Affiliation, equilibrium existence and the revenue ranking of auctions

We consider private value auctions where bidders’ types are dependent, a case usually treated by assuming affiliation. We show that affiliation is a restrictive assumption in three senses: topological, measure-theoretic and statistical (affiliation is a very restrictive characterization of positive dependence). We also show that affiliation’s main implications do not generalize for alternative definitions of positive dependence. From this, we propose new approaches to the problems of pure strategy equilibrium existence in first-price auctions (PSEE) and the characterization of the revenue ranking of auctions. For equilibrium existence, we slightly restrict the set of distributions considered, without loss of economic generality, and offer a complete characterization of PSEE. For revenue ranking, we obtain a characterization of the expected revenue differences between second and first price auctions with general dependence of types.

Auctions with options for re-auction

We examine the role of seller bidding and reserve prices in an infinitely repeated independent-private-value (IPV) ascending-price auction. The seller has a single object that she values at zero. At the end of any auction round, she may either sell to the highest bidder or pass-in the object and hold a new auction next period. New bidders are drawn randomly in each round. The ability to re-auction motivates a notion of reserve price as the option value of retaining the object for re-auctioning. Even in the absence of a mechanism with which to commit to a reserve price, the optimal “secret” reserve is shown to exceed zero. However, despite the infinite repetition, there may be significant value to the seller from a binding reserve price commitment: the optimal binding reserve is higher than the optimal “secret” reserve, and may be substantially so, even with very patient players. Furthermore, reserve price commitments may even be socially preferable at high discount factors. We also show that the optimal “phantom” bidding strategy for the seller is revenue-equivalent to a commitment to an optimal public reserve price.

All-pay auctions with endogenous asymmetries

We study N-bidders, asymmetric all-pay auctions under incomplete information. First, we solve for the equilibrium of a parametric model. Each bidder’s valuation is independently drawn from an uniform [0, αi] where the parameter αi may vary across bidders. In this game, asymmetries are exogenously given. Next, a two-stage game where asymmetries are endogenously generated is studied. At the first stage, each bidder chooses the level of an observable, costly, value-enhancing action. The second stage is the bidding sub-game, whose equilibrium is simply the equilibrium of the, previously analyzed, game with exogenous asymmetries. Finally, natural applications of the all pay-auction in the context of political lobbying are considered: the effects of excluding bidders, as well as, the impact of caps on bids.

Buy-or-sell auctions

This paper develops a game theoretic model of a "Buy-or-Sell" auction. Participants have to submit both a bid and an offer price for up to one of the many units of the good being auctioned. The bid-ask spread is set in advance by the auctioneer. Such an auction was used by the Central Bank of Brazil to intervene in the foreign exchange market during the exchange rate crawling-peg regime (1995-1999). I investigate whether such mechanism is more effective than standard intervention auctions to prevent speculative attacks in the context of managed exchange rate regimes.

Mid-auction information acquisition

This paper studies a model of a sequential auction where bidders are allowed to acquire further information about their valuations of the object in the middle of the auction. It is shown that, in any equilibrium where the distribution of the final price is atornless, a bidder's best response has a simple characterization. In particular, the optimal information acquisition point is the same, regardless of the other bidders' actions. This makes it natural to focus on symmetric, undominated equilibria, as in the Vickrey auction. An existence theorem for such a class of equilibria is presented. The paper also presents some results and numerical simulations that compare this sequential auction with the one-shot auction. 8equential auctions typically yield more expected revenue for the seller than their one-shot counterparts. 80 the possibility of mid-auction information acquisition can provide an explanation for why sequential procedures are more often adopted.

Auctions of identical objects with single-unit demands : a survey

The theory of auctions of a single object generalizes to a situation where identical objects are sold either sequentially or simultaneously but individuais can only buy one object. In this context, I will present a survey of the main results regarding the ranking of auctions based on revenue, bidding behaviour, effects of entry fees and reserve prices, and other strategic issues.

A simple analysis of the U.S. emission permits auctions

We examine a stylized version of EPA auctions when agents know the list of values of sellers and buyers. Sellers and buyers behave strategically. We show that there are two types of equilibria: inefficient equilibria where no goods are traded and efficient equilibria where alI exchange occurs at a uniform price. We also provide examples of the EPA auction game under incomplete information when the uniform price equilibrium holds and when it does not hold. When the uniform price equilibrium holds, sellers shade their bids up and buyers shade their bids down. In the example where the uniform price equilibrium does not hold, both buyers and sellers shade their bids down in an equilibrium.

Share bidding auctions, sliding scale royalty rates and the new brazilian regulatory framework for the pre-salt areas

O governo brasileiro recentemente aprovou uma legislação instituindo um novo marco regulatório para as reservas petrolíferas do pré-sal. Segundo as novas regras, estas áreas deverão ser licitadas mediante um leilão de partilha de lucro. Motivado por esta mudança, apresentamos um modelo de leilão de partilha sob afiliação, demonstrando a existência de um equilíbrio monótono em estratégias puras e caracterizando a solução. Alem disso, provamos que este mecanismo gera receita esperada maior ou igual a um leilão de primeiro preço usual. Em seguida, introduzimos no modelo uma função representando taxas de royalties que dependem do valor do objeto. Este instrumento permite uma elevação na receita esperada de ambos os modelos, fazendo com que a diferença entre eles encolha. Finalmente, analisando o novo marco regulatório sob o ponto de vista dos resultados obtidos, concluímos que o antigo modelo de concessão utilizado pelo governo brasileiro é mais adequado e lucrativo.

Profit-share bidding auctions: a theoretical approach

Neste trabalho, estudamos o regime de partilha de produção brasileiro, instituí do pela Lei No 12.351, para exploração de petróleo através de uma abordagem te orica. Desenvolvemos um modelo de partilha de produção a fim de capturar algumas características do modelo de partilha brasileiro como, por exemplo, a participação obrigatória da Petrobras, assimetria de informação e a presença de participantes estratégicos. Através de solução numérica, fazemos uma análise das estratégias dos participantes e dos ganhos esperados. Além disso, desenvolvemos um modelo de custos heterogêneos para estudar as regras de conteúdo local.

Asymmetric auctions and risk aversion within independent private valoues

We study tournaments with many ex-ante asymmetric (heterogeneous) contestants as an independent-private-values all-pay auction. The asymmetry is either with respect to the distribution of valuations for the prize or the risk preferences. By characterizing equilibria in tnonotone strategies we show that tournaments \:vith man~y heterogenous contestants are qualitatively distinct. First, with two (or many ex-ante identical) participants, a contestant always exerts some effort with positive probability. In contrast, with many asymmetric participants, one 1night not exert any effort at all, even if there is a positive probability that he has the highest valuation among ali. Second, in tournan1ents with t'wo (o r n1any ex-ante h01nogenous) contestants, equilibrium effort densities are decreasing. This prediction is at odds with experimental evidence that shows the empírica! density might be increasing at high effort levels. V\.lith rnany heterogeneous contestants, however. the increasing bid density is consistent with an equilibrium behavior.

Sequential histopathology at the Rhipicephalus sanguineus tick feeding site on dogs and guinea pigs

The tick Rhipicephalus sanguineus is a very common parasite of dogs worldwide. Dogs seem unable to acquire resistance against this tick species, whereas guinea pigs demonstrate a very strong resistance following primary infestation. We studied the inflammatory reaction at the R. sanguineus tick feeding site on dogs and guinea pigs during primary and tertiary infestations at different time intervals after attachment. Biopsies were collected after 4, 24, 48 and 96 hours. Changes that were found in all experimental groups included a cone of cement around the mouthparts of the tick, epidermal hyperplasia, edema and inflammatory cell infiltration in the dermis directly underneath the tick attachment site. Dogs reacted to ticks mainly with neutrophils, particularly after repeated exposure. Mast cells and mononuclear leukocytes were also present. Guinea pigs reacted to R. sanguineus mainly with mononuclear cells, eosinophils and basophils. These cells were particularly numerous after repeated exposure to R. sanguineus. Our results suggest that basophils and eosinophils are involved in resistance of guinea pigs to R. sanguineus and that neutrophils in dogs have little effect against this tick species.

Group Sequential Communication (GSC): Especificação e Análise de Desempenho de umMecanismo de Comunicação de Tempo Real Compatível ao Padrão IEEE 802.11/11e Aplicado à Automação Industrial

This thesis proposes the specification and performance analysis of a real-time communication mechanism for IEEE 802.11/11e standard. This approach is called Group Sequential Communication (GSC). The GSC has a better performance for dealing with small data packets when compared to the HCCA mechanism by adopting a decentralized medium access control using a publish/subscribe communication scheme. The main objective of the thesis is the HCCA overhead reduction of the Polling, ACK and QoS Null frames exchanged between the Hybrid Coordinator and the polled stations. The GSC eliminates the polling scheme used by HCCA scheduling algorithm by using a Virtual Token Passing procedure among members of the real-time group to whom a high-priority and sequential access to communication medium is granted. In order to improve the reliability of the mechanism proposed into a noisy channel, it is presented an error recovery scheme called second chance algorithm. This scheme is based on block acknowledgment strategy where there is a possibility of retransmitting when missing real-time messages. Thus, the GSC mechanism maintains the real-time traffic across many IEEE 802.11/11e devices, optimized bandwidth usage and minimal delay variation for data packets in the wireless network. For validation purpose of the communication scheme, the GSC and HCCA mechanisms have been implemented in network simulation software developed in C/C++ and their performance results were compared. The experiments show the efficiency of the GSC mechanism, especially in industrial communication scenarios.

Molecular typing and antifungal susceptibility of clinical sequential isolates of Cryptococcus neoformans from São Paulo State, Brazil

The antifungal susceptibility profiles and the genetic variability of 83 sequential clinical isolates of Cryptococcus neoformans, including four Cryptococcus gattii isolates, obtained from 38 São Paulo AIDS patients with cryptococcal meningitis were assessed by electrophoretic karyotyping and random amplified polymorphic DNA (RAPD) analysis. The majority of the Cryptococcus neoformans isolates were highly susceptible to amphotericin B and fluconazole. Twenty percent of the minimum inhibitory concentration values for amphotericin B varied from 0.5 to 1 mu g mL(-1). For fluconazole, 22% occurred in the range 8-16 mu g mL(-1). Sequential isolates from nine patients showed a trend towards lower susceptibility to fluconazole, flucytosine, itraconazole and amphotericin B. The results of molecular typing by electrophoretic karyotyping and RAPD analysis showed the presence of 22 electrophoretic karyotypes (EK) and 15 RAPD profiles that were highly correlated. Our results provided evidence for the occurrence of genetic changes in some strains associated with microevolution during the course of infection. We also observed both microevolution and simultaneous coinfection with two distinct Cryptococcus neoformans strains in one patient. In some patients, we found changed EK- and RAPD patterns in association with increased MIC values.

Radial Plasma Dynamic in Sequential Pinches

Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES)