The Distributional Consequences of Supply-Side Reforms in General Equilibrium

This paper addresses the issue on whether tax reforms consisten with lower public debt-to-GDP in the long-run can lead to a more efficient and equitable economy. To this end we solve a heterogeneous agent model comprised of a government, a representative capitalist and representative skilled and unskilled workers, under both rational expectations and adaptive learning. Our main ndings are that (i) reductions in capital taxation, while bene cial at the aggregate level, lead to increased inequality mainly due to the substitutability of un- skilled labour and capital; (ii) a fall in taxation for skilled labour is Pareto improving, which is largely explained by its complementarity with the other factor inputs; (iii) all agents would prefer increasing the tax rate on capital to increasing the tax rate on skilled and un- skilled labour since it leads to relatively lower welfare losses; and (iv) heterogeneity in initial beliefs under adaptive learning quantitatively matters for welfare.

Transaction Costs and Institutions

This paper proposes a simple framework for understanding endogenous transaction costs - their composition, size and implications. In a model of diversification against risk, we distinguish between investments in institutions that facilitate exchange and the costs of conducting exchange itself. Institutional quality and market size are determined by the decisions of risk averse agents and conditions are discussed under which the efficient allocation may be decentralized. We highlight a number of differences with models where transaction costs are exogenous, including the implications for taxation and measurement issues.

Time-consistent fiscal policy under heterogeneity: Conflicting or common interests?

This paper studies the aggregate and distributional implications of Markov-perfect tax-spending policy in a neoclassical growth model with capitalists and workers. Focusing on the long run, our main fi ndings are: (i) it is optimal for a benevolent government, which cares equally about its citizens, to tax capital heavily and to subsidise labour; (ii) a Pareto improving means to reduce ine¢ ciently high capital taxation under discretion is for the government to place greater weight on the welfare of capitalists; (iii) capitalists and workers preferences, regarding the optimal amount of "capitalist bias", are not aligned implying a conflict of interests.

Fiscal Policy and Learning

Using the standard real business cycle model with lump-sum taxes, we analyze the impact of fiscal policy when agents form expectations using adaptive learning rather than rational expectations (RE). The output multipliers for government purchases are significantly higher under learning, and fall within empirical bounds reported in the literature (in sharp contrast to the implausibly low values under RE). Effectiveness of fiscal policy is demonstrated during times of economic stress like the recent Great Recession. Finally it is shown how learning can lead to dynamics empirically documented during episodes of 'fiscal consolidations.'

The Optimal Distribution of the Tax Burden over the Business Cycle

This paper analyses optimal income taxes over the business cycle under a balanced-budget restriction, for low, middle and high income households. A model incorporating capital-skill complementarity in production and differential access to capital and labour markets is developed to capture the cyclical characteristics of the US economy, as well as the empirical observations on wage (skill premium) and wealth inequality. We .nd that the tax rate for high income agents is optimally the least volatile and the tax rate for low income agents the least countercyclical. In contrast, the path of optimal taxes for the middle income group is found to be very volatile and counter-cyclical. We further find that the optimal response to output-enhancing capital equipment technology and spending cuts is to increase the progressivity of income taxes. Finally, in response to positive TFP shocks, taxation becomes more progressive after about two years.

Government information transparency

This paper studies a model of announcements by a privately informed government about the future state of the economic activity in an economy subject to recurrent shocks and with distortions due to income taxation. Although transparent communication would ex ante be desirable, we find that even a benevolent government may ex-post be non-informative, in an attempt to countervail the tax distortion with a "second best" compensating distortion in information. This result provides a rationale for independent national statistical offices, committed to truthful communication. We also find that whether inequality in income distribution favors or harms government transparency depends on labor supply elasticity.

Computing Markov-Perfect Optimal Policies in Business-Cycle Models

Time-inconsistency is an essential feature of many policy problems (Kydland and Prescott, 1977). This paper presents and compares three methods for computing Markov-perfect optimal policies in stochastic nonlinear business cycle models. The methods considered include value function iteration, generalized Euler-equations, and parameterized shadow prices. In the context of a business cycle model in which a scal authority chooses government spending and income taxation optimally, while lacking the ability to commit, we show that the solutions obtained using value function iteration and generalized Euler equations are somewhat more accurate than that obtained using parameterized shadow prices. Among these three methods, we show that value function iteration can be applied easily, even to environments that include a risk-sensitive scal authority and/or inequality constraints on government spending. We show that the risk-sensitive scal authority lowers government spending and income-taxation, reducing the disincentive households face to accumulate wealth.

Transaction Costs and Institutions: Investments in Exchange

This paper proposes a simple model for understanding transaction costs for their composition, size and policy implications. We distinguish between investments in institutions that facilitate exchange and the cost of conducting exchange itself. Institutional quality and market size are determined by the decisions of risk averse agents and conditions are discussed under which the efficient allocation may be decentralized. We highlight a number of differences with models where transaction costs are exogenous, including the implications for taxation and measurement issues.

A systematic review of longitudinal population-based studies on the predictors of smoking cessation in adolescent and young adult smokers

Le tabagisme est responsable de plus de 5 million de décès par an à travers le monde. En Suisse (2010), la prévalence de fumeurs chez les 14-19 ans était de 22% et la prévalence d'ex-fumeurs de 3%, taux qui reste relativement stable au fil des dernières années. La plupart des jeunes fumeurs désirant arrêter de fumer rencontrent des difficultés pour y parvenir. Les revues empiriques ont conclu que les programmes ayant pour but l'arrêt du tabagisme chez les jeunes ont une efficacité limitée. Afin de fournir une base solide de connaissances pour les programmes d'interventions contre le tabagisme, les déterminants de l'auto-cessation ont besoin d'être compris. Nous avons systématiquement recherché dans PUBMED et EMBASE des études longitudinales, basées sur la population, portant sur les déterminants de l'auto-cessation chez des adolescents et des jeunes adultes fumeurs. Nous avons passé en revue 4'502 titres et 871 abstracts, tous examinés indépendamment par deux et trois examinateurs, respectivement. Les critères d'inclusion étant : articles publiés entre janvier 1984 et août 2010, concernant les jeunes entre 10 et 29 ans et avoir une définition de cessation de fumer d'au moins 6 mois. Neuf articles ont été retenus pour une analyse détaillée. Les données suivantes ont été extraites de chaque article : le lieu de l'étude, la période étudiée, la durée du suivi, le nombre de collecte de données, la taille de l'échantillon, l'âge ou l'année scolaire des participants, le nombre de participants qui arrêtent de fumer, le status tabagique lors de la première collecte, la définition de cessation, les co-variantes et la méthode analytique. Le nombre d'études qui montrent une association significativement significative entre un déterminant et l'arrêt du tabagisme a été tabulé à partir de toutes les études qui ont évalués ce déterminant. Trois des neufs articles retenus ont défini l'arrêt du tabagisme comme une abstinence de plus de 6 mois et les six autres comme 12 mois d'abstinence. Malgré l'hétérogénéité des méthodes utilisées, cinq facteurs principaux ressortent comme prédicteur de l'arrêt du tabagisme : 1) ne pas avoir d'amis qui fument, 2) ne pas avoir l'intention de continuer de fumer dans le futur, 3) résister à la pression sociale, 4) être âgé de plus de 18 ans lors de la première cigarette, et 5) avoir un avis négatif au sujet du tabagisme. D'autres facteurs sont significatifs mais ne sont évalués que dans peu d'articles. La littérature au sujet des prédicteurs de cessation chez les adolescents et les jeunes adultes est peu développée. Cependant, nous remarquons que les facteurs que nous avons mis en évidence ne dépendent pas que de l'individu, mais aussi de l'environnement. La prévention du tabagisme peut se centrer sur les bienfaits de l'arrêt (p.ex., par rapport à l'asthme ou les performances sportives) et ainsi motiver les jeunes gens à songer d'arrêter de fumer. Une taxation plus lourde sur le prix des cigarettes peut être envisagée afin de retarder l'âge de la première cigarette. Les publicités anti-tabagiques (non sponsorisées par les entreprises de tabac) peuvent influencer la perception des jeunes par rapport au tabagisme, renforçant ou créant une attitude anti-tabagique. Les prochaines campagnes anti- tabac devraient donc tenir compte de ces différents aspects.

Three Essays on the Formation and Impact of Economic Policy

Introduction In my thesis I argue that economic policy is all about economics and politics. Consequently, analysing and understanding economic policy ideally has at least two parts. The economics part, which is centered around the expected impact of a specific policy on the real economy both in terms of efficiency and equity. The insights of this part point into which direction the fine-tuning of economic policies should go. However, fine-tuning of economic policies will be most likely subject to political constraints. That is why, in the politics part, a much better understanding can be gained by taking into account how the incentives of politicians and special interest groups as well as the role played by different institutional features affect the formation of economic policies. The first part and chapter of my thesis concentrates on the efficiency-related impact of economic policies: how does corporate income taxation in general, and corporate income tax progressivity in specific, affect the creation of new firms? Reduced progressivity and flat-rate taxes are in vogue. By 2009, 22 countries are operating flat-rate income tax systems, as do 7 US states and 14 Swiss cantons (for corporate income only). Tax reform proposals in the spirit of the "flat tax" model typically aim to reduce three parameters: the average tax burden, the progressivity of the tax schedule, and the complexity of the tax code. In joint work, Marius Brülhart and I explore the implications of changes in these three parameters on entrepreneurial activity, measured by counts of firm births in a panel of Swiss municipalities. Our results show that lower average tax rates and reduced complexity of the tax code promote firm births. Controlling for these effects, reduced progressivity inhibits firm births. Our reading of these results is that tax progressivity has an insurance effect that facilitates entrepreneurial risk taking. The positive effects of lower tax levels and reduced complexity are estimated to be significantly stronger than the negative effect of reduced progressivity. To the extent that firm births reflect desirable entrepreneurial dynamism, it is not the flattening of tax schedules that is key to successful tax reforms, but the lowering of average tax burdens and the simplification of tax codes. Flatness per se is of secondary importance and even appears to be detrimental to firm births. The second part of my thesis, which corresponds to the second and third chapter, concentrates on how economic policies are formed. By the nature of the analysis, these two chapters draw on a broader literature than the first chapter. Both economists and political scientists have done extensive research on how economic policies are formed. Thereby, researchers in both disciplines have recognised the importance of special interest groups trying to influence policy-making through various channels. In general, economists base their analysis on a formal and microeconomically founded approach, while abstracting from institutional details. In contrast, political scientists' frameworks are generally richer in terms of institutional features but lack the theoretical rigour of economists' approaches. I start from the economist's point of view. However, I try to borrow as much as possible from the findings of political science to gain a better understanding of how economic policies are formed in reality. In the second chapter, I take a theoretical approach and focus on the institutional policy framework to explore how interactions between different political institutions affect the outcome of trade policy in presence of special interest groups' lobbying. Standard political economy theory treats the government as a single institutional actor which sets tariffs by trading off social welfare against contributions from special interest groups seeking industry-specific protection from imports. However, these models lack important (institutional) features of reality. That is why, in my model, I split up the government into a legislative and executive branch which can both be lobbied by special interest groups. Furthermore, the legislative has the option to delegate its trade policy authority to the executive. I allow the executive to compensate the legislative in exchange for delegation. Despite ample anecdotal evidence, bargaining over delegation of trade policy authority has not yet been formally modelled in the literature. I show that delegation has an impact on policy formation in that it leads to lower equilibrium tariffs compared to a standard model without delegation. I also show that delegation will only take place if the lobby is not strong enough to prevent it. Furthermore, the option to delegate increases the bargaining power of the legislative at the expense of the lobbies. Therefore, the findings of this model can shed a light on why the U.S. Congress often practices delegation to the executive. In the final chapter of my thesis, my coauthor, Antonio Fidalgo, and I take a narrower approach and focus on the individual politician level of policy-making to explore how connections to private firms and networks within parliament affect individual politicians' decision-making. Theories in the spirit of the model of the second chapter show how campaign contributions from lobbies to politicians can influence economic policies. There exists an abundant empirical literature that analyses ties between firms and politicians based on campaign contributions. However, the evidence on the impact of campaign contributions is mixed, at best. In our paper, we analyse an alternative channel of influence in the shape of personal connections between politicians and firms through board membership. We identify a direct effect of board membership on individual politicians' voting behaviour and an indirect leverage effect when politicians with board connections influence non-connected peers. We assess the importance of these two effects using a vote in the Swiss parliament on a government bailout of the national airline, Swissair, in 2001, which serves as a natural experiment. We find that both the direct effect of connections to firms and the indirect leverage effect had a strong and positive impact on the probability that a politician supported the government bailout.

Dimensionality of drinking consequences - cross-cultural comparability and stability over time

Despite the long tradition for asking about the negative social and health consequences of alcohol consumption in surveys, little is known about the dimensionality of these consequences. Analysing cross-sectional and longitudinal data from the Nordic Taxation Study collected for Sweden, Finland, and Denmark in two waves in 2003 and 2004 by means of an explorative principal component analysis for categorical data (CATPCA), it is tested whether consequences have a single underlying dimension across cultures. It further tests the reliability, replicability, concurrent and predictive validity of the consequence scales. A one-dimensional solution was commonly preferable. Whereas the two-dimensional solution was unable to distinguish clearly between different concepts of consequences, the one-dimensional solution resulted in interpretable, generally very stable scales within countries across different samples and time.

Materials web de fiscalitat enfocats per competències per a fomentar l'aprenentatge autònom

La finalitat principal del projecte consisteix en el disseny d'un material web mitjançant el qual els estudiants puguin anar desenvolupant i perfeccionant les diferents competències de les assignatures que conformen l'àrea de fiscalitat del Grau de Dret. Per a desenvolupar aquest material web s’ha fet servir la plataforma virtual Moodle. Concretament, el projecte s’ha centrat en una assignatura de fiscalitat del Grau de Dret, tot i que els resultats obtinguts són perfectament traslladables a qualsevol assignatura del Grau de Dret o postgrau en matèries jurídiques. El pla de treball del projecte ha consistit en desenvolupar un material web enfocat per competències, mitjançant les eines disponibles a la plataforma Moodle en una assignatura de fiscalitat i analitzar les seves possibilitats i característiques, especialment pel que fa a la planificació docent i l’avaluació de l’aprenentatge, així com comprovar el nivell de satisfacció dels estudiants mitjançant la realització d’unes enquestes.

Activitats d'autoavaluació de fiscalitat enfocades per competències

En el curs acadèmic 2007-2008 s'ha implementat l’autoavaluació formativa en les assignatures de Dret Financer i Tributari I i II de la Llicenciatura en Dret de la Universitat Oberta de Catalunya, com a conseqüència del Projecte de millora de la qualitat docent concedit per l'AGAUR l’any 2006. Es tracta d'unes assignatures en les quals se segueix des del curs acadèmic 2004-2005 un sistema d’avaluació continua enfocada per competències, amb molt bona acollida tant pels docents com pels estudiants. Mitjançant aquesta experiència docent, ideada com a complement de l’avaluació contínua, i que consisteix en l'elaboració d'activitats d’autoavaluació formativa de diferent tipologia enfocades per competències, es pretén ajudar l’estudiant a desenvolupar i millorar les competències d'ambdues assignatures de forma autònoma en el marc de l'Espai Europeu d’Educació Superior.

The Rise of The Swiss Tax Haven in the Interwar Period: An International Comparison

The history of tax havens during the decades before World War II is still little known. To date, the studies that have focused on the 1920s and 1930s have presented either a very general perspective on the development of tax havens or a narrow national point of view. Based on unpublished historical archives of five countries (Switzerland, Great Britain, Belgium, France, Germany), this paper offers therefore a new comparative appraisal of international tax competition during this period in order to answer the following question: What was the specificity of the Swiss case - already considered a quintessential tax haven at the time - in comparison to other banking centres? The findings of this research study are twofold. First, the 1920s and 1930s appear as something of a golden age of opportunity for avoiding taxation through the relocation of assets. Most of the financial centres granted consistent tax benefits for imported capital, while the limited degree of international cooperation and the usual guarantee of banking secrecy in European countries prevented the taxation of exported assets. Second, within this general environment, the fiscal strategies of a tax haven like Switzerland differed from those of a great financial power like Great Britain. Whereas the Swiss administration readily placed itself at the service of the banking community, British policy was more balanced between the contradictory interests of the Board of Inland Revenue, the Treasury, and the English business circles.

Simulating the Impact of Sectorial Productivity Gains on Two Regional Economies: Key Sectors from a Supply Side Perspective

In this paper we simulate and analyse the economic impact that sectorial productivity gains have on two regional Spanish economies (Catalonia and Extremadura). In particular we study the quantitative effect that each sector’s productivity gain has on household welfare (real disposable income and equivalent variation), on the consumption price indices and factor relative prices, on real production (GDP) and on the government’s net income (net taxation revenues of social transfers to households). The analytical approach consists of a computable general equilibrium model, in which we assume perfect competition and cleared markets, including factor markets. All the parameters and exogenous variables of the model are calibrated by means of two social accounting matrices, one for each region under study. The results allow us to identify those sectors with the greatest impact on consumer welfare as the key sectors in the regional economies. Keywords: Productivity gains, key sectors, computable general equilibrium