Love Thy Neighbor? Relationships between Religion and Racial Intolerance in Europe.

This article examines relationships between religion and racial intolerance across 47 countries by applying multilevel modeling to European survey data and is the first in-depth analysis of moderation of these relationships by European national contexts. The analysis distinguishes a believing, belonging, and practice-dimension of religiosity. The results yield little evidence of a link between denominational belonging, religious practice, and racial intolerance. The religiosity dimension that matters most for racial intolerance in Europe is believing: believers in a traditional God and believers in a Spirit/Life Force are decidedly less likely, and fundamentalists are more likely than non- believers to be racially intolerant. National contexts also matter greatly: individuals living in Europe’s most religious countries, countries with legacies of ethnic-religious conflict and countries with low GDP are significantly more likely to be racially intolerant than those living in wealthier, secular and politically stable countries. This is especially the case for the religiously devout.

Northern Ireland: Religion and Transitional Justice

The right to practice religion is recognised as one of the universal liberties transitional justice interventions are designed to defend, and religion is often mentioned as one of the cultural factors that impact on local transitional justice practices from below. Many human rights cases of abuse, however, are motivated by religious extremism and the association of religion with conflict has largely a discouraged reflection on its positive contribution to transitional justice. This field is undeveloped and the little work that elaborates its positive role is descriptive. This paper theorises the relationship between religion and transitional justice and develops a model for understanding its potential role that better allows an assessment of its strengths and weaknesses. The model is applied to original research conducted on ex-combatants in Northern Ireland, and concludes that only in very limited circumstances can religious actors make a telling contribution to transitional justice.Understanding what these circumstances are is the purpose of the model developed here.

On affirmation and becoming : a Deleuzian reading of Nietzsche's critique of nihilism

The main thrust of this thesis is the re-exploration of Friedrich Nietzsche's "critique of nihilism" through the lenses of Gilles Deleuze. A Deleuzian reading of Nietzsche is motivated by a post-deconstrnctive style of interpretation, inasmuch as Deleuze goes beyond, or in between, henneneutics and deconstrnction. Deleuze's post-deconstrnctive reading of Nietzsche is, however, only secondary to the main aim of this thesis. The primary thrust of this study is the critique of a way of thinking characterized by Nietzsche as nihilistic. Therefore, it should be noted that this study is not about Deleuze's reading per se; rather, it is an appraisal of Nietzsche's "critique of nihilism" using Deleuze's experimental reading. We will accrue Nietzsche's critique and Deleuze's post-deconstrnctive reading in order to appraise Nietzsche's critique itself. Insofar as we have underscored Deleuze's purported experimentation of Nietzschean themes, this study is also an experiment in itself. Through this experimentation, we will find out whether it is possible to partly gloss Nietzsche's critique of nihilism through Deleuzian phraseology. Far from presenting a mere exposition of Nietzsche's text, we are, rather, re-reading, that is, re-evaluating Nietzsche's critique of nihilism through Deleuze's experimentation. This is our way of thinking with Nietzsche. Nihilism is the central problem upon which Nietzsche's philosophical musings are directed; he deems nihilism as a cultural experience and, as such, a phenomenon to be reckoned with. In our reconstruction of Nietzsche's critique of nihilism, we locate two related elements which constitute the structure of the prescription of a cure, Le., the ethics of affirmation and the ontology of becoming. Appraising Nietzsche's ethics and ontology amounts to clarifying what Deleuze thinks as the movement from the "dogmatic image of thought" to the "new image of thought." Through this new image of thought, Deleuze makes sense of a Nietzschean counterculture which is a perspective that resists traditional or representational metaphysics. Deleuze takes the reversal of Platonism or the transmutation of values to be the point of departure. We have to, according to Deleuze, abandon our old image of the world in order to free ourselves from the obscurantism of foundationalist or essentialist thinking. It is only through the transmutation of values that we can make sense of Nietzsche's ethics of affirmation and ontology of becoming. We have to think of Nietzsche's ethics as an "ethics" and not a moral philosophy, and we have to think of his ontology as 1/ ontology" and not as metaphysics. Through Deleuze, we are able to avoid reading Nietzsche as a moral philosopher and metaphysician. Rather, we are able to read Nietzsche as one espousing an ethical imperative through the thought of the eternal return and one advocating a theory of existence based on an immanent, as opposed to transcendent, image of the world.

The association of faculty's teaching philosophy and teaching behaviour, and critical thinking and self- direction in learning

The intent in this study was to investigate in what ways teachers· beliefs about education and teaching are expressed in the specific teaching behaviours they employ, and whether teaching behaviours, as perceived by their students, are correlated with students· critical thinking and self-directed learning. To this end the relationships studied were: among faCUlty members· philosophy of teaching, locus of control orientation, psychological type, and observed teaching behaviour; and among students· psychological type, perceptions of teaching behaviour, self-directed learning readiness, and critical thinking. The overall purpose of the study was to investigate whether the implicit goals of higher education, critical thinking and self-direction, were actually accounted for in the university classroom. The research was set within the context of path-goal theory, adapted from the leadership literature. Within this framework, Mezirow·s work on transformative learning, including the influences of Habermas· writings, was integrated to develop a theoretical perspective upon which to base the research methodology. Both qualitative and quantitative methodologies were incorporated. Four faCUlty and a total of 142 students participated in the study. Philosophy of teaching was described through faCUlty interviews and completion of a repertory grid. Faculty completed a descriptive locus of control scale, and a psychological type test. Observations of their teaching behaviour were conducted. Students completed a Teaching Behaviour Assessment Scale, the Self-Directed Learning Readiness Scale, a psychological type test, and the Watson-Glaser Critical Thinking Appraisal. A small sample of students were interviewed. Follow-up discussions with faculty were used to validate the interview, observation, teaching behaviour, and repertory grid data. Results indicated that some discrepancies existed between faculty's espoused philosophy of teaching and their observed teaching behaviour. Instructors' teaching behaviour, however, was a function of their personal theory of practice. Relationships were found between perceived teaching behaviour and students· self-directed learning and critical thinking, but these varied across situations, as would be predicted from path-goal theory. Psychological type of students and instructor also accounted for some of the variability in the relationships studied. Student psychological type could be shown as a partial predictor of self-directed learning readiness. The results were discussed in terms of theory development and implications for further research and practice.

Well-Being Freedom and The Possibility of Public-Provision Unit in Global Context

The purpose of this paper is, first, to investigate the interconnections of substantive freedoms, which are indispensable for every individual to “lead the kind of lives they have reason to value” (Sen, 1999b, p.10,18), and which have legitimate and ethical reasons to be publicly secured, second, to investigate a conception of public-provision unit that embodies “the right to well-being freedom”, and a conception of decision-making unit that corresponds to it, based on the perspective of Sen’s capability theory and its extension, comparing with that of Rawls’ Theory of Justice and A Law of People. If we intend to construct such a public-provision unit, which conducts redistribution as a whole, and which receives every individual who cannot belong to any fixed local group, what kind of a body should we assume as a public-provision unit? And further, what kind of a body should we assume as a decision-making unit, which is responsible for deciding or revising the basic conceptions of public provision unit?

An Egalitarian Argument in Favour of Free Access to Healthcare and Rationing

La pensée égalitariste a traditionnellement promu l’idéal d’un système de santé universel, gratuit et accessible à tous les membres de la société. J’appuie cette position en répliquant tout d’abord à la critique qui prétend que les riches tireraient plus d’avantages que les pauvres de la gratuité du système de santé. J’ouvre ensuite la réflexion sur ce qui me semble être un enjeu crucial pour l’avenir des systèmes modernes de santé : le rationnement de l’offre. Cette idée ne plaît généralement pas à la population, aux décideurs politiques et à de nombreux égalitaristes. Je considère pourtant que les principaux arguments invoqués contre le rationnement sont incohérents ou faussement égalitaristes. La gratuité des services de santé n’est pas incompatible avec la limitation de l’offre publique.

Social Opportunities and Individual Responsibility: The Capability Approach and the Third Way

The fashionable widespreading of Sen’s ideas coincides with a new mood in the shaping of public policies in affluent societies. In Europe indeed, an “opportunity”-based approach to social security has been implemented through the European Employment Strategy. Public action tends to rely on a procedural concern with individual opportunities or potentialities in the labour market. The underlying ethics is that individuals are then responsible to use these background opportunities in order to lead the kind of life they value most. More broadly, the discourse and practice of the so-called “Third Way” shares with the capability approach an appeal for a procedural and enabling depiction of the role of the State. The paper intends to clarify the relation between procedural and opportunity-based approaches to social justice, among them the capability approach, and these new patterns of public action. Our vision goes in the way of a yet renewed, but deeper action of the welfare state, where social agency is envisaged as the very condition of individual agency. Drawing on the various critics of mainstream equality of opportunity, two opposed approaches to responsibility are identified: on the one hand, responsibility is conceived of as i) a “luck vs. choice” fixed starting point, ii) a backward-looking conception and iii) a highly individualistic framework. On the other hand, responsibility is envisaged as i) an outcome of public policies rather than a starting point, ii) a forward-looking conception, and iii) a combined institutional-individual framework. We situate here Sen’s capability approach, as well as critics of the luck egalitarianism path. The Third Way rhetoric is assessed against both these perspectives. The issue eventually boils down to an ethical reflection on the articulation of responsibilities, and to a pragmatic and substantial concern for the content of what providing security should mean in practice.

Economic Incentives and Liberal Equality

In order to assess to the degree to which the provision of economic incentives can result in justified inequalities, we need to distinguish between compensatory incentive payments and non-compensatory incentive payments. From a liberal egalitarian perspective, economic inequalities traceable to the provision of compensatory incentive payments are generally justifiable. However, economic inequalities created by the provision of non-compensatory incentive payments are more problematic. I argue that in non-ideal circumstances justice may permit and even require the provision of non-compensatory incentives despite the fact that those who receive non-compensatory payments are not entitled to them. In some circumstances, justice may require us to accede to unreasonable demands for incentive payments by hard bargainers. This leads to a kind of paradox: from a systemic point of view, non-compensatory incentive payments can be justified even though those who receive them have no just claim to them.

Incentives and Principles for Individuals in Rawls’s Theory of Justice

Philippe van Parijs (2003) has argued that an egalitarian ethos cannot be part of a post- Political Liberalism Rawlsian view of justice, because the demands of political justice are confined to principles for institutions of the basic structure alone. This paper argues, by contrast, that certain principles for individual conduct—including a principle requiring relatively advantaged individuals to sometimes make their economic choices with the aim of maximising the prospects of the least advantaged—are an integral part of a Rawlsian political conception of justice. It concludes that incentive payments will have a clearly limited role in a Rawlsian theory of justice.