886 resultados para Taxation.
Resumo:
Despite attempts to secure harmonisation of accounting practice,significant variations in accounting rules and practice continueto arise in European countries, variations which give rise tocompliance costs for multinational companies.Firstly, this paper considers the relevance of internationalaccounting harmonisation for European business. It then proceedsto examine accounting regulation in three countries: Spain, Swedenand Austria, highlighting the key regulatory issues of the 'trueand fair' view requirement and the link between taxation andaccounting. The three countries are selected because of theinteresting contrasts which they provide; these contrasts areexamined in detail in the paper.The work is based upon a series of interviews carried out withleading accounting practitioners in the three countries during1996-97.The paper concludes that there are significant obstacles toaccounting harmonisation in Europe and that there is potentialfor continuing diversity of national accounting practice.
Resumo:
The Committee was authorized to meet three days during the 2007 Legislative Interim and two days during the 2008 Legislative Interim. The Committee met on September 12, 2007; November 7, 2007; December 5, 2007; November 14, 2008; and January 7, 2009, at the State Capitol, Des Moines, Iowa. In 2008, the Committee retained consultants from the Institute for Public Policy at George Washington University to study property taxation and other forms of revenue generation used by local governments in Iowa and other states.
Resumo:
The most important aspect of property taxation is the concept that all property should be valued for tax purposes on a uniform basis so that the actual property tax burden can be distributed equitably among individual property owners. One of the most widely used and accepted methods of determining relative levels and uniformity of assessments is the assessment/sales ratio study. Such a study, in its most fundamental analysis, is the comparison of the assessed value of an individual property to its sale price. For example, a property assessed at $12,000 which sold for $26,000 would have an assessment/sales ratio of 46% ($12,000 ÷ $26,000). The purpose of this study is to provide assessment/sales ratio information that may be utilized by property tax administrators, local assessing officials, and interested taxpayers in examining the relative levels and uniformity of assessments throughout the State of Iowa. After further refinement, the study is one factor considered by the Director of Revenue in the biennial equalization of assessments.
Resumo:
The most important aspect of property taxation is the concept that all property should be valued for tax purposes on a uniform basis so that the actual property tax burden can be distributed equitably among individual property owners. One of the most widely used and accepted methods of determining relative levels and uniformity of assessments is the assessment/sales ratio study. Such a study, in its most fundamental analysis, is the comparison of the assessed value of an individual property to its sale price. For example, a property assessed at $12,000 which sold for $26,000 would have an assessment/sales ratio of 46% ($12,000 ÷ $26,000). The purpose of this study is to provide assessment/sales ratio information that may be utilized by property tax administrators, local assessing officials, and interested taxpayers in examining the relative levels and uniformity of assessments throughout the State of Iowa. After further refinement, the study is one factor considered by the Director of Revenue in the biennial equalization of assessments.
Resumo:
This paper offers empirical evidence from Spain of a connection between the tax administration and the political power. Firstly, the regional tax administration is not immune to the budgetary situation of regional government, and tends to exert a greater (or lesser) effort in tax collection the greater (or lower) the (expected) public deficit. At the same time, the system of unconditional grants from the central layer of government provokes an ¿income effect¿ which disincentivises the efforts of the tax administration. Secondly, these efforts also decrease when the margin to lose a parliamentary seat in an electoral district is cut, although the importance of this disincentive decreases according to the parliamentary strength of the incumbent
Resumo:
[spa] El objetivo de este trabajo es analizar si los municipios españoles se ajustan en presencia de un shock presupuestario y (si es así) qué elementos del presupuesto son los que realizan el ajuste. La metodología utilizada para contestar estas preguntas es un mecanismo de corrección del error, VECM, que estimamos con un panel de datos de los municipios españoles durante el período 1988-2006. Nuestros resultados confirman que, en primer lugar, los municipios se ajustan en presencia de un shock fiscal (es decir, el déficit es estacionario en el largo plazo). En segundo lugar, obtenemos que cuando el shock afecta a los ingresos el ajuste lo soporta principalmente el municipio reduciendo el gasto, las transferencias tienen un papel muy reducido en este proceso de ajuste. Por el contrario, cuando el shock afecta al gasto, el ajuste es compartido en términos similares entre el municipio – incrementado los impuestos – y los gobiernos de niveles superiores – incrementando las transferencias. Estos resultados sugieren que la viabilidad de las finanzas pública locales es factible con diferentes entornos institucionales.
Resumo:
[cat] Besley i Rosen -1998- van ser els primers autors en estimar empíricament la rellevància de les externalitats impositives verticals. Aquests autors varen fer-ho per al cas dels impostos sobre la benzina i el tabac, en concret, per al cas dels EEUU. Ara bé, no varen tenir en compte les diferències en el nivell de vida entre Estats: àrees amb un nivell elevat paguen menys en termes reals que àrees amb un nivell de vida baix, doncs l'impost unitari sobre la benzina o sobre el tabac no difereix d'acord amb l'Estat on l'impost s'aplica. En conseqüència, proposem que la competència impositiva vertical sigui estimada deflactant totes les variables monetàries utilitzant l'anomenat "House Price Index (HPI)", el qual està disponible al nivell dels Estats. Això genera una variable impositiva federal expressada en termes reals i que presenta variació entre Estats. Aquesta estratègia empírica ens permet diferenciar entre la interdependència vertical entre els tipus impositius federals i els estatals de shocks agregats al llarg del temps, utilitzant dades per als EEUU durant el període 1975 a 2006 per a benzina i tabac. Trobem una nivell significatiu de competència impositiva horitzontal, la qual és més elevada en el cas del tabac, però en cap cas reacció impositiva vertical. Els resultats són robustos al període analitzat.
Resumo:
In this paper, we study how public and private expenditures in health and education affect economic growth by their influence on people's health, abilities, skills and knowledge. We consider a growth accounting framework in order to test whether welfare expenditures more than offset the efficiency losses caused by distortionary taxation, and whether the effects of public expenditure on economic growth differ from those of private expenditure. Our empirical analysis is based on a panel of 19 OECD countries observed between 1971 and 1998. The results are consistent with the hypothesis that the contribution of welfare expenditures more than compensates for the distortions caused by the tax system; and the estimated positive impact is stronger for health than for education. We also find some evidence that public expenditure influences GDP growth more than private expenditure.
Resumo:
This paper analyses empirically how differences in local taxes affect the intraregional location of new manufacturing plants. These effects are examined within the random profit maximization framework while accounting for the presence of different types of agglomeration economies (localization/ urbanization/ Jacobs¿ economies) at the municipal level. We look at the location decision of more than 10,000 establishments locating between 1996 and 2003 across more than 400 municipalities in Catalonia, a Spanish region. It is necessary to restrict the choice set to the local labor market and, above all, to control for agglomeration economies so as to identify the effects of taxes on the location of new establishments.
Resumo:
This research provides a description of the process followed in order to assemble a "Social Accounting Matrix" for Spain corresponding to the year 2000 (SAMSP00). As argued in the paper, this process attempts to reconcile ESA95 conventions with requirements of applied general equilibrium modelling. Particularly, problems related to the level of aggregation of net taxation data, and to the valuation system used for expressing the monetary value of input-output transactions have deserved special attention. Since the adoption of ESA95 conventions, input-output transactions have been preferably valued at basic prices, which impose additional difficulties on modellers interested in computing applied general equilibrium models. This paper addresses these difficulties by developing a procedure that allows SAM-builders to change the valuation system of input-output transactions conveniently. In addition, this procedure produces new data related to net taxation information.
Resumo:
This paper analyses empirically how differences in local taxes affect the intraregional location of new manufacturing plants. These effects are examined within the random profit maximization framework while accounting for the presence of different types of agglomeration economies (localization/ urbanization/ Jacobs¿ economies) at the municipal level. We look at the location decision of more than 10,000 establishments locating between 1996 and 2003 across more than 400 municipalities in Catalonia, a Spanish region. It is necessary to restrict the choice set to the local labor market and, above all, to control for agglomeration economies so as to identify the effects of taxes on the location of new establishments.
Resumo:
[spa] El objetivo de este trabajo es analizar si los municipios españoles se ajustan en presencia de un shock presupuestario y (si es así) qué elementos del presupuesto son los que realizan el ajuste. La metodología utilizada para contestar estas preguntas es un mecanismo de corrección del error, VECM, que estimamos con un panel de datos de los municipios españoles durante el período 1988-2006. Nuestros resultados confirman que, en primer lugar, los municipios se ajustan en presencia de un shock fiscal (es decir, el déficit es estacionario en el largo plazo). En segundo lugar, obtenemos que cuando el shock afecta a los ingresos el ajuste lo soporta principalmente el municipio reduciendo el gasto, las transferencias tienen un papel muy reducido en este proceso de ajuste. Por el contrario, cuando el shock afecta al gasto, el ajuste es compartido en términos similares entre el municipio – incrementado los impuestos – y los gobiernos de niveles superiores – incrementando las transferencias. Estos resultados sugieren que la viabilidad de las finanzas pública locales es factible con diferentes entornos institucionales.
Resumo:
[cat] Besley i Rosen -1998- van ser els primers autors en estimar empíricament la rellevància de les externalitats impositives verticals. Aquests autors varen fer-ho per al cas dels impostos sobre la benzina i el tabac, en concret, per al cas dels EEUU. Ara bé, no varen tenir en compte les diferències en el nivell de vida entre Estats: àrees amb un nivell elevat paguen menys en termes reals que àrees amb un nivell de vida baix, doncs l'impost unitari sobre la benzina o sobre el tabac no difereix d'acord amb l'Estat on l'impost s'aplica. En conseqüència, proposem que la competència impositiva vertical sigui estimada deflactant totes les variables monetàries utilitzant l'anomenat "House Price Index (HPI)", el qual està disponible al nivell dels Estats. Això genera una variable impositiva federal expressada en termes reals i que presenta variació entre Estats. Aquesta estratègia empírica ens permet diferenciar entre la interdependència vertical entre els tipus impositius federals i els estatals de shocks agregats al llarg del temps, utilitzant dades per als EEUU durant el període 1975 a 2006 per a benzina i tabac. Trobem una nivell significatiu de competència impositiva horitzontal, la qual és més elevada en el cas del tabac, però en cap cas reacció impositiva vertical. Els resultats són robustos al període analitzat.
Resumo:
[eng] This paper provides, from a theoretical and quantitative point of view, an explanation of why taxes on capital returns are high (around 35%) by analyzing the optimal fiscal policy in an economy with intergenerational redistribution. For this purpose, the government is modeled explicitly and can choose (and commit to) an optimal tax policy in order to maximize society's welfare. In an infinitely lived economy with heterogeneous agents, the long run optimal capital tax is zero. If heterogeneity is due to the existence of overlapping generations, this result in general is no longer true. I provide sufficient conditions for zero capital and labor taxes, and show that a general class of preferences, commonly used on the macro and public finance literature, violate these conditions. For a version of the model, calibrated to the US economy, the main results are: first, if the government is restricted to a set of instruments, the observed fiscal policy cannot be disregarded as sub optimal and capital taxes are positive and quantitatively relevant. Second, if the government can use age specific taxes for each generation, then the age profile capital tax pattern implies subsidizing asset returns of the younger generations and taxing at higher rates the asset returns of the older ones.
Resumo:
[eng] In this paper we analyze how the composition of labor taxation affects unemployment in a unionized economy with capital accumulation and an unemployment benefit system. We show that if the unemployment benefit system is gross Bismarckian then the unemployment rate is reduced if wage taxes are decreased (and thus payroll taxes are increased). However, if the unemployment benefit system is net Bismarckian then the unemployment rate does not depend on how the system is financed. Besides, in a Beveridgean system the labor tax composition does not affect the unemployment rate if and only if the unemployed do not pay taxes and the employed pay a constant marginal tax rate. We also analyze when an unemployment benefit budget-balanced rule makes the economy to have a hysteresis process.