Inflation persistence in Central and Eastern European countries. Bruegel Working Paper 2013/04, 22 July 2013

This paper studies inflation persistence with time-varying coefficient autoregressions for twelve central European countries,in comparison with the United States and the euro area. Inflation persistence tends to be higher in times of high inflation. Since the oil price shocks, inflation persistence has declined both in the US and euro-area. In most central and eastern European countries, for which our study covers 1993-2012, inflation persistence has also declined, with the main exceptions of the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Slovenia, where persistence seems to be rather stable.

The euro area's tightrope walk: debt and competitiveness in Italy and Spain. Bruegel Policy Contribution 2013/11, September 2013

Competitiveness adjustment in struggling southern euro-area members requires persistently lower inflation than in major trading partners, but low inflation worsens public debt sustainability. When average euro-area inflation undershoots the two percent target, the conflict between intra-euro relative price adjustment and debt sustainability is more severe. In our baseline scenario, the projected public debt ratio reduction in Italy and Spain is too slow and does not meet the European fiscal rule. Debt projections are very sensitive to underlying assumptions and even small negative deviations from GDP growth, inflation and budget surplus assumptions can easily result in a runaway debt trajectory. The case for a greater than five percent of GDP primary budget surplus is very weak. Beyond vitally important structural reforms, the top priority is to ensure that euro area inflation does not undershoot the two percent target, which requires national policy actions and more accommodative monetary policy. The latter would weaken the euro exchange rate, thereby facilitating further intra-euro adjustment. More effective policies are needed to foster growth. But if all else fails, the European Central Bank’s Outright Monetary Transactions could reduce borrowing costs.

Macroeconomic and Financial Crisis Management in the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean: Diagnosis and Prospects. CEPS Paperbacks. December 2013

The global financial crisis, which started in the summer of 2007 and deepened in the aftermath of the Lehman failure in September 2008, has led to a virtual collapse in economic activity and increased financial volatility worldwide. For the developing countries, the main channel of transmission has been a drop in external transactions, such as trade, financial and capital flows, and remittances. The emerging economies in the southern and eastern Mediterranean have also faced declining economic activity, although there seems to be considerable variation in the relative magnitude and timing. Most of these economies have shown a delayed but more lasting response to the crisis, driven mostly by their close trade and investment ties with the EU and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries. This book explores the fiscal, monetary and financial effects of the crisis in the region and provides an in-depth analysis of the fiscal, monetary and banking policies in the post-crisis era, the viability of their exit strategies and the future of reforms in the region. These analyses not only provide a comprehensive comparison between the countries but also provide a solid basis for assessing future economic and financial developments and reforms in the region.

Did the German court do Europe a favor? Bruegel Working Paper 2014/09, July 2014

The European Central Bank’s Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) programme was a politically-pragmatic tool to diffuse the euro-area crisis. But it did not deal with the fundamental incompleteness of the European monetary union. As such, it blurred the boundary between monetary and fiscal policy. The fuzziness of this boundary helped in the short-term but pushed political and economic risks to the future. Unless a credible commitment to enforcing losses on private creditors is instituted, these conundrums will persist. The German Federal Constitutional Court has helped by insisting that such a dialogue be conducted in order to achieve a more durable political and economic solution. A study of the European Union Court of Justice’s Pringle decision (Thomas Pringle v Government of Ireland, Ireland and The Attorney General, Case C-370/12, ECJ, 27 November 2012) suggests that the ECJ will also not rubber-stamp the OMT – and, if it does, the legal victory will not resolve the fundamental dilemmas.

Asset-backed securities: The key to unlocking Europe's credit markets? Bruegel Policy Contribution 2014/07, 24 July 2014

The European market for asset-backed securities (ABS) has all but closed for business since the start of the economic and financial crisis. ABS (see Box 1) were in fact the first financial assets hit at the onset of the crisis in 2008. The subprime mortgage meltdown caused a deterioration in the quality of collateral in the ABS market in the United States, which in turn dried up overall liquidity because ABS AAA notes were popular collateral for inter-bank lending. The lack of demand for these products, together with the Great Recession in 2009, had a considerable negative impact on the European ABS market. The post-crisis regulatory environment has further undermined the market. The practice of slicing and dicing of loans into ABS packages was blamed for starting and spreading the crisis through the global financial system. Regulation in the post-crisis context has thus been relatively unfavourable to these types of instruments, with heightened capital requirements now necessary for the issuance of new ABS products. And yet policymakers have recently underlined the need to revitalise the ABS market as a tool to improve credit market conditions in the euro area and to enhance transmission of monetary policy. In particular, the European Central Bank and the Bank of England have jointly emphasised that: “a market for prudently designed ABS has the potential to improve the efficiency of resource allocation in the economy and to allow for better risk sharing... by transforming relatively illiquid assets into more liquid securities. These can then be sold to investors thereby allowing originators to obtain funding and, potentially, transfer part of the underlying risk, while investors in such securities can diversify their portfolios... . This can lead to lower costs of capital, higher economic growth and a broader distribution of risk” (ECB and Bank of England, 2014a). In addition, consideration has started to be given to the extent to which ABS products could become the target of explicit monetary policy operations, a line of action proposed by Claeys et al (2014). The ECB has officially announced the start of preparatory work related to possible outright purchases of selected ABS1. In this paper we discuss how a revamped market for corporate loans securitised via ABS products, and how use of ABS as a monetary policy instrument, can indeed play a role in revitalising Europe’s credit market. However, before using this instrument a number of issues should be addressed: First, the European ABS market has significantly contracted since the crisis. Hence it needs to be revamped through appropriate regulation if securitisation is to play a role in improving the efficiency of resource allocation in the economy. Second, even assuming that this market can expand again, the European ABS market is heterogeneous: lending criteria are different in different countries and banking institutions and the rating methodologies to assess the quality of the borrowers have to take these differences into account. One further element of differentiation is default law, which is specific to national jurisdictions in the euro area. Therefore, the pool of loans will not only be different in terms of the macro risks related to each country of origination (which is a ‘positive’ idiosyncratic risk, because it enables a portfolio manager to differentiate), but also in terms of the normative side, in case of default. The latter introduces uncertainties and inefficiencies in the ABS market that could create arbitrage opportunities. It is also unclear to what extent a direct purchase of these securities by the ECB might have an impact on the credit market. This will depend on, for example, the type of securities targeted in terms of the underlying assets that would be considered as eligible for inclusion (such as loans to small and medium-sized companies, car loans, leases, residential and commercial mortgages). The timing of a possible move by the ECB is also an issue; immediate action would take place in the context of relatively limited market volumes, while if the ECB waits, it might have access to a larger market, provided steps are taken in the next few months to revamp the market. We start by discussing the first of these issues – the size of the EU ABS market. We estimate how much this market could be worth if some specific measures are implemented. We then discuss the different options available to the ECB should they decide to intervene in the EU ABS market. We include a preliminary list of regulatory steps that could be taken to homogenise asset-backed securities in the euro area. We conclude with our recommended course of action.

So far apart and yet so close: Should the ECB care about inflation differentials? Bruegel Policy Contribution, Issue 2014/10 September 2014

Inflation rates can differ across regions of monetary unions. We show that in the euro area, the US, Canada, Japan and Australia, inflation rates have been substantially and persistently different in different regions. Differences were particularly substantial in the euro area. Inflation differences can reflect normal adjustment processes such as price convergence or the Balassa-Samuelson effect, or can reflect the different cyclical position of regions. But they can also be the result of economic distortions resulting from segmented markets or unsustainable demand and credit developments fueled by low real interest rates. In normal times, the European Central Bank cannot influence such developments with its single interest rate instrument. However, unconventional policy measures can have different effects on different countries depending on the chosen instrument, and should be used to reduce fragmentation and ensure the proper transmission of monetary policy. The new macro prudential policy tools are unlikely to be practical in addressing inflation divergences. It is crucial to keep the average inflation rate close to two percent so that inflation differentials are possible without deflation in some parts of the euro area, which in turn might endanger area-wide financial stability and price stability.

Trudny "Sojusznik" Bialorus w polityce Rosji. Prace OSW 2008. = Difficult "ally." Belarus in Russia's foreign policy. OSW Study 28/2008

Belarus holds a special position in Russian policy due to its geopolitical, military and transit significance. Russia's influence and position in the entire Eastern European region largely depend on how strong Russian influence in Belarus is. The process of Russian-Belarusian integration began in 1994, when Alyaksandr Lukashenka came to power in Minsk. At the time, Russia's policy towards Belarus was based on twomain assumptions. Firstly, the Kremlin supported Lukashenka's authoritarian regime. This allowed Russia to keep Belarus within its orbit of political influence and prevent other states from getting involved, since an undemocratic Belarus could not count on closer contacts with the West. Secondly, Russia heavily subsidised Belarus with cheap energy resources (way below the market price) and allowed the duty-free access of Belarusian goods to its market. Thus Belarus became a kind of 'sponsored authoritarianism' with a specific economic model, owing its existence to Russia's economic and political support. At the same time, Moscow's key objective in its policy towards Belarus was to make Minsk accept the Russian conditions concerning integration, which would in fact lead to Belarus' incorporation by the Russian Federation. However, Belarus managed to maintain its sovereignty, while Alyaksandr Lukashenka bandied the term 'integration' about in order to maintain the preferential model of his state's relations with Russia. Russia's intention to alter the nature of these bilateral relations became evident when Vladimir Putin took power in 2000. However, Moscow faced Minsk's refusal to accept the Russian integration plan (which, among other measures, provided for the takeover of Belarusian economic assets by Russian companies). This forced Russia to use its main tool against Minsk: the supplies of cheap gas and oil that had been sustaining Belarus' archaic economy. The most serious crisis in Russian-Belarusian relations broke out at the beginning of 2007, following Moscow's decision to raise the energy resource prices. This decision marked the beginning of the application of market principles to settlements between Moscow and Minsk. The key question this study is meant to answer concerns the consequences of the aforementioned decision by Russia for future Russian-Belarusian relations. Are they at a turning point? What are Russia's policy objectives? What results can come from the process of moving mutual relations onto an economic footing? What policy will replace Russia's 'sponsoring of Belarusian authoritarianism', which it has been implementing since 1994? Finally, what further measures will Russia undertake towards Belarus? The current study consists of five chapters. The first chapter offers a brief presentation of Belarus' significance and position in Russian policy. The second analyses the development of Russian-Belarusian political relations, first of all the establishment of the Union State, Belarus' position in Russian domestic policy and Russia's influence on Belarusian policy. The third chapter presents bilateral economic relations, primarily energy issues. The fourth chapter describes the state and perspectives of military cooperation between the two states. The fifth chapter presents conclusions, where the author attempts to define the essence of the ongoing re-evaluation in Russian-Belarusian relations and to project their future model.

Measuring the intermittent synchronicity of macroeconomic growth in Europe. ACES Cases No. 2010.1

Synchronization of growth rates are an important feature of international business cycles, particularly in relation to regional integration projects such as the single currency in Europe. Synchronization of growth rates clearly enhances the effectiveness of European Central Bank monetary policy, ensuring that policy changes are attuned to the dynamics of growth and business cycles in the majority of member states. In this paper a dissimilarity metric is constructed by measuring the topological differences between the GDP growth patterns in recurrence plots for individual countries. The results show that synchronization of growth rates were higher among the Euro area member states during the second half of the 1980s and from 1997 to roughly 2002. Apart from these two time periods, Euro area member states do not appear to be more synchronized than a group of major international countries, signifying that globalization was the major cause of international business cycle synchronization.

Les enjeux de la libéralisation des comptes de capital dans les pays du sud de la Méditerranée. = Challenges arising from Capital Account Liberalisation in the Countries of the South Mediterranean Region. MEDPRO Technical Report No. 11/March 2012

This MEDPRO Technical Report confirms the importance of commercial openness and macroeconomic performance (i.e. the control of inflation and stability of current account balance and exchange rate) on growth dynamics in the south Mediterranean countries. In particular, the positive impact of capital account liberalisation is conditioned by the imperative reinforcement of institutional quality, country risk reduction, and government stability. An examination of the Tunisian case shows that only sectors subject to tariff dismantlement within the framework of the Association Agreement with the EU appear to benefit from capital account liberalisation. Furthermore, the report shows that a scenario of capital account liberalisation requires the anticipation of monetary policy reaction functions. It follows that the mechanisms for interest rate adjustment, or inter alia, the interest rates’ reaction to price fluctuations, are weakly volatile. In turn, the analysis shows that an active control of inflation mismatches occurs essentially through exchange rate corrections, thus highlighting the greater interest central banks have in exchange rate stability over real stability. A capital account liberalisation scenario would hence impose a tightening of monetary policy.

The ECB’s Latest Gimmick. Cash for loans, CEPS Policy Brief No. 341, March 2016

Among several important monetary policy initiatives decided by the European Central Bank on 10 March 2016 was the launch of a new set of targeted longer-term refinancing operations (TLTRO II), expanding on the previous TLTRO. In assessing this scheme, which might cost up to €24 billion, this Policy Brief finds that while it could become important, it is questionable whether it will achieve its goal of encouraging the extension of credit for new investment, as banks can easily window dress their loan book.

Inflation expectations, interest rates and arbitrary income transfers

Unexpected inflation, disinflation or deflation cause arbitrary income transfers between an economy's borrowers and lenders. This redistribution results from distorted real interest rates that are too high when price level changes are over-predicted and too low when they are under-predicted. This article shows that in Australia's case, inflation expectations were mostly biased upwards throughout the 1990s, according to the Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research series and to a new derived series based on bond yields, implying that real interest rates were too high over this time. In turn, this caused substantial arbitrary income transfers from debtors to creditors, estimated to have averaged up to 3 per cent of gross domestic product over the period.

Is there a case for low inflation-induced productivity growth in selected Asian economies?

The authors examine the evidence on the relationship between inflation and productivity growth for nine Asian economies using causality analysis in a multivariate model with money supply as a possible effective monetary policy tool. The inflation-productivity growth relationship is found to be non-uniform, as the evidence of uni-directional, bi-directional, and no causality between the two variables is varied and significant for some countries and insignificant for others. An attempt is made to explain the inflation-productivity nexus for these countries and to discuss implications for anti-inflationary policies such as inflation targeting.

IDENTIFICAÇÃO DE SURPRESAS MONETÁRIAS E SEUS IMPACTOS SOBRE A ESTRUTURA A TERMO DA TAXA DE JUROS

A reação dos mercados às alterações na taxa básica de juros é relevante para toda a economia. O entendimento da relação entre a política monetária e as taxas de juros é de extrema importância, uma vez que surpresas monetárias, ou seja, os erros de previsão do mercado a respeito das alterações da meta da Taxa Selic, podem afetar as taxas de juros de diferentes maturidades ou vencimentos, impactando diretamente a Administração Financeira. O objetivo deste estudo foi analisar a variação da Estrutura a Termo da Taxa de Juros (ETTJ) quando verificadas surpresas monetárias na ocasião da decisão do Comitê de Política Monetária (Copom) a respeito da meta da Taxa Selic. Para isso, foi desenvolvido um estudo descritivo quantitativo, que considerou as 88 reuniões ordinárias do Copom realizadas no período de janeiro de 2004 a dezembro de 2013. As surpresas monetárias foram identificadas através de duas formas distintas. Na primeira forma foram consideradas as taxas do contrato de DI1 referente ao último negócio realizado no pregão da data da reunião do Copom, e a taxa do primeiro negócio realizado no pregão seguinte. Desta maneira foram identificadas 11 surpresas monetárias. Na segunda forma foram consideradas as taxas médias verificadas nos mesmos contratos e ocasiões citados anteriormente, sendo assim identificadas 10 surpresas monetárias. Já para a análise da relação entre as variações da ETTJ e as surpresas monetárias foram considerados os vencimentos de 2, 3, 6, 9, 12, 15, 18 e 24 meses. Como resultado foi possível observar que as surpresas monetárias e as variações na ETTJ são diretamente proporcionais, movendo-se na mesma direção, para as duas formas distintas de surpresas monetárias identificadas neste estudo. Além disso, foi empregada nas análises a questão da unanimidade na decisão do Copom, com o objetivo testar o seu conteúdo informacional, e observou-se como resultado uma menor variação da ETTJ em ocasiões em que a decisão do Copom foi unânime. Em resumo, entende-se que os resultados encontrados no presente estudo estão em linha aos apresentados por outros autores, sendo possível comprovar a correlação existente entre as variações da ETTJ e as surpresas monetárias, bem como verificar que a magnitude das variações diminui ao longo da ETTJ, fato este que pode ser relacionado à transparência da política monetária nacional e à experiência na vigência do sistema de metas para a inflação.

Jobs, Unemployment, and Macroeconomic Transmission

Measuring Job Openings: Evidence from Swedish Plant Level Data. In modern macroeconomic models “job openings'' are a key component. Thus, when taking these models to the data we need an empirical counterpart to the theoretical concept of job openings. To achieve this, the literature relies on job vacancies measured either in survey or register data. Insofar as this concept captures the concept of job openings well we should see a tight relationship between vacancies and subsequent hires on the micro level. To investigate this, I analyze a new data set of Swedish hires and job vacancies on the plant level covering the period 2001-2012. I find that vacancies contain little power in predicting hires over and above (i) whether the number of vacancies is positive and (ii) plant size. Building on this, I propose an alternative measure of job openings in the economy. This measure (i) better predicts hiring at the plant level and (ii) provides a better fitting aggregate matching function vis-à-vis the traditional vacancy measure. Firm Level Evidence from Two Vacancy Measures. Using firm level survey and register data for both Sweden and Denmark we show systematic mis-measurement in both vacancy measures. While the register-based measure on the aggregate constitutes a quarter of the survey-based measure, the latter is not a super-set of the former. To obtain the full set of unique vacancies in these two databases, the number of survey vacancies should be multiplied by approximately 1.2. Importantly, this adjustment factor varies over time and across firm characteristics. Our findings have implications for both the search-matching literature and policy analysis based on vacancy measures: observed changes in vacancies can be an outcome of changes in mis-measurement, and are not necessarily changes in the actual number of vacancies. Swedish Unemployment Dynamics. We study the contribution of different labor market flows to business cycle variations in unemployment in the context of a dual labor market. To this end, we develop a decomposition method that allows for a distinction between permanent and temporary employment. We also allow for slow convergence to steady state which is characteristic of European labor markets. We apply the method to a new Swedish data set covering the period 1987-2012 and show that the relative contributions of inflows and outflows to/from unemployment are roughly 60/30. The remaining 10\% are due to flows not involving unemployment. Even though temporary contracts only cover 9-11\% of the working age population, variations in flows involving temporary contracts account for 44\% of the variation in unemployment. We also show that the importance of flows involving temporary contracts is likely to be understated if one does not account for non-steady state dynamics. The New Keynesian Transmission Mechanism: A Heterogeneous-Agent Perspective. We argue that a 2-agent version of the standard New Keynesian model---where a ``worker'' receives only labor income and a “capitalist'' only profit income---offers insights about how income inequality affects the monetary transmission mechanism. Under rigid prices, monetary policy affects the distribution of consumption, but it has no effect on output as workers choose not to change their hours worked in response to wage movements. In the corresponding representative-agent model, in contrast, hours do rise after a monetary policy loosening due to a wealth effect on labor supply: profits fall, thus reducing the representative worker's income. If wages are rigid too, however, the monetary transmission mechanism is active and resembles that in the corresponding representative-agent model. Here, workers are not on their labor supply curve and hence respond passively to demand, and profits are procyclical.

Exchange Rate Policy and Economic Growth after the Financial Crisis in Central and Eastern Europe

In a paper on the effects of the global financial crisis in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), the author reacts to a paper of Åslund (2011) published in the same issue of Eurasian Geography and Economics on the influence of exchange rate policies on the region’s recovery. The author argues that post-crisis corrections in current account deficits in CEE countries do not in themselves signal a return to steady economic growth. Disagreeing with Åslund over the role of loose monetary policy in fostering the region’s economic problems, he outlines a number of competitiveness problems that remain to be addressed in the 10 new EU member states of CEE, along with improvements in framework conditions supporting future macroeconomic growth.