Flashlight Europe N°2–September 2014: Is It Better To Be Alone Than Lonely Together? Scotland Is Voting On Whether Or Not To Become Independent

On 18 September 2014 the Scots are voting on whether or not to sever their ties with the UK. And the pro-independence camp is catching up fast. A survey conducted at the beginning of the month revealed that for the first time 51 percent of the Scottish electorate say that they will be casting a Yes vote, i.e. that they are in favour of independence. The outcome is now in the hands of the undecided voters, who are currently being heavily courted by the various parties. If the Scots vote in favour of independence, it is bound to cast doubt on the future of the government of David Cameron, the Conservative Party leader. Who is fighting on which side? What are the arguments? And what will happen if the Scots decide to opt out of the United Kingdom? Here are some of the things that are a distinct possibility.

Besser allein als gemeinsam einsam? Schottland stimmt über seine Unabhängigkeit ab = Flashlight Europe No. 2, September 2014: Scotland Is Voting On Whether Or Not To Become Independent

No abstract.

Kazakhstan’s voting enthusiasm. EUCAM Commentary No. 11, April 2011

The Kazakhstani political landscape will not be shaken by similar tremors to those that have rocked North Africa and the Middle East in recent months. President Nazarbayev who has been at the helm of Kazakhstan's political architecture since the fall of the Soviet Union is destined to stay. This is in spite of hopes that economic development coupled with the 2010 OSCE Chairmanship would spur the democratisation of the oil-rich state and lead to the rise of a natural successor for the 70 year old leader.

Strategic Voting in Proportional Systems: The Case of Finland. IHS Political Science Series No. 138, September 2014

Voters try to avoid wasting their votes even in PR systems. In this paper we make a case that this type of strategic voting can be observed and predicted even in PR systems. Contrary to the literature we do not see weak institutional incentive structures as indicative of a hopeless endeavor for studying strategic voting. The crucial question for strategic voting is how institutional incentives constrain an individual’s decision-making process. Based on expected utility maximization we put forward a micro-logic of an individual’s expectation formation process driven by institutional and dispositional incentives. All well-known institutional incentives to vote strategically that get channelled through the district magnitude are moderated by dispositional factors in order to become relevant for voting decisions. Employing data from Finland – because of its electoral system a particularly hard testing ground - we find considerable evidence for observable implications of our theory.