Modelling world investment markets using threshold conditional correlation models

In this paper we propose a parsimonious regime-switching approach to model the correlations between assets, the threshold conditional correlation (TCC) model. This method allows the dynamics of the correlations to change from one state (or regime) to another as a function of observable transition variables. Our model is similar in spirit to Silvennoinen and Teräsvirta (2009) and Pelletier (2006) but with the appealing feature that it does not suffer from the course of dimensionality. In particular, estimation of the parameters of the TCC involves a simple grid search procedure. In addition, it is easy to guarantee a positive definite correlation matrix because the TCC estimator is given by the sample correlation matrix, which is positive definite by construction. The methodology is illustrated by evaluating the behaviour of international equities, govenrment bonds and major exchange rates, first separately and then jointly. We also test and allow for different parts in the correlation matrix to be governed by different transition variables. For this, we estimate a multi-threshold TCC specification. Further, we evaluate the economic performance of the TCC model against a constant conditional correlation (CCC) estimator using a Diebold-Mariano type test. We conclude that threshold correlation modelling gives rise to a significant reduction in portfolio´s variance.

The Rise of The Swiss Tax Haven in the Interwar Period: An International Comparison

The history of tax havens is still little known for the decades before World War II. Up to now the studies that have focused on the 1920s and 30s have presented either a very general perspective on the development of tax havens or a narrow national point of view. Based on unpublished historical archives of four countries, this paper offers therefore a new comparative look on international tax competition during this period in order to answer the following question: was the Swiss case - already considered as a quintessential tax haven at the time - specific in comparison to other banking centres? This research has two results. On the one hand, the 1920s and 30s appear as something of a golden age of opportunity for avoiding taxation through the relocation of assets. Actually, most of the financial centres granted consistent tax benefits for imported capital, while the extremely limited degree of international cooperation and the usual guarantee of banking secrecy in European countries prevented the taxation of exported assets. On the other hand, within this general balance sheet, the fiscal strategies of a tax haven like Switzerland differed from those of a great financial power like Great Britain. Whereas the Swiss administration readily placed itself at the service of the bankers, the British policy was more balanced between the contradictory interests of the Board of Inland Revenue, the Treasury and the English business circles.

Investment, duration, and exit strategies for corporate and independent venture capital-backed start-ups

We propose a model of investment, duration, and exit strategies for start-ups backed by venture capital (VC) funds that accounts for the high level of uncertainty, the asymmetry of information between insiders and outsiders, and the discount rate. Our analysis predicts that start-ups backed by corporate VC funds remain for a longer period of time before exiting and receive larger investment amounts than those financed by independent VC funds. Although a longer duration leads to a higher likelihood of an exit through an acquisition, a larger investment increases the probability of an IPO exit. These predictions find strong empirical support.

The efficiency of direct payments versus tax reductions under uncertainty

This paper analyzes the optimal behavior of farmers in the presence of direct payments and uncertainty. In an empirical analysis for Switzerland, it confirms previously obtained theoretical results and determines the magnitude of the theoretical predicted effects. The results show that direct payments increase agricultural production between 3.7% to 4.8%. Alternatively to direct payments, the production effect of tax reductions is evaluated in order to determine its magnitude. The empirical analysis corroborates the theoretical results of the literature and demonstrates that tax reductions are also distorting, but to a substantially lesser degree if losses are not offset. However, tax reductions, independently whether losses are offset or not, lead to higher government spending than pure direct payments

CREB-2, a cellular CRE-dependent transcription repressor, functions in association with Tax as an activator of the human T-cell leukemia virus type 1 promoter.

The Tax protein of the human T-cell leukemia virus type 1 (HTLV-1) has been implicated in human T-cell immortalization. The primary function of Tax is to transcriptionally activate the HTLV-1 promoter, but Tax is also known to stimulate expression of cellular genes. It has been reported to associate with several transcription factors, as well as proteins not involved in transcription. To better characterize potential cellular targets of Tax present in infected cells, a Saccharomyces cerevisiae two-hybrid screening was performed with a cDNA library constructed from the HTLV-1-infected MT2 cell line. From this study, we found 158 positive clones representing seven different cDNAs. We focused our attention on the cDNA encoding the transcription factor CREB-2. CREB-2 is an unconventional member of the ATF/CREB family in that it lacks a protein kinase A (PKA) phosphorylation site and has been reported to negatively regulate transcription from the cyclic AMP response element of the human enkephalin promoter. In this study, we demonstrate that CREB-2 cooperates with Tax to enhance viral transcription and that its basic-leucine zipper C-terminal domain is required for both in vitro and in vivo interactions with Tax. Our results confirm that the activation of the HTLV-1 promoter through Tax and factors of the ATF/CREB family is PKA independent.

Iowa Department of Commerce - Credit Union Division, Agency Performance Plan

Annual Report, Agency Performance Plan

Tax incentives and direct support for R&D: What do firms use and why?

This paper studies whether firms' use of R&D subsidies and R&D tax incentives is correlated to two sources of underinvestment in R&D, financing constraints and appropriability. We find that financially constrained SMEs are less likely to use R&D tax credits and more likely to obtain subsidies. SMEs using legal methods to protect their intellectual property are more likely to use tax incentives. Results are ambiguous for large firms. For both having previous experience in R&D increases the likelihood of using tax incentives, while it reduces the likelihood of using exclusively subsidies, suggesting that the latter induce entry into R&D. Results imply that direct funding and tax credits do not have the same ability to address each source of R&D underinvestment, and that on average subsidies may be better suited than tax credits at least for SMEs. From a policy perspective these tools may be complements rather than substitutes.

Behavioral aspects of investment fund's markets: are good managers lucky or skilled?

It is generally accepted that financial markets are efficient in the long run a lthough there may be some deviations in the short run. It is also accepted that a good portfolio manager is the one who beats the market persistently along time, this type of manager could not exist if markets were perfectly efficient According to this in a pure efficient market we should find that managers know that they can not beat the market so they would undertake only pure passive management strategies. Assuming a certain degree of inefficiency in the short run, a market may show some managers who tr y to beat the market by undertaking active strategies. From Fama’s efficient markets theory we can state that these active managers may beat the market occasionally although they will not be able to enhance significantly their performance in the long run. On the other hand, in an inefficient market it would be expected to find a higher level of activity related with the higher probability of beating the market. In this paper we follow two objectives: first, we set a basis to analyse the level of efficiency in an asset invest- ment funds market by measuring performance, strategies activity and it’s persistence for a certain group of funds during the period of study. Second, we analyse individual performance persistence in order to determine the existence of skilled managers. The CAPM model is taken as theoretical background and the use of the Sharpe’s ratio as a suitable performance measure in a limited information environment leads to a group performance measurement proposal. The empiri- cal study takes quarterly data from 1999-2007 period, for the whole population of the Spanish asset investment funds market, provided by the CNMV (Comisión Nacional del Mercado de Valores). This period of study has been chosen to ensure a wide enough range of efficient market observation so it would allow us to set a proper basis to compare with the following period. As a result we develop a model that allows us to measure efficiency in a given asset mutual funds market, based on the level of strategy’s activity undertaken by managers. We also observe persistence in individual performance for a certain group of funds

Debt enforcement and relational contracting

We examine how third-party debt enforcement affects the emergence and performance ofrelational contracts in credit markets. We implement an experiment with finitely repeatedcredit relationships in which borrowers can default. In the weak enforcement treatmentdefaulting borrowers can keep their funds invested. In the strong enforcement treatmentdefaulting borrowers have to liquidate their investment. Under weak enforcement fewerrelationships emerge in which loans are extended and repaid. When such relationships doemerge they exhibit a lower credit volume than under strong enforcement. These findingssuggest that relational contracting in credit markets requires a minimum standard of thirdpartydebt enforcement.

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A brouchure by the Iowa Commission on the Status of Women

A-1 Monthly Public Assistance Statistical Report Family Investment Program, December 2003

Monthly Public Assistance Statistical Report Family Investment Program