Is there a connection between the tax administration and the political power?

This paper offers empirical evidence from Spain of a connection between the tax administration and the political power. Firstly, the regional tax administration is not immune to the budgetary situation of regional government, and tends to exert a greater (or lesser) effort in tax collection the greater (or lower) the (expected) public deficit. At the same time, the system of unconditional grants from the central layer of government provokes an ¿income effect¿ which disincentivises the efforts of the tax administration. Secondly, these efforts also decrease when the margin to lose a parliamentary seat in an electoral district is cut, although the importance of this disincentive decreases according to the parliamentary strength of the incumbent

Lobbying, political competition, and local land supply: recent evidence from Spain

We analyze whether local land supply is influenced by the degree of political competition, and interpret the findings as being indicative of the influence wielded by land development lobbies. We use a new database including both political and land supply data for more than 2,000 Spanish municipalities for the period 2003-2007. In Spain, land use policies are largely a local responsibility with municipalities having periodically to pass compre- hensive land use plans. The main policy variable in these plans, and the one analyzed here, is the amount of land classified for potential development. We measure local political competition as the margin of victory of the incumbent government. We instrument this variable using the number of votes obtained by parties represented in local government when standing at the first national legislative elections following the re-establishment of democracy, and the number of votes they actually obtained regionally at the national legislative elections. The results indicate that stiffer political competition does indeed reduce the amount of new land designated for development. This effect is found to be most marked in suburbs, in towns with a high percent of commuters and homeowners, and in municipalities governed by the left.

Building a Social Accounting Matrix within the ESA95 Framework: Obtaining a Dataset for Applied General Equilibrium Modelling

This research provides a description of the process followed in order to assemble a "Social Accounting Matrix" for Spain corresponding to the year 2000 (SAMSP00). As argued in the paper, this process attempts to reconcile ESA95 conventions with requirements of applied general equilibrium modelling. Particularly, problems related to the level of aggregation of net taxation data, and to the valuation system used for expressing the monetary value of input-output transactions have deserved special attention. Since the adoption of ESA95 conventions, input-output transactions have been preferably valued at basic prices, which impose additional difficulties on modellers interested in computing applied general equilibrium models. This paper addresses these difficulties by developing a procedure that allows SAM-builders to change the valuation system of input-output transactions conveniently. In addition, this procedure produces new data related to net taxation information.

Lobbying, political competition, and local land supply: recent evidence from Spain

We analyze whether local land supply is influenced by the degree of political competition, and interpret the findings as being indicative of the influence wielded by land development lobbies. We use a new database including both political and land supply data for more than 2,000 Spanish municipalities for the period 2003-2007. In Spain, land use policies are largely a local responsibility with municipalities having periodically to pass compre- hensive land use plans. The main policy variable in these plans, and the one analyzed here, is the amount of land classified for potential development. We measure local political competition as the margin of victory of the incumbent government. We instrument this variable using the number of votes obtained by parties represented in local government when standing at the first national legislative elections following the re-establishment of democracy, and the number of votes they actually obtained regionally at the national legislative elections. The results indicate that stiffer political competition does indeed reduce the amount of new land designated for development. This effect is found to be most marked in suburbs, in towns with a high percent of commuters and homeowners, and in municipalities governed by the left.

A comparison of the processes of institutionalisation of political economy in Spain and Italy (1860-1900)

[spa] El estudio de los procesos a través de los cuales la economía política se ha transformado en una disciplina académica es un área de creciente interés en la historia del pensamiento económico. Dicho estudio se ha abordado a través del análisis de la importancia de la economía política en un conjunto de instituciones, consideradas clave en la expansión de la economía en las sociedades occidentales en la segunda mitad del siglo XIX y primeras décadas del XX: universidades, sociedades económicas, publicaciones periódicas de contenido económico y los parlamentos nacionales. Este papel presenta una comparación entre los desarrollos del proceso de institutionalización de la economía política en España e Italia, a través del estudio de la presencia de esta disciplina en las instituciones mencionadas para el periodo 1860-1900. El objetivo es medir la posible existencia de una vía común en la institucionalización de la economía política en ambos países, como un primer paso hacia la elaboración de un modelo supranacional de institucionalización de la economía en este periodo.

Is there a connection between the tax administration and the political power?

This paper offers empirical evidence from Spain of a connection between the tax administration and the political power. Firstly, the regional tax administration is not immune to the budgetary situation of regional government, and tends to exert a greater (or lesser) effort in tax collection the greater (or lower) the (expected) public deficit. At the same time, the system of unconditional grants from the central layer of government provokes an ¿income effect¿ which disincentivises the efforts of the tax administration. Secondly, these efforts also decrease when the margin to lose a parliamentary seat in an electoral district is cut, although the importance of this disincentive decreases according to the parliamentary strength of the incumbent

Political economy of municipal water service privatization in Spain: a duration model analysis

This empirical work applies a duration model to the study of factors determining privatization of local water services. I assess how factors determining privatization decision evolve as time goes by. A sample of 133 Spanish municipalities during the six terms of office taken place during the 1980-2002 period is analyzed. A dynamic neighboring effect is hypothesized and successfully tested. In a first stage, private water supply firms may try to expand to regions where there is no service privatized, in order to spread over this region after having being installed thanks to its scale advantages. Other factors influencing privatization decision evolve during the two decades under study, from the priority to fix old infrastructures to the concern about service efficiency. Some complementary results regarding political and budgetary factors are also obtained

Reading films through political classics : genres of politics in popular cultures

Abstract: Readin films through political classics

Carbon balance and crop residue management in dynamic equilibrium under a no-till system in Campos Gerais

The adoption of no-tillage systems (NT) and the maintenance of crop residues on the soil surface result in the long-term increase of carbon (C) in the system, promoting C sequestration and reducing C-CO2 emissions to the atmosphere. The purpose of this study was to evaluate the C sequestration rate and the minimum amount of crop residues required to maintain the dynamic C equilibrium (dC/dt = 0) of two soils (Typic Hapludox) with different textural classes. The experiment was arranged in a 2 x 2 x 2 randomized block factorial design. The following factors were analyzed: (a) two soil types: Typic Hapludox (Oxisol) with medium texture (LVTM) and Oxisol with clay texture (LVTA), (b) two sampling layers (0-5 and 5-20 cm), and (c) two sampling periods (P1 - October 2007; P2 - September 2008). Samples were collected from fields under a long-term (20 years) NT system with the following crop rotations: wheat/soybean/black oat + vetch/maize (LVTM) and wheat/maize/black oat + vetch/soybean (LVTA). The annual C sequestration rates were 0.83 and 0.76 Mg ha-1 for LVTM and LVTA, respectively. The estimates of the minimum amount of crop residues required to maintain a dynamic equilibrium (dC/dt = 0) were 7.13 and 6.53 Mg ha-1 year-1 for LVTM and LVTA, respectively. The C conversion rate in both studied soils was lower than that reported in other studies in the region, resulting in a greater amount of crop residues left on the soil surface.