods (strong convergence of the proximal algorithm). In a Hilbert setting we further establish that asymptotic properties of the semiflow generated by -∂f are strongly linked to this inequality. This is done by introducing the notion of a piecewise subgradient curve: such curves have uniformly bounded lengths if and only if the Kurdyka- Lojasiewicz inequality is satisfied. Further characterizations in terms of talweg lines -a concept linked to the location of the less steepest points at the level sets of f- and integrability conditions are given. In the convex case these results are significantly reinforced, allowing in particular to establish the asymptotic equivalence of discrete gradient methods and continuous gradient curves. On the other hand, a counterexample of a convex C2 function in R2 is constructed to illustrate the fact that, contrary to our intuition, and unless a specific growth condition is satisfied, convex functions may fail to fulfill the Kurdyka- Lojasiewicz inequality.

Payoff levels, loss avoidance, and equilibrium selection in the Stag Hunt: an experimental study

Game theorists typically assume that changing a game’s payoff levels—by adding the same constant to, or subtracting it from, all payoffs—should not affect behavior. While this invariance is an implication of the theory when payoffs mirror expected utilities, it is an empirical question when the “payoffs” are actually money amounts. In particular, if individuals treat monetary gains and losses differently, then payoff–level changes may matter when they result in positive payoffs becoming negative, or vice versa. We report the results of a human–subjects experiment designed to test for two types of loss avoidance: certain–loss avoidance (avoiding a strategy leading to a sure loss, in favor of an alternative that might lead to a gain) and possible–loss avoidance (avoiding a strategy leading to a possible loss, in favor of an alternative that leads to a sure gain). Subjects in the experiment play three versions of Stag Hunt, which are identical up to the level of payoffs, under a variety of treatments. We find differences in behavior across the three versions of Stag Hunt; these differences are hard to detect in the first round of play, but grow over time. When significant, the differences we find are in the direction predicted by certain– and possible–loss avoidance. Our results carry implications for games with multiple equilibria, and for theories that attempt to select among equilibria in such games.

Virus infection speeds: theory versus experiment

In order to explain the speed of Vesicular Stomatitis Virus VSV infections, we develop a simple model that improves previous approaches to the propagation of virus infections. For VSV infections, we find that the delay time elapsed between the adsorption of a viral particle into a cell and the release of its progeny has a veryimportant effect. Moreover, this delay time makes the adsorption rate essentially irrelevant in order to predict VSV infection speeds. Numerical simulations are in agreement with the analytical results. Our model satisfactorily explains the experimentally measured speeds of VSV infections

Fitness, inclusive fitness, and optimization

Individual-as-maximizing agent analogies result in a simple understanding of the functioning of the biological world. Identifying the conditions under which individuals can be regarded as fitness maximizing agents is thus of considerable interest to biologists. Here, we compare different concepts of fitness maximization, and discuss within a single framework the relationship between Hamilton's (J Theor Biol 7: 1-16, 1964) model of social interactions, Grafen's (J Evol Biol 20: 1243-1254, 2007a) formal Darwinism project, and the idea of evolutionary stable strategies. We distinguish cases where phenotypic effects are additive separable or not, the latter not being covered by Grafen's analysis. In both cases it is possible to define a maximand, in the form of an objective function phi(z), whose argument is the phenotype of an individual and whose derivative is proportional to Hamilton's inclusive fitness effect. However, this maximand can be identified with the expression for fecundity or fitness only in the case of additive separable phenotypic effects, making individual-as-maximizing agent analogies unattractive (although formally correct) under general situations of social interactions. We also feel that there is an inconsistency in Grafen's characterization of the solution of his maximization program by use of inclusive fitness arguments. His results are in conflict with those on evolutionary stable strategies obtained by applying inclusive fitness theory, and can be repaired only by changing the definition of the problem.

Local Competition, Inbreeding, and the Evolution of Sex-Biased Dispersal.

Using game theory, we developed a kin-selection model to investigate the consequences of local competition and inbreeding depression on the evolution of natal dispersal. Mating systems have the potential to favor strong sex biases in dispersal because sex differences in potential reproductive success affect the balance between local resource competition and local mate competition. No bias is expected when local competition equally affects males and females, as happens in monogamous systems and also in polygynous or promiscuous ones as long as female fitness is limited by extrinsic factors (breeding resources). In contrast, a male-biased dispersal is predicted when local mate competition exceeds local resource competition, as happens under polygyny/promiscuity when female fitness is limited by intrinsic factors (maximal rate of processing resources rather than resources themselves). This bias is reinforced by among-sex interactions: female philopatry enhances breeding opportunities for related males, while male dispersal decreases the chances that related females will inbreed. These results meet empirical patterns in mammals: polygynous/promiscuous species usually display a male-biased dispersal, while both sexes disperse in monogamous species. A parallel is drawn with sex-ratio theory, which also predicts biases toward the sex that suffers less from local competition. Optimal sex ratios and optimal sex-specific dispersal show mutual dependence, which argues for the development of coevolution models.

Evolutionary games on complex networks : the emergence and maintenance of cooperation

Abstract The object of game theory lies in the analysis of situations where different social actors have conflicting requirements and where their individual decisions will all influence the global outcome. In this framework, several games have been invented to capture the essence of various dilemmas encountered in many common important socio-economic situations. Even though these games often succeed in helping us understand human or animal behavior in interactive settings, some experiments have shown that people tend to cooperate with each other in situations for which classical game theory strongly recommends them to do the exact opposite. Several mechanisms have been invoked to try to explain the emergence of this unexpected cooperative attitude. Among them, repeated interaction, reputation, and belonging to a recognizable group have often been mentioned. However, the work of Nowak and May (1992) showed that the simple fact of arranging the players according to a spatial structure and only allowing them to interact with their immediate neighbors is sufficient to sustain a certain amount of cooperation even when the game is played anonymously and without repetition. Nowak and May's study and much of the following work was based on regular structures such as two-dimensional grids. Axelrod et al. (2002) showed that by randomizing the choice of neighbors, i.e. by actually giving up a strictly local geographical structure, cooperation can still emerge, provided that the interaction patterns remain stable in time. This is a first step towards a social network structure. However, following pioneering work by sociologists in the sixties such as that of Milgram (1967), in the last few years it has become apparent that many social and biological interaction networks, and even some technological networks, have particular, and partly unexpected, properties that set them apart from regular or random graphs. Among other things, they usually display broad degree distributions, and show small-world topological structure. Roughly speaking, a small-world graph is a network where any individual is relatively close, in terms of social ties, to any other individual, a property also found in random graphs but not in regular lattices. However, in contrast with random graphs, small-world networks also have a certain amount of local structure, as measured, for instance, by a quantity called the clustering coefficient. In the same vein, many real conflicting situations in economy and sociology are not well described neither by a fixed geographical position of the individuals in a regular lattice, nor by a random graph. Furthermore, it is a known fact that network structure can highly influence dynamical phenomena such as the way diseases spread across a population and ideas or information get transmitted. Therefore, in the last decade, research attention has naturally shifted from random and regular graphs towards better models of social interaction structures. The primary goal of this work is to discover whether or not the underlying graph structure of real social networks could give explanations as to why one finds higher levels of cooperation in populations of human beings or animals than what is prescribed by classical game theory. To meet this objective, I start by thoroughly studying a real scientific coauthorship network and showing how it differs from biological or technological networks using divers statistical measurements. Furthermore, I extract and describe its community structure taking into account the intensity of a collaboration. Finally, I investigate the temporal evolution of the network, from its inception to its state at the time of the study in 2006, suggesting also an effective view of it as opposed to a historical one. Thereafter, I combine evolutionary game theory with several network models along with the studied coauthorship network in order to highlight which specific network properties foster cooperation and shed some light on the various mechanisms responsible for the maintenance of this same cooperation. I point out the fact that, to resist defection, cooperators take advantage, whenever possible, of the degree-heterogeneity of social networks and their underlying community structure. Finally, I show that cooperation level and stability depend not only on the game played, but also on the evolutionary dynamic rules used and the individual payoff calculations. Synopsis Le but de la théorie des jeux réside dans l'analyse de situations dans lesquelles différents acteurs sociaux, avec des objectifs souvent conflictuels, doivent individuellement prendre des décisions qui influenceront toutes le résultat global. Dans ce cadre, plusieurs jeux ont été inventés afin de saisir l'essence de divers dilemmes rencontrés dans d'importantes situations socio-économiques. Bien que ces jeux nous permettent souvent de comprendre le comportement d'êtres humains ou d'animaux en interactions, des expériences ont montré que les individus ont parfois tendance à coopérer dans des situations pour lesquelles la théorie classique des jeux prescrit de faire le contraire. Plusieurs mécanismes ont été invoqués pour tenter d'expliquer l'émergence de ce comportement coopératif inattendu. Parmi ceux-ci, la répétition des interactions, la réputation ou encore l'appartenance à des groupes reconnaissables ont souvent été mentionnés. Toutefois, les travaux de Nowak et May (1992) ont montré que le simple fait de disposer les joueurs selon une structure spatiale en leur permettant d'interagir uniquement avec leurs voisins directs est suffisant pour maintenir un certain niveau de coopération même si le jeu est joué de manière anonyme et sans répétitions. L'étude de Nowak et May, ainsi qu'un nombre substantiel de travaux qui ont suivi, étaient basés sur des structures régulières telles que des grilles à deux dimensions. Axelrod et al. (2002) ont montré qu'en randomisant le choix des voisins, i.e. en abandonnant une localisation géographique stricte, la coopération peut malgré tout émerger, pour autant que les schémas d'interactions restent stables au cours du temps. Ceci est un premier pas en direction d'une structure de réseau social. Toutefois, suite aux travaux précurseurs de sociologues des années soixante, tels que ceux de Milgram (1967), il est devenu clair ces dernières années qu'une grande partie des réseaux d'interactions sociaux et biologiques, et même quelques réseaux technologiques, possèdent des propriétés particulières, et partiellement inattendues, qui les distinguent de graphes réguliers ou aléatoires. Entre autres, ils affichent en général une distribution du degré relativement large ainsi qu'une structure de "petit-monde". Grossièrement parlant, un graphe "petit-monde" est un réseau où tout individu se trouve relativement près de tout autre individu en termes de distance sociale, une propriété également présente dans les graphes aléatoires mais absente des grilles régulières. Par contre, les réseaux "petit-monde" ont, contrairement aux graphes aléatoires, une certaine structure de localité, mesurée par exemple par une quantité appelée le "coefficient de clustering". Dans le même esprit, plusieurs situations réelles de conflit en économie et sociologie ne sont pas bien décrites ni par des positions géographiquement fixes des individus en grilles régulières, ni par des graphes aléatoires. De plus, il est bien connu que la structure même d'un réseau peut passablement influencer des phénomènes dynamiques tels que la manière qu'a une maladie de se répandre à travers une population, ou encore la façon dont des idées ou une information s'y propagent. Ainsi, durant cette dernière décennie, l'attention de la recherche s'est tout naturellement déplacée des graphes aléatoires et réguliers vers de meilleurs modèles de structure d'interactions sociales. L'objectif principal de ce travail est de découvrir si la structure sous-jacente de graphe de vrais réseaux sociaux peut fournir des explications quant aux raisons pour lesquelles on trouve, chez certains groupes d'êtres humains ou d'animaux, des niveaux de coopération supérieurs à ce qui est prescrit par la théorie classique des jeux. Dans l'optique d'atteindre ce but, je commence par étudier un véritable réseau de collaborations scientifiques et, en utilisant diverses mesures statistiques, je mets en évidence la manière dont il diffère de réseaux biologiques ou technologiques. De plus, j'extrais et je décris sa structure de communautés en tenant compte de l'intensité d'une collaboration. Finalement, j'examine l'évolution temporelle du réseau depuis son origine jusqu'à son état en 2006, date à laquelle l'étude a été effectuée, en suggérant également une vue effective du réseau par opposition à une vue historique. Par la suite, je combine la théorie évolutionnaire des jeux avec des réseaux comprenant plusieurs modèles et le réseau de collaboration susmentionné, afin de déterminer les propriétés structurelles utiles à la promotion de la coopération et les mécanismes responsables du maintien de celle-ci. Je mets en évidence le fait que, pour ne pas succomber à la défection, les coopérateurs exploitent dans la mesure du possible l'hétérogénéité des réseaux sociaux en termes de degré ainsi que la structure de communautés sous-jacente de ces mêmes réseaux. Finalement, je montre que le niveau de coopération et sa stabilité dépendent non seulement du jeu joué, mais aussi des règles de la dynamique évolutionnaire utilisées et du calcul du bénéfice d'un individu.