Tasavallan Presidentin tervehdyssanat Euroopan turvallisuus- ja yhteistyökonferenssin avajaisissa Helsingissä 3.7.1973 = speech of welcome by the President of the Republic, Dr. Urho Kekkonen, at the inaugural session of CSCE in Helsinki, July 3rd, 1973

Puhe

Speech prognosis and need of pharyngeal flap for non syndromic vs syndromic Pierre Robin Sequence

BACKGROUND: The aim of this retrospective study was to evaluate speech outcome and need of a pharyngeal flap in children born with nonsyndromic Pierre Robin Sequence (nsPRS) vs syndromic Pierre Robin Sequence (sPRS). METHODS: Pierre Robin Sequence was diagnosed when the triad microretrognathia, glossoptosis, and cleft palate were present. Children were classified at birth in 3 categories depending on respiratory and feeding problems. The Borel-Maisonny classification was used to score the velopharyngeal insufficiency. RESULTS: The study was based on 38 children followed from 1985 to 2006. For the 25 nsPRS, 9 (36%) pharyngeal flaps were performed with improvements of the phonatory score in the 3 categories. For the 13 sPRS, 3 (23%) pharyngeal flaps were performed with an improvement of the phonatory scores in the 3 children. There was no statistical difference between the nsPRS and sPRS groups (P = .3) even if we compared the children in the 3 categories (P = .2). CONCLUSIONS: Children born with nsPRS did not have a better prognosis of speech outcome than children born with sPRS. Respiratory and feeding problems at birth did not seem to be correlated with speech outcome. This is important when informing parents on the prognosis of long-term therapy

Civil conflict and human capital accumulation: The long-term effects of political violence in Perú

This paper provides empirical evidence of the persistent effect of exposure to political violence on humancapital accumulation. I exploit the variation in conflict location and birth cohorts to identify the longandshort-term effects of the civil war on educational attainment. Conditional on being exposed toviolence, the average person accumulates 0.31 less years of education as an adult. In the short-term,the effects are stronger than in the long-run; these results hold when comparing children within thesame household. Further, exposure to violence during early childhood leads to permanent losses. I alsoexplore the potential causal mechanisms.

The political cost of reforms

This paper formalizes in a fully-rational model the popular idea that politiciansperceive an electoral cost in adopting costly reforms with future benefits and reconciles it with the evidence that reformist governments are not punished by voters.To do so, it proposes a model of elections where political ability is ex-ante unknownand investment in reforms is unobservable. On the one hand, elections improve accountability and allow to keep well-performing incumbents. On the other, politiciansmake too little reforms in an attempt to signal high ability and increase their reappointment probability. Although in a rational expectation equilibrium voters cannotbe fooled and hence reelection does not depend on reforms, the strategy of underinvesting in reforms is nonetheless sustained by out-of-equilibrium beliefs. Contrary tothe conventional wisdom, uncertainty makes reforms more politically viable and may,under some conditions, increase social welfare. The model is then used to study howpolitical rewards can be set so as to maximize social welfare and the desirability of imposing a one-term limit to governments. The predictions of this theory are consistentwith a number of empirical regularities on the determinants of reforms and reelection.They are also consistent with a new stylized fact documented in this paper: economicuncertainty is associated to more reforms in a panel of 20 OECD countries.

Turnout, political preferences and information: Experimental evidence from Perú

Electoral institutions that encourage citizens to vote are widely used around the world. Yet littleis known about the effects of such institutions on voter participation and the composition of the electorate.In this paper, I combine a field experiment with a change in Peruvian voting laws to identify theeffect of monetary (dis-)incentives on voting. Using the random variation in the fine for abstention andan objective measure of turnout at the individual level, I estimate the elasticity of voting with respectto cost to be -0.21. Consistent with the theoretical model presented, the reduction in turnout inducedby the reduction in the fine is driven by voters who (i) are in the center of the political spectrum, (ii)are less interested in politics, and (iii) hold less political information. However, voters who respondto changes in the cost of abstention do not have different preferences for policies than those who voteregardless of the cost. Further, involvement in politics, as measured by the decision to acquire politicalinformation, seems to be independent of the level of the fine. Additional results indicate that thereduction in the fine does not affect the incidence of vote buying, but increases the price paid for avote.