987 resultados para Massachusetts--History--Revolution, 1775-1783
Resumo:
v. 5 (1832)
Resumo:
v. 2 (1829)
Resumo:
n.s. v. 1 (1837)
Resumo:
v. 8 (1835)
Resumo:
v. 7 (1834)
Resumo:
v. 6 (1833)
Resumo:
Latin America participated in the electric revolution which profoundly transformed the most developed Western economies between 1880 and 1930. The electrification of Latin America began relatively soon after these economies, but it was incapable of keeping up with them. Public electric lighting was introduced early in the big Latin American cities, where electric trams started running at almost the same time as in Europe, and electricity spread rapidly in the mining sector. In the most advanced countries or areas in the region, the manufacturing industry substituted the steam engine with the electric motor, following the example of industry in the United States and Europe. Nevertheless, towards 1930 electricity consumption per inhabitant for Latin America was far below that of the more advanced economies, and only the Latin American countries which lead the process of electrification had reached levels of electric consumption that were similar to those of the late industrialised European countries. One of the most striking features of the electric revolution in Latin America is rooted precisely in the enormous national differences. These differences are indicative of the great economic inequalities existing in the heart of the region and these nations highly diverse capacity for economic modernisation.
Resumo:
Crowding-out during the British Industrial Revolution has long been one of the leadingexplanations for slow growth during the Industrial Revolution, but little empirical evidence exists to support it. We argue that examinations of interest rates are fundamentally misguided, and that the eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century private loan market balanced through quantity rationing. Using a unique set of observations on lending volume at a London goldsmith bank, Hoare s, we document the impact of wartime financing on private credit markets. We conclude that there is considerable evidence that government borrowing, especially during wartime, crowded out private credit.
Resumo:
This paper presents new estimates of total factor productivity growth in Britain for the period1770 1860. We use the dual technique and argue that the estimates we derive from factorprices are of similar quality to quantity-based calculations. Our results provide further evidence,calculated on the basis of an independent set of sources, that productivity growth duringthe British Industrial Revolution was relatively slow. The Crafts Harley view of theIndustrial Revolution is thus reinforced. Our preferred estimates suggest a modest accelerationafter 1800.
Resumo:
Why was England first? And why Europe? We present a probabilistic model that builds on big-push models by Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1989), combined with hierarchical preferences. The interaction of exogenous demographic factors (in particular the English low-pressure variant of the European marriage pattern)and redistributive institutions such as the old Poor Law combined to make an Industrial Revolution more likely. Essentially, industrialization is the result of having a critical mass of consumers that is rich enough to afford (potentially) mass-produced goods. Our model is then calibrated to match the main characteristics of the English economy in 1750 and the observed transition until 1850.This allows us to address explicitly one of the key features of the British IndustrialRevolution unearthed by economic historians over the last three decades the slowness of productivity and output change. In our calibration, we find that the probability of Britain industrializing is 5 times larger than France s. Contrary to the recent argument by Pomeranz, China in the 18th century had essentially no chance to industrialize at all. This difference is decomposed into a demographic and a policy component, with the former being far more important than the latter.
Resumo:
Age data frequently display excess frequencies at round or attractive ages, such as even numbers and multiples of five. This phenomenon of age heaping has been viewed as a problem in previous research, especially in demography and epidemiology. We see it as an opportunity and propose its use as a measure of human capital that can yield comparable estimates across a wide range of historical contexts. A simulation study yields methodological guidelines for measuring and interpreting differences in ageheaping, while analysis of contemporary and historical datasets demonstrates the existence of a robust correlation between age heaping and literacy at both the individual and aggregate level. To illustrate the method, we generate estimates of human capital in Europe over the very long run, which support the hypothesis of a major increase in human capital preceding the industrial revolution.
Resumo:
The financial revolution improved the British government s ability to borrow, andthus its ability to wage war. North andWeingast argued that it also permitted privateparties to borrow more cheaply and widely.We test these inferences with evidencefrom a London bank.We confirm that private bank credit was cheap in the earlyeighteenth century, but we argue that it was not available widely. Importantly, thegovernment reduced the usury rate in 1714, sharply reducing the circle of privateclients that could be served profitably.
Resumo:
This report contains information on the Iowa American Revolution Bicentennial Commission. It includes the history, member information and their duties, activities performed, photos and a report from each Iowa county on what they accomplished for the celebration of the U.S. Bicentennial.