Restrictions on Aliens in the United Kingdom, 1914-1919 : a Study of the Origins and Political Background of the Aliens Restrictions Acts of 1914 and 1919.

At first glance the Aliens Restriction Act of 1914, which was introduced and passed on the first day of World War One, seems a hasty and ill-prepared piece of legislation. Actually, when examined in the light of Arthur Marwick's thesis that war is a forcing house for pre-existent social and governmental ideas, it becomes clear that the act was not after all the product of hastily formed notions. In point of fact it followed the precedent of detailed draft clauses produced in 1911 by a sub-committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence established to consider the treatment of aliens in the event of war. Indeed the draft clauses and the restrictions embodied in the 1914 act were strikingly similar to restrictions on aliens legislated in 1793. Hostility to aliens had been growing from 1905 to 1914 and this hostility blossomed into xeno-phobia on the outbreak of war, a crucial precondition for the specifically anti-enemy fears of the time. In 1919 the Aliens Restriction (Amendment) Bill was introduced into parliament to extend temporarily the provisions of the 1914 act thus permitting the Home Secretary to plan permanent, detailed legislation. Two minority groups of MPs with extreme views on the treatment of aliens were prominent in the debates on this bill. The extreme Liberal group which advocated leniency in the treatment of aliens had little effect on the final form of the bill, but the extreme Conservative group, which demanded severe restrictions on aliens, succeeded in persuading the government to include detailed restrictions. Despite its allegedly temporary nature, the Aliens Restriction (Amendment) Act of 1919 was renewed annually until 1971.

The concept of 'economic activity' in the EU treaty: from ideological dead-ends to workable judicial concepts. Research Paper in Law 06/2011

[From the Introduction]. The economic rules, or put more ambitiously, the economic constitution of the Treaty,1 only apply to economic activities. This general principle remains valid, even if some authors strive to demonstrate that certain Treaty rules also apply in the absence of an economic activity,2 and despite the fact that non-economic (horizontal) Treaty provisions (e.g. principle of nondiscrimination, rules on citizenship) are also applicable in the absence of any economic activity.3 Indeed, the exercise of some economic activity transcends the concepts of ‘goods’ (having positive or negative market value),4 workers (even if admitted in an extensive manner),5 and services (offered for remuneration).6 It is also economic activity or ‘the activity of offering goods and services into the market’7 that characterises an ‘undertaking’ thus making the competition rules applicable. Further, it is for regulating economic activity that Article 115 TFEU, Article 106(3) TFEU and most other legal bases in the TFEU provide harmonisation powers in favour of the EU. Last but not least, Article 14 TFEU on the distinction between services of general economic interest (SGEIs) and non-economic services of general interest (NESGIs), as well as Protocol n. 26 on Services of General Interest (SGIs) confirm the constitutional significance of the distinction between economic and non-economic: a means of dividing competences between the EU and the member states. The distinction between economic and non-economic activities is fraught with legal and technical intricacies – the latter being generated by dynamic technological advances and regulatory experimentation. More importantly, however, the distinction is overcharged with political and ideological significations and misunderstandings and, even, terminological confusions.8

The EU’s Economic Policy Architecture after Ratification of the Fiscal Stability Treaty. CEPS Commentary, 30 August 2013

In his presentation of the new Fiscal Stability Treaty, which came into force in January 2013, Jørgen Mortensen questions the extent to which the new inter-governmental agreement can be expected to solve the fundamental problem of consistency between budgetary and monetary policy.

All Roads Lead to Rome: Background, Context and Legacy of the Treaty on the European Community. Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series Special Issue 3, August 2012

From the Introduction. The rejection by the French National Assembly of the ill-fated European Defense Community (EDC) Treaty in August 30, 1954, together with the automatic shelving of the equally faulty European Political Community (EPC) proposal, put an end, at least for the time being, to any form of political and military union of the existing Western Europe on a supranational level. The times were difficult in Europe and the international atmosphere was cloudy. The end of the Korean War coincided with the insistence of the Soviets to stick to a policy of détente, leading to the suppression of the Hungarian rebellion. France was facing opposition to her colonial presence in Indochina, as well as in North Africa. But the crisis of Suez prompted the French government to distance itself from the British and the United States. The defeat of the EDC and EPC was not going to be the end of the story and the dream inaugurated by Monnet and Schuman in 1950. It was not long before plans in favor of a European re-launch were taking shape. 1