How competition controls team production: The case of fishing firms

Under team production, those who monitor individual productivity areusually the only ones compensated with a residual that varies withthe performance of the team. This pattern is efficient, as is shownby the prevalence of conventional firms, except for small teams andwhen specialized monitoring is ineffective. Profit sharing in repeatedteam production induces all team members to take disciplinary actionagainst underperformers through switching and separation decisions,however. Such action provides effective self-enforcemnt when themarkets for team members are competitive, even for large teams usingspecialized monitoring. The traditional share system of fishing firmsshows that for this competition to provide powerful enough incentivesthe costs of switching teams and measuring team productivity must bebellow. Risk allocation may constrain the organizational designdefined by the use of a share system. It does not account for itsexistence, however.

Plasmacytoid dendritic cells promote immunosuppression in ovarian cancer via ICOS costimulation of Foxp3(+) T-regulatory cells.

Epithelial ovarian cancer (EOC) is the fifth most common cause of cancer death among women. Despite its immunogenicity, effective antitumor responses are limited, due, in part, to the presence of forkhead box protein 3-positive (Foxp3(+)) T regulatory (Treg) cells in the tumor microenvironment. However, the mechanisms that regulate the accumulation and the suppressive function of these Foxp3(+) Treg cells are poorly understood. Here, we found that the majority of Foxp3(+) Treg cells accumulating in the tumor microenvironment of EOCs belong to the subset of Foxp3(+) Treg cells expressing inducible costimulator (ICOS). The expansion and the suppressive function of these cells were strictly dependent on ICOS-L costimulation provided by tumor plasmacytoid dendritic cells (pDC). Accordingly, ICOS(+) Foxp3(+) Treg cells were found to localize in close vicinity of tumor pDCs, and their number directly correlated with the numbers of pDCs in the tumors. Furthermore, pDCs and ICOS(+) Foxp3(+) Treg cells were found to be strong predictors for disease progression in patients with ovarian cancer, with ICOS(+) Treg cell subset being a stronger predictor than total Foxp3(+) Treg cells. These findings suggest an essential role for pDCs and ICOS-L in immunosuppression mediated by ICOS(+) Foxp3(+) Treg cells, leading to tumor progression in ovarian cancer.

Bundling and competition for slots: On the portfolio effects of bundling

We consider competition among sellers when each of them sells a portfolio ofdistinct products to a buyer having limited slots. We study how bundling affectscompetition for slots. Under independent pricing, equilibrium often does not existand hence the outcome is often inefficient. When bundling is allowed, each sellerhas an incentive to bundle his products and an efficient equilibrium always exists.Furthermore, in the case of digital goods, all equilibria are efficient if slotting contracts are prohibited. We also identify portfolio effects of bundling and analyze theconsequences on horizontal mergers. Finally, we derive clear-cut policy implications.

Increasing returns, imperfect competition and factor prices

We show how, in general equilibrium models featuring increasing returns, imperfectcompetition and endogenous markups, changes in the scale of economic activity affectincome distribution across factors. Whenever final goods are gross-substitutes (gross-complements), a scale expansion raises (lowers) the relative reward of the scarce factoror the factor used intensively in the sector characterized by a higher degree of product differentiation and higher fixed costs. Under very reasonable hypothesis, our theory suggests that scale is skill-biased. This result provides a microfoundation for the secular increase in the relative demand for skilled labor. Moreover, it constitutes an important link among major explanations for the rise in wage inequality: skill-biased technical change, capital-skill complementarities and international trade. We provide new evidence on the mechanism underlying the skill bias of scale.

Conflicts of interest, information provision and competition in banking

In some markets, such as the market for drugs or for financial services, sellers have better information than buyersregarding the matching between the buyer's needs and the good's actual characteristics. Depending on the market structure,this may lead to conflicts of interest and/or the underprovision of information by the seller. This paper studies this issuein the market for financial services. The analysis presents a new model of competition between banks, as banks' pricecompetition influences the ensuing incentives for truthful information revelation. We compare two different firm structures,specialized banking, where financial institutions provide a unique financial product, and one-stop banking, where a financialinstitution is able to provide several financial products which are horizontally differentiated. We show first that, althoughconflicts of interest may prevent information disclosure under monopoly, competition forces full information provision forsufficiently high reputation costs. Second, in the presence of market power, one-stop banks will use information strategicallyto increase product differentiation and therefore will always provide reliable information and charge higher rices thanspecialized banks, thus providing a new justification for the creation of one-stop banks. Finally, we show that, ifindependent financial advisers are able to provide reliable information, this increases product differentiation and thereforemarket power, so that it is in the interest of financial intermediaries to promote external independent financial advice.

The provision on non-audit services by auditors: Let the market evolve and decide

The provision of non-audit services by auditors to their auditclients reduces total costs, increases technical competence and motivates more intense competition. Furthermore, theseservices do not necessarily damage auditor independence nor the quality of non-audit services. This assessment leads to recommending that legislative policy should aim at facilitating the development and use of the safeguardsprovided by the free action of market forces. Regulation should thus aim to enable the parties-audit firms, self-regulatory bodies and audit clients-to discover through competitive market interaction both the most efficient mix of services and the corresponding quality safeguards, adjusting for the costs and benefits of each possibility. Particular emphasis is placed on the role played by fee income diversification and the enhancement, through disclosurerules, of market incentives to diversify.

R&D in the pharmaceutical industry: A world of small innovations

It is commonly argued that in recent years pharmaceutical companies have directed theirR&D towards small improvements of existing compounds instead of more risky drastic innovations. In this paper we show that the proliferation of these small innovations is likely to be linked to the lack of market sensitivity of a part of the demand to changes in prices. Compared to their social contribution, small innovations are relatively more profitable than large ones because they are targeted to the smaller but more inelastic part of the demand. We also study the effect of regulatory instruments such as price ceilings, copayments and reference prices and extend the analysis to competition in research.

Corruption and competition in procurement

We consider a procurement problem in which the procurement agent is supposed to allocate the realization of a project according to a competitive mechanism that values bids in terms of the proposed price and quality. Potential bidders have private information about their production costs. Since the procurement agent is also in charge of verifying delivered quality, in exchange for a bribe, he can allow an arbitrary firm to be awarded the realization of the project and to produce a quality level lower than the announced. We compute the equilibrium level of corruption and we study the impact on corruption of the competitiveness of the environment, and in particular of: i) an increase in the number of potential suppliers of the good or service to be procured, ii) competitive (rather than collusive) behavior of procurement agents, and iii) an increase of competition in the market for procurement agents. We identify the effects that influence the equilibrium level of corruption and show that, contrary to conventional wisdom, corruption may well be increasing in competition.

Electoral competition under the threat of political unrest

We study elections in which one party (the strong party) controls a source of political unrest; e.g., this party could instigate riots if it lost the election. We show that the strong party is more likely to win the election when there is less information about its ability to cause unrest. This is because when theweak party is better informed, it can more reliably prevent political unrest by implementing a ``centrist'' policy. When there is uncertainty over the credibility of the threat, ``posturing'' by the strong party leads to platform divergence.

Indoleamine 2,3-dioxygenase-expressing mature human monocyte-derived dendritic cells expand potent autologous regulatory T cells.

A comprehensive understanding of the complex, autologous cellular interactions and regulatory mechanisms that occur during normal dendritic cell (DC)-stimulated immune responses is critical to optimizing DC-based immunotherapy. We have found that mature, immunogenic human monocyte-derived DCs (moDCs) up-regulate the immune-inhibitory enzyme, indoleamine 2,3-dioxygenase (IDO). Under stringent autologous culture conditions without exogenous cytokines, mature moDCs expand regulatory T cells (Tregs) by an IDO-dependent mechanism. The priming of resting T cells with autologous, IDO-expressing, mature moDCs results in up to 10-fold expansion of CD4(+)CD25(bright)Foxp3(+)CD127(neg) Tregs. Treg expansion requires moDC contact, CD80/CD86 ligation, and endogenous interleukin-2. Cytofluorographically sorted CD4(+) CD25(bright)Foxp3(+) Tregs inhibit as much as 80% to 90% of DC-stimulated autologous and allogeneic T-cell proliferation, in a dose-dependent manner at Treg:T-cell ratios of 1:1, 1:5, and as low as 1:25. CD4(+)CD25(bright)Foxp3(+) Tregs also suppress the generation of cytotoxic T lymphocytes specific for the Wilms tumor antigen 1, resulting in more than an 80% decrease in specific target cell lysis. Suppression by Tregs is both contact-dependent and transforming growth factor-beta-mediated. Although mature moDCs can generate Tregs by this IDO-dependent mechanism to limit otherwise unrestrained immune responses, inhibition of this counter-regulatory pathway should also prove useful in sustaining responses stimulated by DC-based immunotherapy.

Biodiesel Facility Regulatory Assistance Guide, 2008

This guide is a general outline for bio diesel facilities on potential regulatory requirements and regulatory agency approval times. Much of the information is related to environmental permitting by the Iowa Department of Natural Resources (IDNR). Your facility’s permit requirements may differ depending upon the specific operations planned. Information is also provided about regulatory requirements administered by the Iowa Workforce Development, Labor Services Division and the Iowa Department of Public Safety, Fire Marshal Division. Requirements established by local units of government may also apply. Be sure to contact the city in which the facility will be located or the county if the facility is not located in a city, to identify these requirements.

Ethanol Facility Regulatory Assistance Guide, May 19, 2008

This guide is a general outline for ethanol facilities on potential regulatory requirements and regulatory agency approval times. Much of the information is related to environmental permitting by the Iowa Department of Natural Resources (IDNR). Your facility’s permit requirements may differ depending upon the specific operations planned. Information is also provided about regulatory requirements administered by the Iowa Workforce Development, Labor Services Division and the Iowa Department of Public Safety, Fire Marshal Division. Requirements established by local units of government may also apply. Be sure to contact the city in which the facility will be located or the county if the facility is not located in a city, to identify these requirements.

Propane Regulatory Assistance Guilty,

This fact sheets summarizes, in brief form, the compliance requirements for transportation, storage, handling and use of propane. It is not intended to provide comprehensive guidance on regulatory compliance for those dealing with propane, but to highlight those requirements and to assist those who may be affected by the various requirements to obtain detailed information when needed. Information about requirements which apply to the use of propane as a motor fuel is not included.

Regulatory Assistance, March 12, 2009

The Iowa Business and Regulatory Assistance Network ensures access and responsiveness to inquiries and requests for assistance from citizens, small business, industry and local governments. Facilitated by the Iowa Department of Economic Development (IDED), Business Assistance Coordinators in agencies across state government coordinate regulatory response and service. You may contact IDED or any of the agency contacts listed in this publication for assistance.