Immigration and the survival of the welfare state

This paper analyzes the political sustainability of the welfare state in a model where immigration policy is also endogenous. In the model, the skills of the native population are affected by immigration and skill accumulation. Moreover, immigrants affect future policies, once they gain the right to vote. The main finding is that the long-run survival of redistributive policies is linked to an immigration policy specifying both skill and quantity restrictions. In particular, in steady state the unskilled majority admits a limited inflow of unskilled immigrants in order to offset growth in the fraction of skilled voters and maintain a high degree of income redistribution.Interestingly, equilibrium immigration policy shifts from unrestricted skilled immigration,when the country is skill-scarce, to restricted unskilled immigration, as the fraction of native skilled workers increases. The analysis also suggests a new set of variables that may help explain international differences in immigration restrictions.

Negativity effect in multiparty electoral competition

We construct a dynamic voting model of multiparty competition in order to capture the following facts: voters base their decision on past economicperformance of the parties, and parties and candidates have different objectives. This model may explain the emergence of parties' ideologies,and shows the compatibility of the different objectives of parties and candidates. Together, these results give rise to the formation ofpolitical parties, as infinetely-lived agents with a certain ideology, out of the competition of myopic candidates freely choosing policy positions. We also show that in multicandidate elections held under the plurality system, Hotelling's principle of minimum differentiation is no longer satisfied.

Electoral platforms, implemented policies and abstention

Recent studies of American politics evidence that political polarization of both the electorate and the political elite have moved 'almost in tandem for the past half century' (McCarty et al., 2003, p.2), and that party polarization has steadily increased since the 1970s. On the other hand, the empirical literature on party platforms and implemented policies has consistently found an imperfect but nonnegligible correlation between electoral platforms and governmental policies: while platforms tend to be polarized, policies are moderate or centrist. However, existing theoretical models of political competition are not manifestly compatible with these observations.In this paper, we distinguish between electoral platforms and implemented policies by incorporating a non-trivial policy-setting process. It follows that voters may care not only about the implemented policy but also about the platform they support with their vote. We find that while parties tend to polarize their positions, the risk of alienating their constituency prevents them from radicalizing. The analysis evidences that the distribution of the electorate, and not only the (expected) location of a pivotal voter, matters in determining policies. Our results are consistent with the observation of polarized platforms and moderate policies, and the alienation and indifference components of abstention.

On the justice of voting systems

What are the best voting systems in terms of utilitarianism? Or in terms of maximin, or maximax? We study these questions for the case of three alternatives and a class of structurally equivalent voting rules. We show that plurality, arguably the most widely used voting system, performs very poorly in terms of remarkable ideals of justice, such as utilitarianism or maximin, and yet is optimal in terms of maximax. Utilitarianism is bestapproached by a voting system converging to the Borda count, while the best way to achieve maximin is by means of a voting system converging to negative voting. We study the robustness of our results across different social cultures, measures of performance, and population sizes.

Social security in theory and practice (I): Facts and political theories

166 countries have some kind of public old age pension. What economic forcescreate and sustain old age Social Security as a public program? We document some of the internationally and historically common features of Social Security programs including explicit and implicit taxes on labor supply, pay-as-you-go features, intergenerational redistribution, benefits which areincreasing functions of lifetime earnings and not means-tested. We partition theories of Social Security into three groups: "political", "efficiency" and "narrative" theories. We explore three political theories in this paper: the majority rational voting model (with its two versions: "the elderly as the leaders of a winning coalition with the poor" and the "once and for all election" model), the "time-intensive model of political competition" and the "taxpayer protection model". Each of the explanations is compared with the international and historical facts. A companion paper explores the "efficiency" and "narrative" theories, and derives implicationsof all the theories for replacing the typical pay-as-you-go system with a forced savings plan.

A positive theory of geographic mobility and social insurance

This paper presents a tractable dynamic general equilibrium model thatcan explain cross-country empirical regularities in geographical mobility,unemployment and labor market institutions. Rational agents vote overunemployment insurance (UI), taking the dynamic distortionary effects ofinsurance on the performance of the labor market into consideration.Agents with higher cost of moving, i.e., more attached to their currentlocation, prefer more generous UI. The key assumption is that an agent'sattachment to a location increases the longer she has resided there. UIreduces the incentive for labor mobility and increases, therefore, thefraction of attached agents and the political support for UI. The mainresult is that this self-reinforcing mechanism can give rise to multiplesteady-states-one 'European' steady-state featuring high unemployment,low geographical mobility and high unemployment insurance, and one'American' steady-state featuring low unemployment, high mobility andlow unemployment insurance.

Iowa Secretary of State 2008 Report, 2008

This report highlights the landmark election legislation adopted in the past two years and statistical information on absentee ballots, provisional ballots, and Election Day Registration. In addition, the report outlines the responsibilities of our Business Services Division which handles hundreds of thousands of corporate filings annually. The Secretary of State’s proposals to the 83rd General Assembly for 2009 legislation are mostly technical in nature and are also set forth in this report. The presidential election on November 4, 2008, brought more voters to the polls in Iowa than ever before. Despite fears of election day problems due to new voting equipment, Election Day Registration, and challenged voter procedures, the election went very smoothly in Iowa. The Elections and Voter Registration Division of my office worked diligently to provide training materials for election administrators and fielded thousands of calls and emails from voters. The result was an efficiently-run election statewide. Though the Secretary of State’s Office, like all other state agencies, is operating under strict budgetary constraints, I assure you that my staff and I will continue to provide excellent service and develop innovative solutions to get through these rough economic times.

Lobbying, political competition, and local land supply: recent evidence from Spain

We analyze whether local land supply is influenced by the degree of political competition, and interpret the findings as being indicative of the influence wielded by land development lobbies. We use a new database including both political and land supply data for more than 2,000 Spanish municipalities for the period 2003-2007. In Spain, land use policies are largely a local responsibility with municipalities having periodically to pass compre- hensive land use plans. The main policy variable in these plans, and the one analyzed here, is the amount of land classified for potential development. We measure local political competition as the margin of victory of the incumbent government. We instrument this variable using the number of votes obtained by parties represented in local government when standing at the first national legislative elections following the re-establishment of democracy, and the number of votes they actually obtained regionally at the national legislative elections. The results indicate that stiffer political competition does indeed reduce the amount of new land designated for development. This effect is found to be most marked in suburbs, in towns with a high percent of commuters and homeowners, and in municipalities governed by the left.

Does partisan alignment affect the electoral reward of intergovernmental transfers?

[spa] En este trabajo analizamos la hipótesis que las transferencias asignadas a los municipios políticamente alineados generan un mayor apoyo político que las transferencias asignada a los municipios gobernados por la oposición. Para contrastar esta hipótesis utilizamos datos de las transferencias recibidas por 617 municipios españoles procedentes de dos niveles de gobierno superiores (Regional o Autonómico y Supra-Local o Diputaciones) durante el período 1993-2003, así como datos de los votos obtenidos en las tres elecciones celebradas en los diferentes niveles de gobierno durante este período.

Lobbying, political competition, and local land supply: recent evidence from Spain

We analyze whether local land supply is influenced by the degree of political competition, and interpret the findings as being indicative of the influence wielded by land development lobbies. We use a new database including both political and land supply data for more than 2,000 Spanish municipalities for the period 2003-2007. In Spain, land use policies are largely a local responsibility with municipalities having periodically to pass compre- hensive land use plans. The main policy variable in these plans, and the one analyzed here, is the amount of land classified for potential development. We measure local political competition as the margin of victory of the incumbent government. We instrument this variable using the number of votes obtained by parties represented in local government when standing at the first national legislative elections following the re-establishment of democracy, and the number of votes they actually obtained regionally at the national legislative elections. The results indicate that stiffer political competition does indeed reduce the amount of new land designated for development. This effect is found to be most marked in suburbs, in towns with a high percent of commuters and homeowners, and in municipalities governed by the left.

Does partisan alignment affect the electoral reward of intergovernmental transfers?

[spa] En este trabajo analizamos la hipótesis que las transferencias asignadas a los municipios políticamente alineados generan un mayor apoyo político que las transferencias asignada a los municipios gobernados por la oposición. Para contrastar esta hipótesis utilizamos datos de las transferencias recibidas por 617 municipios españoles procedentes de dos niveles de gobierno superiores (Regional o Autonómico y Supra-Local o Diputaciones) durante el período 1993-2003, así como datos de los votos obtenidos en las tres elecciones celebradas en los diferentes niveles de gobierno durante este período.

Invasive candidiasis: comparison of management choices by infectious disease and critical care specialists.

OBJECTIVE: To compare the management of invasive candidiasis between infectious disease and critical care specialists. DESIGN AND SETTING: Clinical case scenarios of invasive candidiasis were presented during interactive sessions at national specialty meetings. Participants responded to questions using an anonymous electronic voting system. PATIENTS AND PARTICIPANTS: Sixty-five infectious disease and 51 critical care physicians in Switzerland. RESULTS: Critical care specialists were more likely to ask advice from a colleague with expertise in the field of fungal infections to treat Candida glabrata (19.5% vs. 3.5%) and C. krusei (36.4% vs. 3.3%) candidemia. Most participants reported that they would change or remove a central venous catheter in the presence of candidemia, but 77.1% of critical care specialists would start concomitant antifungal treatment, compared to only 50% of infectious disease specialists. Similarly, more critical care specialists would start antifungal prophylaxis when Candida spp. are isolated from the peritoneal fluid at time of surgery for peritonitis resulting from bowel perforation (22.2% vs. 7.2%). The two groups equally considered Candida spp. as pathogens in tertiary peritonitis, but critical care specialists would more frequently use amphotericin B than fluconazole, caspofungin, or voriconazole. In mechanically ventilated patients the isolation of 10(4) Candida spp. from a bronchoalveolar lavage was considered a colonizing organism by 94.9% of infectious disease, compared to 46.8% of critical care specialists, with a marked difference in the use of antifungal agents (5.1% vs. 51%). CONCLUSIONS: These data highlight differences between management approaches for candidiasis in two groups of specialists, particularly in the reported use of antifungals.

Multi-Atlas based Segmentation of Head and Neck CT Images using Active Contour

This paper presents the segmentation of bilateral parotid glands in the Head and Neck (H&N) CT images using an active contour based atlas registration. We compare segmentation results from three atlas selection strategies: (i) selection of "single-most-similar" atlas for each image to be segmented, (ii) fusion of segmentation results from multiple atlases using STAPLE, and (iii) fusion of segmentation results using majority voting. Among these three approaches, fusion using majority voting provided the best results. Finally, we present a detailed evaluation on a dataset of eight images (provided as a part of H&N auto segmentation challenge conducted in conjunction with MICCAI-2010 conference) using majority voting strategy.

A two-level analysis of the determinants of direct democratic choices in European, immigration and foreign policy in Switzerland

This article employs a unique data set - covering 25 popular votes on foreign, European and immigration/asylum policy held between 1992 and 2006 in Switzerland - in order to examine the conditional impact of context upon utilitarian, cultural, political and cognitive determinants of individual attitudes toward international openness. Our results reveal clear patterns of cross-level interactions between individual determinants and the project-related context of the vote. Thus, although party cues and political competence have a strong impact on individuals' support for international openness, this impact is substantially mediated by the type of coalition that is operating within the party elite. Similarly, subjective utilitarian and cultural considerations influence the voters' decision in interaction with the content of the proposal submitted to the voters as well as with the framing of the voting campaign.

Leadership at the upper echelons : three essays

"IT'S THE ECONOMY STUPID", BUT CHARISMA MATTERS TOO: A DUAL PROCESS MODEL OF PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION OUTCOMES. ABSTRACT Because charisma is assumed to be an important determinant of effective leadership, the extent to which a presidential nominee is more charismatic than his opponent should be an important determinant of voter choices. We computed a composite measure of the rhetorical richness of acceptances speeches given by U.S. presidential candidates at their national party convention. We added this marker of charisma to Ray C. Fair's presidential vote-share equation (1978; 2009). We theorized that voters decide using psychological attribution (i.e., due to macroeconomics and incumbency) as well as inferential processes (i.e., due to leader charismatic behavior) when voting. Controlling for the macro-level variables and incumbency in the Fair model, our results indicated that difference between nominees' charisma is a significant determinant of electoral success, particularly in close elections. This extended model significantly improves the precision of the Fair model and correctly predicts 23 out of the last 24 U.S. presidential elections. Paper 2: IT CEO LEADERSHIP, CORPORATE SOCIAL AND FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE. ABSTRACT We investigated whether CEO leadership predicted corporate financial performance (CFP) and corporate social performance (CSP). Using longitudinal data on 258 CEOs from 117 firms across 19 countries and 10 industry sectors, we found that determinants of CEO leadership (i.e., implicit motives) significantly predicted both CFP and CSP. As expected, the most consistent positive predictor was Responsibility Disposition when interacting with n (need for) Power. n Achievement and n Affiliation were generally negatively related or unrelated to outcomes. CSP was positively related to accounting measures of CFP. Our findings suggest that executive leader characteristics have important consequences for corporate level outcomes. Paper 3. PUNISHING THE POWERFUL: ATTRIBUTIONS OF BLAME AND LEADERSHIP ABSTRACT We propose that individuals are more lenient in attributing blame to leaders than to nonleaders. We advance a motivational explanation building on the perspective of punishment and on system justification theory. We conducted two scenario experiments which supported our proposition. In study 1, wrongdoer leader status was negatively related to blame and the perceived seriousness of the wrongdoing. In study 2, controlling for the Big-Five personality factor and individual differences in moral evaluation (i.e., moral foundations), wrongdoer leader status was negatively related with desired severity of punishment, and fair punishments were perceived as more just for non-leaders than for leaders.