Postglacial paleoecology and effects of European settlement on the environment of Lake Hunger and Lake Lisgar, Southwestern Ontario /

This investigation has three purposes I to make a comparative chemical study on sediment cores collected for Lake Lisgar (man-made lake in an urban center) and Lake Hunger (natural basin in a rural community) encompassing the time since European settlement I to determine the postglacial chemical history of Lake Hunger, and to determine the vegetational history of the Lake Hunger area from postglacial time to the present. The minus 80 mesh fraction of 108 soil samples and 18 stream sediment samples collected in the vicinity of Lakes' Lisgar and Hunger were analyzed for cold hydrochloric acid soluble lead, zinc, nickel, cobalt, copper, aluminum, sodium, potassium, calcium, magnesium, iron and manganese. Lacustrine sediments from 5 boreholes in the Lake Lisgar basin were collected. Boreholes 1, 2, 3, and 4 were analyzed for palynological and chemical information and Borehole 5 was subjected to pollen and ostracode analysis. Lacustrine sediments from 6 boreholes in the Lake Hunger basin were collected. Palyno- -logical and chemical analysis were performed on Boreholes 1, 2, 3, 4, and 6 and Borehole 5 was analyzed for pollen. In addition, radiocarbon dates were obtained on sediment samples from Boreholes 4 and 5. A total of 8 surface samples were collected from the margins of the Lake Hunger basin and these were chemically analyzed in the laboratory. All of the lacustrine sediments were ashed and analyzed for cold hydrochloric acid soluble lead, zinc, nickel, cobalt, copper, aluminum, sodium, potassium, calcium, magnesium, iron and manganese using a Perkin Elmer 40) Atomic Absorption spectrophotometer. The results . obtained for the 12 elements were expressed as parts per million in dry sediments. It was found that man's influence on the element distribution patterns in the sediments of Lake Lisgar appeared to be related to his urbanizing developments within the lake vicinity, whereas, the rural developments in the vicinity of lake Hunger appeared to have had little effect on the element distribution patterns in the lake sediments. The distribution patterns of lead, zinc, nickel, cobalt, aluminum, magnesium, sodium and potassium are similar to the % ash curve throughout postglacial time indicating that the rate of erosion in the drainage basin is the main factor which controls the concentration of these elements in the sediments of Lake Hunger. The vegetational history, from palynological analysis, of Lake Hunger from postglacial time to the present includes the following stages: tundra, open spruce forest, closed boreal forest, deciduous forest and the trend towards the re-establishment of pine following the clearing of land and the subsequent settlement of the Lake Hunger area by European settlers. The concentrations of some elements (cobalt, nickel, iron, manganese, calcium, magnesium, sodium and potassium) in the sediments of Lake Hunger appears to be higher during pre-cultural compared to post-cultural times. At least one complete postglacial record of the chemical history within a lake basin is necessary in order to accurately assess man's effects on his environment.

Husserl's approach to transcendental intersubjectivity

It is our intention in the course of the development of this thesis to give an account of how intersubjectivity is "eidetically" constituted by means of the application of the phenomenological reduction to our experience in the context of the thought of Edmund Husserl; contrasted with various representative thinkers in what H. Spiegelberg refers to as "the wider scene" of phenomenology. That is to say, we intend to show those structures of both consciousness and the relation which man has to the world which present themselves as the generic conditions for the possibility of overcoming our "radical sol itude" in order that we may gain access to the mental 1 ife of an Other as other human subject. It is clear that in order for us to give expression to these accounts in a coherent manner, along with their relative merits, it will be necessary to develop the common features of any phenomenological theory of consdousness whatever. Therefore, our preliminary inquiry, subordinate to the larger theme, shall be into some of the epistemological results of the application of the phenomenological method used to develop a transcendental theory of consciousness. Inherent in this will be the deliniation of the exigency for making this an lIintentional ll theory. We will then be able to see how itis possible to overcome transcendentally the Other as an object merely given among other merely given objects, and further, how this other is constituted specifically as other ego. The problem of transcendental intersubjectivity and its constitution in experience can be viewed as one of the most compelling, if not the most polemical of issues in phenomenology. To be sure, right from the beginning we are forced to ask a number of questions regarding Husserl's responses to the problem within the context of the methodological genesis of the Cartesian Meditations, and The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. This we do in order to set the stage for amplification. First, we ask, has Husserl lived up to his goal, in this connexion, of an apodictic result? We recall that in his Logos article of 1911 he adminished that previous philosophy does not have at its disposal a merely incomplete and, in particular instances, imperfect doctrinal system; it simply has none whatever. Each and every question is herein controverted, each position is a matter of individual conviction, of the interpretation given byaschool, of a "point of view". 1. Moreover in the same article he writes that his goal is a philosophical system of doctrine that, after the gigantic preparatory work. of generations, really be- . gins from the ground up with a foundation free from doubt and rises up like any skilful construction, wherein stone is set upon store, each as solid as the other, in accord with directive insights. 2. Reflecting upon the fact that he foresaw "preparatory work of generations", we perhaps should not expect that he would claim that his was the last word on the matter of intersubjectivity. Indeed, with 2. 'Edmund Husserl, lIPhilosophy as a Rigorous Science" in Phenomenology and theCrisis6fPhilosophy, trans". with an introduction by Quentin Lauer (New York.: Harper & Row, 1965) pp. 74 .. 5. 2Ibid . pp. 75 .. 6. 3. the relatively small amount of published material by Husserl on the subject we can assume that he himself was not entirely satisfied with his solution. The second question we have is that if the transcendental reduction is to yield the generic and apodictic structures of the relationship of consciousness to its various possible objects, how far can we extend this particular constitutive synthetic function to intersubjectivity where the objects must of necessity always remain delitescent? To be sure, the type of 'object' here to be considered is unlike any other which might appear in the perceptual field. What kind of indubitable evidence will convince us that the characteristic which we label "alter-ego" and which we attribute to an object which appears to resemble another body which we have never, and can never see the whole of (namely, our own bodies), is nothing more than a cleverly contrived automaton? What;s the nature of this peculiar intentional function which enables us to say "you think just as I do"? If phenomenology is to take such great pains to reduce the takenfor- granted, lived, everyday world to an immanent world of pure presentation, we must ask the mode of presentation for transcendent sub .. jectivities. And in the end, we must ask if Husserl's argument is not reducible to a case (however special) of reasoning by analogy, and if so, tf this type of reasoning is not so removed from that from whtch the analogy is made that it would render all transcendental intersubjective understandtng impos'sible? 2. HistoticalandEidetic Priority: The Necessity of Abstraction 4. The problem is not a simple one. What is being sought are the conditions for the poss ibili:ty of experi encing other subjects. More precisely, the question of the possibility of intersubjectivity is the question of the essence of intersubjectivity. What we are seeking is the absolute route from one solitude to another. Inherent in this programme is the ultimate discovery of the meaning of community. That this route needs be lIabstract" requires some explanation. It requires little explanation that we agree with Husserl in the aim of fixing the goal of philosophy on apodictic, unquestionable results. This means that we seek a philosophical approach which is, though, not necessarily free from assumptions, one which examines and makes explicit all assumptions in a thorough manner. It would be helpful at this point to distinguish between lIeidetic ll priority, and JlhistoricallJpriority in order to shed some light on the value, in this context, of an abstraction.3 It is true that intersubjectivity is mundanely an accomplished fact, there havi.ng been so many mi.llions of years for humans to beIt eve in the exi s tence of one another I s abili ty to think as they do. But what we seek is not to study how this proceeded historically, but 3Cf• Maurice Natanson;·TheJburne in 'Self, a Stud in Philoso h and Social Role (Santa Cruz, U. of California Press, 1970 . rather the logical, nay, "psychological" conditions under which this is possible at all. It is therefore irrelevant to the exigesis of this monograph whether or not anyone should shrug his shoulders and mumble IIwhy worry about it, it is always already engaged". By way of an explanation of the value of logical priority, we can find an analogy in the case of language. Certainly the language 5. in a spoken or written form predates the formulation of the appropriate grammar. However, this grammar has a logical priority insofar as it lays out the conditions from which that language exhibits coherence. The act of formulating the grammar is a case of abstraction. The abstraction towards the discovery of the conditions for the poss; bi 1 ity of any experiencing whatever, for which intersubjective experience is a definite case, manifests itself as a sort of "grammar". This "grammar" is like the basic grammar of a language in the sense that these "rulesil are the ~ priori conditions for the possibility of that experience. There is, we shall say, an "eidetic priority", or a generic condition which is the logical antecedent to the taken-forgranted object of experience. In the case of intersubjectivity we readily grant that one may mundanely be aware of fellow-men as fellowmen, but in order to discover how that awareness is possible it is necessary to abstract from the mundane, believed-in experience. This process of abstraction is the paramount issue; the first step, in the search for an apodictic basis for social relations. How then is this abstraction to be accomplished? What is the nature of an abstraction which would permit us an Archimedean point, absolutely grounded, from which we may proceed? The answer can be discovered in an examination of Descartes in the light of Husserl's criticism. 3. The Impulse for Scientific Philosophy. The Method to which it Gives Rise. 6. Foremost in our inquiry is the discovery of a method appropriate to the discovery of our grounding point. For the purposes of our investigations, i.e., that of attempting to give a phenomenological view of the problem of intersubjectivity, it would appear to be of cardinal importance to trace the attempt of philosophy predating Husserl, particularly in the philosophy of Descartes, at founding a truly IIscientific ll philosophy. Paramount in this connexion would be the impulse in the Modern period, as the result of more or less recent discoveries in the natural sciences, to found philosophy upon scientific and mathematical principles. This impulse was intended to culminate in an all-encompassing knowledge which might extend to every realm of possible thought, viz., the universal science ot IIMathexis Universalis ll •4 This was a central issue for Descartes, whose conception of a universal science would include all the possible sciences of man. This inclination towards a science upon which all other sciences might be based waS not to be belittled by Husserl, who would appropriate 4This term, according to Jacab Klein, was first used by Barocius, the translator of Proclus into Latin, to designate the highest mathematical discipline. . 7. it himself in hopes of establishing, for the very first time, philosophy as a "rigorous science". It bears emphasizing that this in fact was the drive for the hardening of the foundations of philosophy, the link between the philosophical projects of Husserl and those of the philosophers of the modern period. Indeed, Husserl owes Descartes quite a debt for indicating the starting place from which to attempt a radical, presupositionless, and therefore scientific philosophy, in order not to begin philosophy anew, but rather for the first time.5 The aim of philosophy for Husserl is the search for apodictic, radical certitude. However while he attempted to locate in experience the type of necessity which is found in mathematics, he wished this necessity to be a function of our life in the world, as opposed to the definition and postulation of an axiomatic method as might be found in the unexpurgated attempts to found philosophy in Descartes. Beyond the necessity which is involved in experiencing the world, Husserl was searching for the certainty of roots, of the conditi'ons which underl ie experience and render it pOssible. Descartes believed that hi~ MeditatiOns had uncovered an absolute ground for knowledge, one founded upon the ineluctable givenness of thinking which is present even when one doubts thinking. Husserl, in acknowledging this procedure is certainly Cartesian, but moves, despite this debt to Descartes, far beyond Cartesian philosophy i.n his phenomenology (and in many respects, closer to home). 5Cf. Husserl, Philosophy as a Rigorous Science, pp. 74ff. 8 But wherein lies this Cartesian jumping off point by which we may vivify our theme? Descartes, through inner reflection, saw that all of his convictions and beliefs about the world were coloured in one way or another by prejudice: ... at the end I feel constrained to reply that there is nothing in a all that I formerly believed to be true, of which I cannot in some measure doubt, and that not merely through want of thought or through levity, but for reasons which are very powerful and maturely considered; so that henceforth I ought not the less carefully to refrain from giving credence to these opinions than to that which is manifestly false, if I desire to arrive at any certainty (in the sciences). 6 Doubts arise regardless of the nature of belief - one can never completely believe what one believes. Therefore, in order to establish absolutely grounded knowledge, which may serve as the basis fora "universal Science", one must use a method by which one may purge oneself of all doubts and thereby gain some radically indubitable insight into knowledge. Such a method, gescartes found, was that, as indicated above by hi,s own words, of II radical doubt" which "forbids in advance any judgemental use of (previous convictions and) which forbids taking any position with regard to their val idi'ty. ,,7 This is the method of the "sceptical epoche ll , the method of doubting all which had heretofor 6Descartes,Meditations on First Philosophy, first Med., (Libera 1 Arts Press, New York, 1954) trans. by L. LaFl eur. pp. 10. 7Husserl ,CrisiS of Eliroeari SCiences and Trariscendental Phenomenology, (Northwestern U. Press, Evanston, 1 7 ,p. 76. 9. been considered as belonging to the world, including the world itself. What then is left over? Via the process of a thorough and all-inclusive doubting, Descartes discovers that the ego which performs the epoche, or "reduction", is excluded from these things which can be doubted, and, in principle provides something which is beyond doubt. Consequently this ego provides an absolute and apodictic starting point for founding scientific philosophy. By way of this abstention. of bel ief, Desca'rtes managed to reduce the worl d of everyday 1 ife as bel ieved in, to mere 'phenomena', components of the rescogitans:. Thus:, having discovered his Archimedean point, the existence of the ego without question, he proceeds to deduce the 'rest' of the world with the aid of innate ideas and the veracity of God. In both Husserl and Descartes the compelling problem is that of establ ishing a scientific, apodictic phi'losophy based upon presuppos itionless groundwork .. Husserl, in thi.s regard, levels the charge at Descartes that the engagement of his method was not complete, such that hi.S: starting place was not indeed presupositionless, and that the validity of both causality and deductive methods were not called into question i.'n the performance of theepoche. In this way it is easy for an absolute evidence to make sure of the ego as: a first, "absolute, indubitablyexisting tag~end of the worldll , and it is then only a matter of inferring the absolute subs.tance and the other substances which belon.g to the world, along with my own mental substance, using a logically val i d deductive procedure. 8 8Husserl, E.;' Cartesian 'Meditation;, trans. Dorion Cairns (Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1970), p. 24 ff.

The effects of teaching a mathematics problem solving strategy on the problem solving ability of grade nine students

Forty grade 9 students were selected from a small rural board in southern Ontario. The students were in two classes and were treated as two groups. The treatment group received instruction in the Logical Numerical Problem Solving Strategy every day for 37 minutes over a 6 week period. The control group received instruction in problem solving without this strategy over the same time period. Then the control group received the treat~ent and the treatment group received the instruction without the strategy. Quite a large variance was found in the problem solving ability of students in grade 9. It was also found that the growth of the problem solving ability achievement of students could be measured using growth strands based upon the results of the pilot study. The analysis of the results of the study using t-tests and a MANOVA demonstrated that the teaching of the strategy did not significaritly (at p s 0.05) increase the problem solving achievement of the students. However, there was an encouraging trend seen in the data.

The relation of attentional, emotional, and social regulation to cognitive competence, from infancy to school entry

Recent research on the sources of cognitive competence in infancy and early childhood has highlighted the role of social and emotional factors (for example, Lewis, 1993b). Exploring the roots of competence requires a longitudinal and multivariate approach. To deal with the resulting complexity, potentially integrative theoretical constructs are required. One logical candidate is self-regulation. Three key developmental questions were the focus of this investigation. 1) Does infant self-regulation (attentional, emotional, and social) predict preschool cognitive competence? 2) Does infant self-regulation predict preschool self-regulation? 3) Does preschool self-regulation predict concurrent preschool cognitive competence? One hundred preschoolers (46 females, 54 males; mean age = 5 years, 11 months) who had participated at 9- and/ or 12-months of age in an object permanence task were recruited to participate in this longitudinal investigation. Each subject completed four scales of the WPPSI-R and two social cognitive tasks. Parents completed questionnaires about their preschoolers' regulatory behaviours (Achenbach's Child Behavior Checklist [1991] and selected items from Eisenberg et ale [1993] and Derryberry & Rothbart [1988]). Separate behavioural coding systems were developed to capture regulatory capabilities in infancy (from the object permanence task) and preschool (from the WPPSIR Block Design). Overall, correlational and multiple regression results offered strong affirmative answers to the three key questions (R's = .30 to .38), using the behavioural observations of self-regulation. Behavioural regulation at preschool substantially predicted parental reports of regulation, but the latter variables did not predict preschool competence. Infant selfregulation and preschool regulation made statistically independent contributions to competence, even though regulation at Time 1 and Time 2 ii were substantially related. The results are interpreted as supporting a developmental pathway in which well-regulated infants more readily acquire both expertise and more sophisticated regulatory skills. Future research should address the origins of these skills earlier in infancy, and the social contexts that generate them and support them during the intervening years.

Beyond g : putting multiple intelligences theory to the test /

The purpose of this study was to investigate Howard Gardner's (1983) Multiple Intelligences theory, which proposes that there are eight independent intelligences: Linguistic, Spatial, Logical/Mathematical, Interpersonal, Intrapersonal, Naturalistic, Bodily-Kinesthetic, and Musical. To explore Gardner's theory, two measures of each ability area were administered to 200 participants. Each participant also completed a measure of general cognitive ability, a personality inventory, an ability self-rating scale, and an ability self-report questionnaire. Nonverbal measures were included for most intelligence domains, and a wide range of content was sampled in Gardner's domains. Results showed that all tests of purely cognitive abilities were significantly correlated with the measure of general cognitive ability, whereas Musical, Bodily-Kinesthetic, and one of the Intrapersonal measures were not. Contrary to what Multiple Intelligences theory would seem to predict, correlations among the tests revealed a positive manifold and factor analysis indicated a large factor of general intelligence, with a mathematical reasoning test and a classification task from the Naturalistic domain having the highest ^- loadings. There were only minor sex differences in performance on the ability tests. Participants' self-estimates of ability were significantly and positively correlated with actual performance in some, but not all, intelligences. With regard to personality, a hypothesized association between Openness to Experience and crystallized intelligence was supported. The implications of the findings in regards to the nature of mental abilities were discussed, and recommendations for further research were made.

Frequency-dependent selection at the amylase locus in Drosophila melanogaster

A. strain of Drosophila melanog-aster deficient in null amylase activity (Amylase ) was isolated from a wild null population of flies. The survivorship of Amylase homozygous flies is very low when the principal dietary carbohydrate source is starch. However, the survivorship of the null Amylase genotype is comparable to the wild type when the dietary starch is replaced by glucose. In addition, the null viability of the amylase-producing and Amylase strains is comparable v and very lm<] f on a medium with no carbohydrates . Furthermore, amylase-producing genotypes were shovm to excrete enzymatically active amylase protein into the food medium. The excreted amylase causes the external breakdown of dietary starch to sugar. These results led to the following null prediction: the viability of the A.mvlase genotype (fed on a starch rich diet) might increase in the presence of individuals which were amylase-producing. It was shown experimentally that such an increase in viability did in fact occur and that this increase v\Tas proportional to the number of mnylase..::producing fli.es present. These results provide a unique example of a non-"competi ti ve inter-genotype interaction, and one where the underlying physio~ logical and biochemical mechanism has been fully understood.

A System for Models of First Order Theories

If you want to know whether a property is true or not in a specific algebraic structure,you need to test that property on the given structure. This can be done by hand, which can be cumbersome and erroneous. In addition, the time consumed in testing depends on the size of the structure where the property is applied. We present an implementation of a system for finding counterexamples and testing properties of models of first-order theories. This system is supposed to provide a convenient and paperless environment for researchers and students investigating or studying such models and algebraic structures in particular. To implement a first-order theory in the system, a suitable first-order language.( and some axioms are required. The components of a language are given by a collection of variables, a set of predicate symbols, and a set of operation symbols. Variables and operation symbols are used to build terms. Terms, predicate symbols, and the usual logical connectives are used to build formulas. A first-order theory now consists of a language together with a set of closed formulas, i.e. formulas without free occurrences of variables. The set of formulas is also called the axioms of the theory. The system uses several different formats to allow the user to specify languages, to define axioms and theories and to create models. Besides the obvious operations and tests on these structures, we have introduced the notion of a functor between classes of models in order to generate more co~plex models from given ones automatically. As an example, we will use the system to create several lattices structures starting from a model of the theory of pre-orders.

Using Poetry, Story, and Reflection to Understand Professional Self After Personal Loss

This research investigated professional identity transformation after personal loss. Through autoethnographic methods, I explore how my personal experience of my sister’s breast cancer and death affected my identity as a diabetes educator in the health culture. I discover a transformation of a professional who focuses on evidence-based medicine to a professional who values connection, therapeutic alliance, and mindfulness with patients and self in the diabetes education encounter. Using a holistic perspective on transformational learning, I integrate the poem “Wild Geese” to a collection of written narratives to connect my personal loss experience to my professional life. By unpacking the generated stories and using poetry, I conduct a process of critical and self-reflection to discover how my identity as a health professional has transformed and what makes meaning in my role as a diabetes educator in the health culture. I consider concepts of a conscious self, social relations and language and discover themes of knowledge exchange, food, and empathy as forms of language expression. These language expressions are not present in my professional life as I focus on rational, logical facts of evidence-based medicine and standardized education methods. Through this reflexive process, I hope to understand how my professional practice has changed, where I place an importance on connection, therapeutic alliance, and mindfulness. I move away from always “doing” in my professional life to focus on my state of “being” in my professional world. Rather than knowledge acquisition as the only factor in professional development, this study contributes to an understanding of additional qualities health professionals may consider that focus on the patient education encounter.

Myths of Modern Education

My focus is on assessment criteria of language proficiency in community college education. To demand clear writing is an application of scientism; it seeks to keep separate the fact/value distinction of positivism. This dangerously undermines the democratizing possibilities of education, since clear writing, taken to its extreme, is ultimately anonymous and dehumanizing. The active student-as-citizen is, therefore, subsumed under the neoliberal dictate of the passive student-as-consumer. The process of language acquisition is reduced to a fictitious act of knowledge transmission and regurgitation, and, therefore, those subversive aspects of language learning, such as creativity and critical inquiry, are undermined. An initial overview of the tenets of modernity will provide a conceptual framework for this examination.

Économétrie, théorie des tests et philosophie des sciences

Dans ce texte, nous revoyons certains développements récents de l’économétrie qui peuvent être intéressants pour des chercheurs dans des domaines autres que l’économie et nous soulignons l’éclairage particulier que l’économétrie peut jeter sur certains thèmes généraux de méthodologie et de philosophie des sciences, tels la falsifiabilité comme critère du caractère scientifique d’une théorie (Popper), la sous-détermination des théories par les données (Quine) et l’instrumentalisme. En particulier, nous soulignons le contraste entre deux styles de modélisation - l’approche parcimonieuse et l’approche statistico-descriptive - et nous discutons les liens entre la théorie des tests statistiques et la philosophie des sciences.

Rationalizability of Choice Functions on General Domains without Full Transitivity

The rationalizability of a choice function by means of a transitive relation has been analyzed thoroughly in the literature. However, not much seems to be known when transitivity is weakened to quasi-transitivity or acyclicity. We describe the logical relationships between the different notions of rationalizability involving, for example, the transitivity, quasi-transitivity, or acyclicity of the rationalizing relation. Furthermore, we discuss sufficient conditions and necessary conditions for rational choice on arbitrary domains. Transitive, quasi-transitive, and acyclical rationalizability are fully characterized for domains that contain all singletons and all two-element subsets of the universal set.

Logique et tests d'hypotheses: reflexions sur les problemes mal poses en econometrie

Dans ce texte, nous analysons les développements récents de l’économétrie à la lumière de la théorie des tests statistiques. Nous revoyons d’abord quelques principes fondamentaux de philosophie des sciences et de théorie statistique, en mettant l’accent sur la parcimonie et la falsifiabilité comme critères d’évaluation des modèles, sur le rôle de la théorie des tests comme formalisation du principe de falsification de modèles probabilistes, ainsi que sur la justification logique des notions de base de la théorie des tests (tel le niveau d’un test). Nous montrons ensuite que certaines des méthodes statistiques et économétriques les plus utilisées sont fondamentalement inappropriées pour les problèmes et modèles considérés, tandis que de nombreuses hypothèses, pour lesquelles des procédures de test sont communément proposées, ne sont en fait pas du tout testables. De telles situations conduisent à des problèmes statistiques mal posés. Nous analysons quelques cas particuliers de tels problèmes : (1) la construction d’intervalles de confiance dans le cadre de modèles structurels qui posent des problèmes d’identification; (2) la construction de tests pour des hypothèses non paramétriques, incluant la construction de procédures robustes à l’hétéroscédasticité, à la non-normalité ou à la spécification dynamique. Nous indiquons que ces difficultés proviennent souvent de l’ambition d’affaiblir les conditions de régularité nécessaires à toute analyse statistique ainsi que d’une utilisation inappropriée de résultats de théorie distributionnelle asymptotique. Enfin, nous soulignons l’importance de formuler des hypothèses et modèles testables, et de proposer des techniques économétriques dont les propriétés sont démontrables dans les échantillons finis.

Consistent Rationalizability

Consistency of a binary relation requires any preference cycle to involve indifference only. As shown by Suzumura (1976b), consistency is necessary and sufficient for the existence of an ordering extension of a relation. Because of this important role of consistency, it is of interest to examine the rationalizability of choice functions by means of consistent relations. We describe the logical relationships between the different notions of rationalizability obtained if reflexivity or completeness are added to consistency, both for greatest-element rationalizability and for maximal-element rationalizability. All but one notion of consistent rationalizability are characterized for general domains, and all of them are characterized for domains that contain all two-element subsets of the universal set.

Domain Closedness Conditions and Rational Choice

The rationalizability of a choice function on an arbitrary domain under various coherence properties has received a considerable amount of attention both in the long-established and in the recent literature. Because domain closedness conditions play an important role in much of rational choice theory, we examine the consequences of these requirements on the logical relationships among different versions of rationalizability. It turns out that closedness under intersection does not lead to any results differing from those obtained on arbitrary domains. In contrast, closedness under union allows us to prove an additional implication.

Fair Allocation of Production Externalities: Recent Results

We survey recent axiomatic results in the theory of cost-sharing. In this litterature, a method computes the individual cost shares assigned to the users of a facility for any profile of demands and any monotonic cost function. We discuss two theories taking radically different views of the asymmetries of the cost function. In the full responsibility theory, each agent is accountable for the part of the costs that can be unambiguously separated and attributed to her own demand. In the partial responsibility theory, the asymmetries of the cost function have no bearing on individual cost shares, only the differences in demand levels matter. We describe several invariance and monotonicity properties that reflect both normative and strategic concerns. We uncover a number of logical trade-offs between our axioms, and derive axiomatic characterizations of a handful of intuitive methods: in the full responsibility approach, the Shapley-Shubik, Aumann-Shapley, and subsidyfree serial methods, and in the partial responsibility approach, the cross-subsidizing serial method and the family of quasi-proportional methods.