The Dynamic (In)efficiency of Monetary Policy by Committee

This paper develops a model where the value of the monetary policy instrument is selected by a heterogenous committee engaged in a dynamic voting game. Committee members differ in their institutional power and, in certain states of nature, they also differ in their preferred instrument value. Preference heterogeneity and concern for the future interact to generate decisions that are dynamically ineffcient and inertial around the previously-agreed instrument value. This model endogenously generates autocorrelation in the policy variable and provides an explanation for the empirical observation that the nominal interest rate under the central bank’s control is infrequently adjusted.

Le taux de change effectif reel et le regime des echanges: leur role dans le developpement economique.

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Can business & monetary conditions predict variations in expected stock returns?

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The Transformation Problem : an Aleternative Solution with an Identical Aggregate Profit Rate in the Labor value and the Monetary Space.

The aim of this paper is to demonstrate that, even if Marx's solution to the transformation problem can be modified, his basic conclusions remain valid. the proposed alternative solution which is presented hare is based on the constraint of a common general profit rate in both spaces and a money wage level which will be determined simultaneously with prices.

Monetary Policy by Committee:Consensus, Chairman Dominance or Simple Majority?

This paper studies the theoretical and empirical implications of monetary policy making by committee under three different voting protocols. The protocols are a consensus model, where super-majority is required for a policy change; an agenda-setting model, where the chairman controls the agenda; and a simple majority model, where policy is determined by the median member. These protocols give preeminence to different aspects of the actual decision making process and capture the observed heterogeneity in formal procedures across central banks. The models are estimated by Maximum Likehood using interest rate decisions by the committees of five central banks, namely the Bank of Canada, the Bank of England, the European Central Bank, the Swedish Riksbank, and the U.S. Federal Reserve. For all central banks, results indicate that the consensus model is statically superior to the alternative models. This suggests that despite institutionnal differences, committees share unwritten rules and informal procedures that deliver observationally equivalent policy decisions.

Durable Goods, Inter-Sectoral Linkages and Monetary Policy

Barsky, House and Kimball (2007) show that introducing durable goods into a sticky-price model leads to negative sectoral comovement of production following a monetary policy shock and, under certain conditions, to aggregate neutrality. These results appear to undermine sticky-price models. In this paper, we show that these results are not robust to two prominent and realistic features of the data, namely input-output interactions and limited mobility of productive inputs. When extended to allow for both features, the sticky-price model with durable goods delivers implications in line with VAR evidence on the effects of monetary policy shocks.

Monetary Policy When Wages Are Downwardly Rigid: Friedman Meets Tobin

In a monetary economy with downwardly rigid wages, the central banker should target a low, but strictly positive, inflation rate.

Dissent in monetary policy decisions

Voting records indicate that dissents in monetary policy committees are frequent and predictability regressions show that they help forecast future policy decisions. In order to study whether the latter relation is causal, we construct a model of committee decision making and dissent where members' decisions are not a function of past dissents. The model is estimated using voting data from the Bank of England and the Riksbank. Stochastic simulations show that the decision-making frictions in our model help account for the predictive power of current dissents. The effect of insti- tutional characteristics and structural parameters on dissent rates is examined using simulations as well.

Did Gold Remain Relevant in the Post-1971 International Monetary System?

The central hypothesis to be tested is the relevance of gold in the determination of the value of the US dollar as an international reserve currency after 1971. In the first section the market value of the US dollar is analysed by looking at new forms of value (financial derivative products), the dollar as a safe haven, the choice of a standard of value and the role of SDRs in reforming the international monetary system. Based on dimensional analysis, the second section analyses the definition and meaning of a numéraire for international currency and the justification for a variable standard of value based on a commodity (gold). The second section is the theoretical foundation for the empirical and econometric analysis in the third and fourth sections. The third section is devoted to the specification of an econometric model and a graphical analysis of the data. It is clear that an inverse relation exists between the value of the US dollar and the price of gold. The fourth section shows the estimations of the different specifications of the model including linear regression and cointegration analysis. The most important econometric result is that the null hypothesis is rejected in favour of a significant link between the price of gold and the value of the US dollar. There is also a positive relationship between gold price and inflation. An inverse statistically significant relation between gold price and monetary policy is shown by applying a dynamic model of cointegration with lags.