Teachers' experiences and perceptions of voluntary committee work as a vehicle for leadership development

In response to a looming leadership shortage, leadership development for teachers has become an increasingly important area of interest around the world. A review of the literature identified the key components of educational leadership development programs as effective curriculum, leadership practice, relationship building, and reflection. A gap in the research was found regarding the use of voluntary committee work as a vehicle for leadership practice. The purpose of this study was to explore teachers' perceptions of their experiences within board-level committees to determine the key factors that contributed, positively or negatively, to their leadership,pevelopment. A qualitative research design was employed using semistructured interviews with 8 participants. The key findings included a list of factors perceived by teachers as either supporting or hindering their leadership development. The supporting factors were: (a) leadership practice, (b) mentors and role models, (c) relationships and networks, and (d) positive outcomes for students. The hindering factors were: (a) lack of follow through and support, (b) committee members with a careerist approach to the experience, (c) personal and political agendas, and (d) overcommitment leading to burnout. Recommendations for practice focused on strategies to enhanc~_ the committee experience as a tool for leadership development. Recommendations for theory and research suggested more research be done on each of the 8 key factors, perceptions associated with teachers choosing to follow a leadership path, and how school boards can structure the committee process as an effective leadership development tool. This study provides a starting point for educators to begin to intentionally design, develop, and deliver voluntary committee experiences as a tool for leadership development.

Managerial Risk-Taking and CEO Excess Compensation

This paper examines risk taking and CEO excess compensation problems in U.S firms to determine their impact on shareholders wealth. Literature suggests a positive effect of CEO incentive risk and strong corporate governance on CEO risk taking. Furthermore, the strong governance mitigates excess compensation problem. Controlling for governance quality and incentive risk, I provide empirical evidence of a significant association between risk taking and CEO excess compensation. When I also control for pay-performance sensitivity (delta) and feedback effects of incentive compensation on CEO risk taking, I find that higher use of incentive pay encourages risk taking, and due to a high exposure to risk CEOs draws excess compensation. Furthermore, I find that the excess compensation problem is more serious with CEOs taking high risk than with those taking low risk. Finally, I find that CEO risk taking also has structural impacts on CEO compensation

Report of the committee appointed to inquire what amendments are necessary to the Act granting bounties in land and extra pay to certain Canadian volunteers: January 11, 1817, read, and, together with the bill herewith reported, ordered to be printed. (1817)

Includes (p. 3-4) a letter from the Acting Secretary of War to the chairman of the committee dated Department of War, December 26th, 1816.

Report of a select committee to whom were referred the petition of Samuel Thompson and John Dailey: January 14, 1817, read, and ordered to lie upon the table (1817)

Concerning the request of the petitioners, former residents of Newark (present-day Niagara-on-the-Lake) in Upper Canada, for relief for the loss of their property when they were compelled to flee Canada after having aided the United States Army in the War of 1812.

Letter from the Chairman of the Committee of Ways and Means to the Secretary of the Treasurer on the subject of a system of revenue to revive and maintain unimpaired the public credit, with the answer of the Secretary thereto. (1814)

October 18, 1814. Read, and committed to the Committee of the whole House on the report of the Committee of Ways and Means on so much of the President's message as relates to the finances of the United States.

Corporate Social Responsibility, Corporate Governance, And Managerial Risk-Taking

This dissertation investigates the association between corporate social responsibility (CSR) and managerial risk-taking, as well as the differences in governance structure that affect this association. Using a sample of US public firms from 1995 to 2009, we find that firms with strong CSR records engage in higher risk-taking. Furthermore, we find that this relationship is robust when accounting for differences in governance structure and correcting for endogeneity via simultaneous equations modeling. Additional testing indicates that performance in the employee relations dimension of CSR in particular increases with risk-taking, while high firm visibility dampens the association between CSR and the accounting-based measures of risk-taking. Prior literature establishes that high managerial risk-tolerance is necessary for the undertaking of risky yet value-enhancing investment decisions. Thus, the main findings suggest that CSR, rather than being a waste of scarce corporate resources, is instead an important aspect of shareholder value creation. They contribute to the debate on CSR by documenting that corporate risk-taking is one mechanism among others through which CSR maps into higher firm value.

Letter to Mr. Lee who was clerk of the Heir Devisee Committee in Toronto from Samuel D. Woodruff

Letter to Mr. Lee who was clerk of the Heir Devisee Committee in Toronto from Samuel D. Woodruff. [The Heir and Devisee Committee was formed to clarify the titles to land of heirs of people who had been assigned Crown lands before 1795. Many of the original grantees had not taken out patents to confirm their legal right to the land.] This letter confirms that steps have been taken to issue the patent, July 19, 1847.

Letter to S.D. Woodruff regarding a resolution passed on May 17, 1856 by the Board of Directors of the Port Robinson and Thorold Macadamized Road Committee

Letter to S.D. Woodruff regarding a resolution passed on May 17, 1856 by the Board of Directors of the Port Robinson and Thorold Macadamized Road Committee This is signed by Duncan McFarland, president, May 27, 1856.

Letter from S.D. Woodruff to the president and directors of the Port Robinson and Thorold Macadamized Road Committee regarding extra work done

Letter from S.D. Woodruff to the president and directors of the Port Robinson and Thorold Macadamized Road Committee regarding extra work done (3 pages, handwritten), Aug. 6, 1857.

Meeting of the special committee on new arrangements

Meeting of the special committee on new arrangements (3 copies of 1 page, printed). This has John I. Mackenzie listed on the bottom of the page. Copies 2 and 3 are torn at the bottom. This affects the text slightly, Aug. 23, 1881.

Copy of a report of a Committee of the Honorable and Executive Council dated May 6, 1859 approved by His Excellency the Governor General in Council

Copy of a report of a Committee of the Honorable and Executive Council dated May 6, 1859 approved by His Excellency the Governor General in Council. This is in regard to charges made by Joshua Manly of Port Colborne against Mr. Woodruff, the superintendent and other persons connected with the Welland Canal. The accusations have been substantiated by the committee. This is accompanied by a petition accusing Mr. Woodruff of gross corruption and jobbery [the practice of using a public office or position of trust for one's own advantage]. This was signed by a number of petitioners on July 2, 1858 (2 pages, handwritten), 1859.

The Dynamic (In)efficiency of Monetary Policy by Committee

This paper develops a model where the value of the monetary policy instrument is selected by a heterogenous committee engaged in a dynamic voting game. Committee members differ in their institutional power and, in certain states of nature, they also differ in their preferred instrument value. Preference heterogeneity and concern for the future interact to generate decisions that are dynamically ineffcient and inertial around the previously-agreed instrument value. This model endogenously generates autocorrelation in the policy variable and provides an explanation for the empirical observation that the nominal interest rate under the central bank’s control is infrequently adjusted.