Notes on political economy (1826)

Mode of access: Internet.

Patterns for modern living, based on fact and theory;

[division 1] Psychological patterns. 3 v.--[division 2] Political patterns. 3 v.--[division 3] Cultural patterns. 3 v.

The retirement of national debts; the theory and history since the world war,

Published also as Studies in history, economics and public law, edited by the Faculty of political science of Columbia university, no. 374.

A Sham Delight Has No Exchange Value: Henri Lefebvre and the evolution of Bernard Tschumi's early architectural theory

Thesis (Master's)--University of Washington, 2016-06

Making the 2004 Constitution of Afghanistan: A History and Analysis Through the Lens of Coordination and Deferral Theory

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Washington, 2016-06

Hegemony, Institutionalism and US Foreign Policy: theory and practice in comparative historical perspective

This paper explores the theoretical and policy implications of contemporary American hegemony. A key argument is that the development of US hegemony generally, and the distinctive turn in US foreign policy that has occurred in the wake of 11 September in particular, can best be understood by placing recent events in a comparative and historical framework. The immediate post-World War II order laid the foundations of a highly institutionalised multilateral system that provided key benefits for a number of countries while simultaneously constraining and enhancing US power. An historical reading of US hegemony suggests that its recent unilateralism is undermining the foundations of its power and influence.

Stochastic dynamic programming for election timing: A game theory approach

In this paper, we consider dynamic programming for the election timing in the majoritarian parliamentary system such as in Australia, where the government has a constitutional right to call an early election. This right can give the government an advantage to remain in power for as long as possible by calling an election, when its popularity is high. On the other hand, the opposition's natural objective is to gain power, and it will apply controls termed as "boosts" to reduce the chance of the government being re-elected by introducing policy and economic responses. In this paper, we explore equilibrium solutions to the government, and the opposition strategies in a political game using stochastic dynamic programming. Results are given in terms of the expected remaining life in power, call and boost probabilities at each time at any level of popularity.

The Strategic Utility of ‘Chineseness’ in the Political Cultures of Diasporic Chinese Communities: Some Preliminary Thoughts

It is not especially controversial to suggest that the academic literature on Chineseness has for some time been focused upon the ‘porousness’ and ‘strategic’ possibilities of identity categories. This is most clearly observable in the legacy of cultural theory upon identity politics. In particular, terms such as hybridity have not only expanded the political potential for fragmenting conventional identifications, but also symbolised the sorts of ‘complicated entanglements’ within which individuals and communities are perpetually caught. The discursive mileage of hybridity has meant, over time, that it has also attracted criticism. Some of this criticism comes from academics engaged in more materialist forms of research. These sorts of contrary perspectives have often sought to ground hybrid identifications within the cultural and historical milieu from which they are enacted, whenever they are enacted.

On the opportunism-independent theory of the firm

Previous developments in the opportunism-independent theory of the firm are either restricted to special cases or are derived from the capabilities or resource-based perspective. However, a more general opportunism-independent approach can be developed, based on the work of Demsetz and Coase, which is nevertheless contractual in nature. This depends on 'direction', that is, deriving economic value by permitting one set of actors to direct the activities of another, and of non-human factors of production. Direction helps to explain not only firm boundaries and organisation, but also the existence of firms, without appealing to opportunism or moral hazard. The paper also considers the extent to which it is meaningful to speak of 'contractual' theories in the absence of opportunism, and whether this analysis can be extended beyond the employment contract to encompass ownership of assets by the firm. © The Author 2005. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Cambridge Political Economy Society. All rights reserved.

Governance regimes, corruption and growth: theory and evidence

We study the role of political accountability as a determinant of corruption and economic growth. Our model identifies two governance regimes defined by the quality of political institutions and shows that the relationship between corruption and growth is regime specific. We use a threshold model to estimate the impact of corruption on growth where corruption is treated as an endogenous variable. We find two governance regimes, conditional on the quality of political institutions. In the regime with high quality political institutions, corruption has a substantial negative impact on growth. In the regime with low quality institutions, corruption has no impact on growth.

Making political films politically?:the film-making practice of Jean-Luc Godard

This thesis attempts to re-examine the work of Jean-Luc Godard and in particular the claims which have been made for it as the starting-point for a revolutionary cinema.This re-examination involves, firstly, a critical summary of the development of Structuralist thinking, from its origins in linguistics, with Saussure, through to its influence on Marxism, with Althusser. It is this `Structural Marxism' which prepared the ground for a view of Godard as a revolutionary film-maker so its influences on film theory in the decade after 1968 is traced in journals such as Cahiers du Cinéma and Screen and in the work of their editors and contributors. Godard's relationship with such theories was a complex one and some of the cross-breeding is revealed in a brief account of his own ideas about his film-making. More important, however is his practice as a committed `political' film-maker between 1968 and 1972 which is analysed in terms of the responses it makes to the cultural opportunities offered in the period after the revolutionary situation of May 1968. The severe problems revealed by that analysis may be partially resolved in Godard's greatest `political' achievement Tout va bien, but a comparative analysis proves that in earlier `a-political' films such as Vivre sa vie, he was creating more meaningful and perhaps even more revolutionary art, whose formal experimentation is more organically linked to its subject and whose ability to communicate ideas far oustrips the later work. In conclusion some indications are suggested of a more fruitful basis for Marxist theories of art than Structural variants, seeking a non-formalist approach in the work of Marx, of Trotsky, of Brecht and Lukacs.