China´s Economic Security Police Towards ASEAN From

After the economic reforms of 1978, China started rising very fast and started engaging other countries in the region which has served to increase its confidence in the region. In the post cold war period, China was seen as a big threat for the region because of its claims on the South China Sea. Nevertheless, this image was eliminated when China engaged ASEAN and other multilateral and regional organizations. This paper is studying China’s economic and security policies towards ASEAN. Globalization Theory is the theory being used to explain the nature of China-ASEAN relations. This research paper argues that China’s rise is promoting peace in the region. With the engagement policy, China started promoting trade and security co operations based on mutual benefits and dialogues for the peaceful resolutions of the disputes in the region. This contributed greatly to improve China’s image in the region. Additionally, China’s posture during the economic crises of 1997 also greatly contributed to improve its image. Thus, the rise of China is providing opportunity to the other countries in East Asia. Chapter One: Background On China-ASEAN Relations The use of Soft Power and engagement policy by the Chinese government has helped to change China’s image in the region. By using these policies China has been able to clear the feeling of suspicion and mistrust among the Asian states. China has increased its participation in multilateral and regional organizations, such as ASEAN. Due to this China has been able to promote economic and security co-operation among countries in the region. Thus, from being a potential threat China became a potential co-operative partner. Chapter Two: A Look into ASEAN ASEAN was originally formed on 8th August 1967 in Bangkok, Thailand, by Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. Nevertheless, ASEAN was not the first regional group created to act as forum for dialogue between the leaders of different countries. Thought, it is the only one which could work in the region. The aim of the foundation of ASEAN was to promote peace and stability in the Abstract 2 region and also contain the spread of communism in Southeast Asia. For this reason, China did not engage ASEAN until 1990. However, in 1978 with the establishment of the open up policy China started engaging other countries. It started building trust among its neighboring countries by using soft power. By 1992, China formalized its diplomatic ties with ASEAN as a group. The diplomatic ties between China and ASEAN focus on multilateralism and co-operation as the best way for a more peaceful Asia and the search for common security. Thus, security in the region is promoted through economic co-operation among the states. Therefore the relation between China – ASEAN emphasizes the five principles of peaceful coexistence, mutual benefits in economic co-operation, dialogue promoting trust and the peaceful settlement of disputes. Chapter Three: China-ASEAN Economic Relations Since 1978 The economic reform of 1978 has greatly contributed to the economic development of China. After the adoption of the open up policy, China has been able to establish economic and trade relations with the outside world. The realist school of thought had predicted that Asia will not be stable in the post cold war period. Nevertheless, this has not been the case in Asia. China is growing peacefully with the co-operation of countries in the region. China is establishing strong ties with its neighboring countries. China and ASEAN relations focus on mutual benefit instead of being a zero sum game. Thus these relations are aimed at encouraging trust and economic co-operation in the region. China and ASEAN have agreed on Free Trade to assure that the two parties benefit from the co-operation. The ACFTA will have a great impact on economic, political and security issues. This will enable China to increase its influence in Asia and counterbalance the influences that Japan and U.S have in the region. Chapter Four: China ASEAN Relations in the Security Perspective This Chapter is about China and ASEAN relations on security issue. The new security issues of the post cold war period need to be solved in multilateral way. China as a major power in the region, through its engagement policy has solved most Abstract 3 of the disputes in the region using multilateral means. China has also found ways to solve the dispute over Spratly Islands peacefully, through dialogue using ASEAN. Additionally, China signed the Treaty of Amity in 2003, promoted security initiatives through ARF, Declaration on Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea and documents covering non-traditional security threats, economic co-operation and agricultural co-operation in November 2002, and the Joint Declaration on Strategic. Chapter Five: Finding and Analysis This chapter provides a quantitative and qualitative analysis of the date collected throughout this research. It provides an analysis of how the rise of China is promoting peace in the region. China has been promoting mutual beneficial trade and security co-operation which has increased its influence in the region. China has also been able to solve most of the territorial and border dispute in the region through ASEAN. Thus, ASEAN has amended China’s relations with other countries in the region. Therefore, China’s foreign policy in the region has a big impact in shaping the dynamic relations in East Asia. Conclusion and Recommendations This paper concluded that the relationships between China and ASEAN are contributing to peace in the region. After China engaged ASEAN, it has been able to promote multilateral trade based on mutual benefit. This is clearly emphasized by the CAFTA. Additionally, China has solved most of the dispute in the region. It has also found way for a peaceful resolution of the dispute over Spratly Island. Nowadays, the ASEAN countries don’t see China as a threat to the region. Nevertheless, they’ve adopted deterrence measures such as establishing diplomatic relations with other big powers in the region to assure that the region continues to grow peacefully. Concerning this deterrence measures, I recommend as another way for a continued peaceful growth, the resolution of the outstanding dispute.

Strategic Plan for Improved Concrete Pavement Surface Characteristics, July 2006

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New Iowans Pilot Project, 2001

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In this paper we view bargaining and cooperation as an interaction superimposed on a strategic form game. A multistage bargaining procedure for N players, the proposer commitment procedure, is presented. It is inspired by Nash s two-player variable-threat model; a key feature is the commitment to threats. We establish links to classical cooperative game theory solutions, such as the Shapley value in the transferable utility case. However, we show that even in standard pure exchange economies the traditional coalitional function may not be adequate when utilities are not transferable.

Revising the Cannabis Use Disorders Identification Test (CUDIT) by means of Item Response Theory.

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Unemployment in an estimated new Keynesian model

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Notes for a new guide to Keynes (I): Wages, aggregate demand, and employment

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The implicit theory of historical change in the work of Alan S. Milward

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An economic theory of church strictness

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A leverage theory of reputation building with co-branding: Complementarity in reputation building

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The growth and diffusion of knowlegde and the theory of the firm

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