Rationalising ‘Irrational’ Support for Political Violence

This paper provides a rationale for group support for political violence when violence does not provide a material benefi t. A theory of fairness is adopted to demonstrate that although group violence may not be the equilibrium of a material game it may be a fairness equilibrium in a game containing psychological payoffs. For this to happen the material stakes must be perceived as low and psychological payoffs are expressive. Although the material stakes are actually high, members of each group may choose expressively to support the use of violence because the probability of being decisive is low. The paper also considers the possibility of peace emerging as a fairness equilibrium. This can only happen if each group perceives the other as making some sacrifi ce in choosing peace.

Domestic Violence and Football in Glasgow: Are Reference Points Relevant?

Much research suggests that sporting events can trigger domestic violence with recent evidence suggesting that pre-match expectations (which can be interpreted as reference points) play an especially important role in this relationship. In particular, unexpectedly disappointing results have been associated with large increases in domestic violence. This paper contributes to this literature using a new data set containing every domestic violence incident in Glasgow over a period of more than eight years. We find that Old Firm matches, where Glasgow rivals Celtic and Rangers play, are associated with large increases in domestic violence (regardless of the timing or the outcome of the match). Non-Old Firm matches tend to have little impact on domestic violence. Furthermore, we fi nd little evidence for the importance of reference points. Matches with disappointing outcomes, relative to pre-match expectations, are found to be associated with unusual increases in domestic violence only in a very limited set of matches.

Rebellion against Reason? A Study of Expressive Choice and Strikes

In this paper we challenge the conventional view that strikes are caused by asymmetric information regarding firm protability such that union members are uninformed. Instead, we build an expressive model of strikes where the perception of unfairness provides the expressive benefit of voting for a strike. The model predicts that larger union size increases both wage offers and the incidence of strikes. Furthermore, while asymmetric information is still important in causing strikes, we find that it is the employer who is not fully informed about the level of emotionality within the union, thereby contributing to strike incidence. An empirical test using UK data provides support for the predictions. In particular, union size has a positive effect on the incidence of strikes and other industrial actions even when asymmetric information regarding protability is controlled for.

Domestic Violence and Football in Glasgow: Are Reference Points Relevant?

Much research suggests that sporting events can trigger domestic violence with recent evidence suggesting that pre-match expectations (which can be interpreted as reference points) play an especially important role in this relationship. In particular, unexpectedly disappointing results have been associated with large increases in domestic violence. This paper contributes to this literature using a new data set containing every domestic violence incident in Glasgow over a period of more than eight years. We find that Old Firm matches, where Glasgow rivals Celtic and Rangers play, are associated with large increases in domestic violence (regardless of the timing or the outcome of the match). Non-Old Firm matches tend to have little impact on domestic violence. Furthermore, we find little evidence for the importance of reference points. Matches with disappointing outcomes, relative to pre-match expectations, are found to be associated with unusual increases in domestic violence only in a very limited set of matches.

Institutions and prosperity

This article reviews ‘Pillars of Prosperity’ by Timothy Besley and Torsten Persson and ‘Why Nations Fail’ by Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson. Both books are focussed on the role of institutions in determining the wealth of nations and the review compares and contrasts the different approaches contained in the two texts. The review also attempts to locate the texts within the broader literature in development and political economics and to link them to other recent work in these areas.

The thermal stability of yellow fever vaccines

The assessment of yellow fever vaccine thermostability both in lyophilized form and after reconstitution were analyzed. Two commercial yellow fever vaccines were assayed for their thermal stability. Vaccines were exposed to test temperatures in the range of 8 (graus) C to 45 (graus) C. Residual infectivity was measured by a plaque assay using Vero cells. The titre values were used in an accelerated degradation test that follows the Arrhenius equation and the minimum immunizing dose was assumed to be 10 (ao cubo) particles forming unit (pfu)/dose. Some of the most relevant results include that (i) regular culture medium show the same degradation pattern of a reconstituted 17D-204 vaccine; (ii) reconstituted YF-17D-204 showed a predictable half life of more than six days if kept at 0 (graus) C; (iii) there are differences in thermostability between different products that are probably due to both presence of stabilizers in the preparation and the modernization in the vaccine production; (iv) it is important to establish a proper correlation between the mouse infectivity test and the plaque assay since the last appears to be more simple, economical, and practical for small laboratories to assess the potency of the vaccine, and (v) the accelerated degradation test appears to be the best procedure to quantify the thermostability of biological products.

Perceiving Prospects Properly

When an agent chooses between prospects, noise in information processing generates an effect akin to the winner’s curse. Statistically unbiased perception systematically overvalues the chosen action because it fails to account for the possibility that noise is responsible for making the preferred action appear to be optimal. The optimal perception patterns share key features with prospect theory, namely, overweighting of small probability events (and corresponding underweighting of high probability events), status quo bias, and reference-dependent S-shaped valuations. These biases arise to correct for the winner’s curse effect.

Optimization and inhibition of the adherent ability of Plasmodium falciparum-infected erythrocytes

The vast majority of the 1-2 million malaria associated deaths that occur each year are due to anemia and cerebral malaria (the attachment of erythrocytes containing mature forms of Plasmodium falciparum to the endothelial cells that line the vascular beds of the brain). A "model" system"for the study of cerebral malaria employs amelanotic melanoma cells as the "target"cells in an vitro cytoadherence assay. Using this model system we determined that the optimum pH for adherence is 6.6 to 6.8, that high concentrations of Ca²* (50mM) result in increased levels of binding, and that the type of buffer used influences adherence (Bis Tris > MOPS > HEPES > PIPES). We also observed that the ability of infected erythrocytes to cytoadhere varied from (erythrocyte) donor to donor. We have produced murine monoclonal antibodies against P. falciparum-infected red cells which recognized modified forms of human band 3; these inhibit the adherence of infected erythrocytes to melanoma cells in a doso responsive fashion. Antimalarials (chloroquine, quinacrine, mefloquine, artemisinin), on the other hand, affected adherence in an indirect fashion i.e. since cytoadherence is due, in part to the presence of knobs on the surface of the infected erythrocyte, and knob formation is dependent on intracellular parasite growth, when plasmodial development is inhibited so is knob production, and consequently adherence is ablated.

On graphs with few disjoint t-stars

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