Going Preferential in Services Trade: Lessons from Practice

Lecture given by Pierre Sauvé at Utrecht University School of Economics

Trade reference roster; containing names of shippers, brokers and jobbers who have signed agreements making their transactions subject to the standard trading rules or who are members of an association that has adopted the said "rules."

Mode of access: Internet.

Report of the United States Trade Representative's Intergovernmental Policy Advisory Committee (IGPAC), to the agreements reached in the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations : submitted to the Congress, January 14, 1994.

Shipping list no.: 94-0061-P.

Double tax agreements and the international allocation of business income in Australia

Increasingly, the effectiveness of the present system of taxation of international businesses is being questioned. The problem associated with the taxation of such businesses is twofold. A system of international taxation must be a fair and equitable system, distributing profits between the relevant jurisdictions and, in doing so, avoiding double taxation. At the same time, the prevention of fiscal evasion must be secured. In an attempt to achieve a fair and equitable system Australia adopts unilateral, bilateral and multilateral measures to avoid double taxation and restrict the avoidance of tax. The first step in ascertaining the international allocation of business income is to consider the taxation of business income according to domestic law, that is, the unilateral measures. The treatment of international business income under the Australian domestic law, that is, the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) and Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth), will depend on two concepts, first, whether the taxpayer is a resident of Australia and secondly, whether the income is sourced in Australia. After the taxation of business profits has been determined according to domestic law it is necessary to consider the applicability of the bilateral measures, that is, the Double Tax Agreements (DTAs) to which Australia is a party, as the DTAs will override the domestic law where there is any conflict. Australia is a party to 40 DTAs with another seven presently being negotiated. The preamble to Australia's DTAs provides that the purpose of such agreements is 'to conclude an Agreement for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income'. Both purposes, for different reasons, are equally important. It has been said that: The taxpayer hopes the treaty will prevent the double taxation of his income; the tax gatherer hopes the treaty will prevent fiscal evasion; and the politician just hopes. The first purpose, the avoidance of double taxation, is achieved through the provision of rules whereby the Contracting States agree to the classification of income and the allocation of that income to a particular State. In this sense DTAs do not allocate jurisdiction to tax but rather provide an arrangement whereby the States agree to restrict their substantive law. The restriction is either through the non-taxing of the income or via the provision of a tax credit.

Trick or treaty?: The Australian debate over the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement

The secretive 2011 Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement – known in short by the catchy acronym ACTA – is a controversial trade pact designed to provide for stronger enforcement of intellectual property rights. The preamble to the treaty reads like pulp fiction – it raises moral panics about piracy, counterfeiting, organised crime, and border security. The agreement contains provisions on civil remedies and criminal offences; copyright law and trademark law; the regulation of the digital environment; and border measures. Memorably, Susan Sell called the international treaty a TRIPS Double-Plus Agreement, because its obligations far exceed those of the World Trade Organization's TRIPS Agreement 1994, and TRIPS-Plus Agreements, such as the Australia-United States Free Trade Agreement 2004. ACTA lacks the language of other international intellectual property agreements, which emphasise the need to balance the protection of intellectual property owners with the wider public interest in access to medicines, human development, and transfer of knowledge and technology. In Australia, there was much controversy both about the form and the substance of ACTA. While the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade was a partisan supporter of the agreement, a wide range of stakeholders were openly critical. After holding hearings and taking note of the position of the European Parliament and the controversy in the United States, the Joint Standing Committee on Treaties in the Australian Parliament recommended the deferral of ratification of ACTA. This was striking as representatives of all the main parties agreed on the recommendation. The committee was concerned about the lack of transparency, due process, public participation, and substantive analysis of the treaty. There were also reservations about the ambiguity of the treaty text, and its potential implications for the digital economy, innovation and competition, plain packaging of tobacco products, and access to essential medicines. The treaty has provoked much soul-searching as to whether the Trick or Treaty reforms on the international treaty-making process in Australia have been compromised or undermined. Although ACTA stalled in the Australian Parliament, the debate over it is yet to conclude. There have been concerns in Australia and elsewhere that ACTA will be revived as a ‘zombie agreement’. Indeed, in March 2013, the Canadian government introduced a bill to ensure compliance with ACTA. Will it be also resurrected in Australia? Has it already been revived? There are three possibilities. First, the Australian government passed enhanced remedies with respect to piracy, counterfeiting and border measures in a separate piece of legislation – the Intellectual Property Laws Amendment (Raising the Bar) Act 2012 (Cth). Second, the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade remains supportive of ACTA. It is possible, after further analysis, that the next Australian Parliament – to be elected in September 2013 – will ratify the treaty. Third, Australia is involved in the Trans-Pacific Partnership negotiations. The government has argued that ACTA should be a template for the Intellectual Property Chapter in the Trans-Pacific Partnership. The United States Trade Representative would prefer a regime even stronger than ACTA. This chapter provides a portrait of the Australian debate over ACTA. It is the account of an interested participant in the policy proceedings. This chapter will first consider the deliberations and recommendations of the Joint Standing Committee on Treaties on ACTA. Second, there was a concern that ACTA had failed to provide appropriate safeguards with respect to civil liberties, human rights, consumer protection and privacy laws. Third, there was a concern about the lack of balance in the treaty’s copyright measures; the definition of piracy is overbroad; the suite of civil remedies, criminal offences and border measures is excessive; and there is a lack of suitable protection for copyright exceptions, limitations and remedies. Fourth, there was a worry that the provisions on trademark law, intermediary liability and counterfeiting could have an adverse impact upon consumer interests, competition policy and innovation in the digital economy. Fifth, there was significant debate about the impact of ACTA on pharmaceutical drugs, access to essential medicines and health-care. Sixth, there was concern over the lobbying by tobacco industries for ACTA – particularly given Australia’s leadership on tobacco control and the plain packaging of tobacco products. Seventh, there were concerns about the operation of border measures in ACTA. Eighth, the Joint Standing Committee on Treaties was concerned about the jurisdiction of the ACTA Committee, and the treaty’s protean nature. Finally, the chapter raises fundamental issues about the relationship between the executive and the Australian Parliament with respect to treaty-making. There is a need to reconsider the efficacy of the Trick or Treaty reforms passed by the Australian Parliament in the 1990s.

The Nineteenth Century Law of the Sea and the British Abolition of the Slave Trade

This study focuses on British attempts during the nineteenth century to outlaw the Atlantic Slave Trade internationally, for which it was successful, after seventy-five years of effort. It considers the lack of willingness to allow Great Britain, at the Congress of Vienna and during the Concert of Europe, to establish a universal treaty outlawing the slave trade. As a result, this mandated a change in British tactics, which would ultimately prove to be successful – the establishment of a web of bilateral agreements which came to included all maritime powers. The study then moves on to consider the evolution of these bilateral agreements while highlighting the relationship between Great Britain and States (Brazil, France, Portugal and the United States) which were obstinate in their willingness to join this bilateral regime. Finally, consideration is given to the move towards the establishment of the 1890 General Act of Brussels; and thus the conclusion of the decades long British foreign policy objective of a universal instrument meant to suppress the Atlantic Slave Trade.

From Fordism to neoconservatism : free trade and Canadian industrial policy in an era of globalism /

Nothing today affects the lives of people in countries throughout the industrialized and developing world as much as international trade. Nowhere is this more true than in Canada. Canada's involvement in international trade has a long history dating back to 1854 when it was a British colony. As a major trading country, Canada has always adopted a proactive industrial policy which has been largely responsible for its relative economic prosperi ty. But, wi th businesses now free to invest and divest under the terms of the CUFTA and the NAFTA, the most fundamental concerns for Canadians, in a borderless world, are what powers will the Canadian government have to shape industrial policy, and to what extent can Canada continue as a viable nationstate if it can no longer control its national economy? These are important concerns because, in world without borders, the adjustment process becomes more volatile and more difficult to manage. The CUFTA and the NAFTA not only create the rules for conducting trade, but they also establish a set of new rules for the Canadian government that will diminish its power. As a member of a new North American trading bloc, Canada will find itself subject to a set of forces requiring analysis beyond participation in a conventional free trade area. Because many of the traditional levers of government will now be subject to external control imposed by these agreements, Canada will not be able to mount certain policies in the future that it has relied on in the past. This reality limits the pro-active role of the Canadian state to use policies and programmes for the country's immediate national development. What this thesis attempts is an examination of the evolution of Canadian industrial policy, in effect, the transi tion from Fordism to Neoconservatism, and an assessment of Canada's future as a nation-state as it tries to find security and improved access in a free trade arrangement. Unless Canada takes steps to neutralize the asymmetry of power between itself and the United States through adjustment programmes, it is the contention of this thesis that its economic future is anything but stable.