Iron regulatory protein 1 is not required for the modulation of ferritin and transferrin receptor expression by iron in a murine pro-B lymphocyte cell line

Iron regulatory proteins (IRPs) are cytoplasmic RNA binding proteins that are central components of a sensory and regulatory network that modulates vertebrate iron homeostasis. IRPs regulate iron metabolism by binding to iron responsive element(s) (IREs) in the 5′ or 3′ untranslated region of ferritin or transferrin receptor (TfR) mRNAs. Two IRPs, IRP1 and IRP2, have been identified previously. IRP1 exhibits two mutually exclusive functions as an RNA binding protein or as the cytosolic isoform of aconitase. We demonstrate that the Ba/F3 family of murine pro-B lymphocytes represents the first example of a mammalian cell line that fails to express IRP1 protein or mRNA. First, all of the IRE binding activity in Ba/F3-gp55 cells is attributable to IRP2. Second, synthesis of IRP2, but not of IRP1, is detectable in Ba/F3-gp55 cells. Third, the Ba/F3 family of cells express IRP2 mRNA at a level similar to other murine cell lines, but IRP1 mRNA is not detectable. In the Ba/F3 family of cells, alterations in iron status modulated ferritin biosynthesis and TfR mRNA level over as much as a 20- and 14-fold range, respectively. We conclude that IRP1 is not essential for regulation of ferritin or TfR expression by iron and that IRP2 can act as the sole IRE-dependent mediator of cellular iron homeostasis.

Reauthorization of GSA and multiple award program : hearing before the Committee on Governmental Affairs, United States Senate, One Hundred Second Congress, second session, on S. 1958 ... and S. 2619 ... June 11, 1992.

"S. 1958, to authorize functions and activities under the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949, to amend laws relating to federal procurement, and for other purposes and S. 2619, to amend the Federal Property and Amdinistrative Services Act of 1949 to enact provisions governing the negotiation and award of contracts under the multiple award schedule program of the Feneral Services Administration"

Opinions of the Attorney-General of Porto Rico to the Governor, the heads of departments, the Judiciary and other officials in relation to their official duties and construing and explaining the insular constitution and laws.

Vol.1 includes the annual reports of the Attorney-General to the Governor of Puerto Rico and to the Attorney-General of the United States.

Notices of judgment under the Food and drugs act.

Nos. 2986-15000, Aug. 3, 1914-June, 1927, issued as Supplements to Service and regulatory announcements of the Bureau of chemistry. Beginning with no. 3501, Apr. 3, 1915, Supplements are numbered consecutively S.R.A. Chem. suppl. 1-230.

Annual report to the Governor and General Assembly fiscal year ...

Includes recommendations regarding the state's compliance with the federal Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act.

Co mo manejo mi aceite usado y filtros de aceite usado?

In Spanish.

Cumplimiento de reglamentos y consejos de prevenci on de poluci on para talleres de reparaci on de automo biles y latoneria.

In Spanish.

How do I manage my remediation waste?

"Information presented in this publication is intended to provide a general understanding of the statutory and regulatory requirements governing remediation waste. This information is not intended to replace, limit or expand upon the complete statutory and regulatory requirements found in the Illinois Environmental Protection Act and Title 35 of the Illinois Administrative Code of Regulations."

Manejo y reducción de desperidicios de lavadores de repuestos.

Overview: Information presented in this publication is intended to provide a general understanding of the statutory and regulatory requirements governing generator identification numbers and manifests. This information is not intended to replace, limit, or expand upon the complete statutory and regulatory requirements found in the Illinois Environmental Protection Act and Title 35 of the Illinois Administrative Code of Regulations.

Regulatory compliance and pollution prevention tips for automotive repair and autobody shops /

Provides a general understanding of the statutory and regulatory requirements governing automotive repair and autobody shops.

Report to the members of the Illinois General Assembly /

Six mandates were identified by the Committee as high-impact and worthy of the General Assembly's immediate attention. These recommendations include the elimination or modification of three mandates that would result in an estimated $55.1 million in annual savings for public universities. The other three recommendations, if implemented, will provide long-term indirect savings by reducing administrative work and promoting efficiencies at public universities. Two additional mandates are included in this report as areas of concern. The Committee asks the General Assembly to also review these two concerns during the upcoming fiscal year.

Storm water ... keep it clean!

"Information presented in this publication is intended to provide a general understanding of the statutory and regulatory requirements governing storm water. This information is not intended to replace, limit or expand upon the complete statutory and regulatory requirements found in the Illinois Environmental Protection Act and Title 35 of the Illinois Administrative Code."

Tengo yo un desperdicio especial?

In Spanish.

[Reorganization and consolidation of the Illinois Dept. of Insurance, Illinois Office of Banks and Real Estate, Illinois Dept. of Professional Regulation, and the Illinois Dept. of Financial Institutions into the Illinois Dept. of Financial and Professional Regulation]

As part of the Governor's effort to streamline State government through improvements in the efficiency and effectiveness of operations, Executive Order 2004-06 ("EO6") provided for the reorganization (consolidation) of the Department of Insurance, Office of Banks and Real Estate, Department of Professional Regulation and Department of Financial Institutions. Through EO6 the four predecessor Agencies were abolished and a single new agency, The Department of Financial and Professional Regulation (hereafter referred to as "IDFPR") was created. The purpose of the consolidation of the four regulatory agencies was to allow for certain economies of scale to be realized primarily within the executive management and administrative functions. Additionally, the consolidation would increases the effectiveness of operations through the integration of certain duplicative functions within the four predecessor agencies without the denegration of the frontline functions. Beginning on or about July 1, 2004, the IDFPR began consolidation activities focusing primarily on the administrative functions of Executive Management, Fiscal and Accounting, General Counsel, Human Resources, Information Technology and Other Administrative Services. The underlying premise of the reorganization was that all improvements could be accomplished without the denegration of the frontline functions of the predecessor agencies. Accordingly, all powers, duties, rights, responsibilities and functions of the predecessor agencies migrated to IDFPR and the reorganization activities commenced July 1, 2004.

The missing ingredient:inter-municipal cooperation and central-local relations in the UK

The thrust of the argument presented in this chapter is that inter-municipal cooperation (IMC) in the United Kingdom reflects local government's constitutional position and its exposure to the exigencies of Westminster (elected central government) and Whitehall (centre of the professional civil service that services central government). For the most part councils are without general powers of competence and are restricted in what they can do by Parliament. This suggests that the capacity for locally driven IMC is restricted and operates principally within a framework constructed by central government's policy objectives and legislation and the political expediencies of the governing political party. In practice, however, recent examples of IMC demonstrate that the practices are more complex than this initial analysis suggests. Central government may exert top-down pressures and impose hierarchical directives, but there are important countervailing forces. Constitutional changes in Scotland and Wales have shifted the locus of central- local relations away from Westminster and Whitehall. In England, the seeding of English government regional offices in 1994 has evolved into an important structural arrangement that encourages councils to work together. Within the local government community there is now widespread acknowledgement that to achieve the ambitious targets set by central government, councils are, by necessity, bound to cooperate and work with other agencies. In recent years, the fragmentation of public service delivery has affected the scope of IMC. Elected local government in the UK is now only one piece of a complex jigsaw of agencies that provides services to the public; whether it is with non-elected bodies, such as health authorities, public protection authorities (police and fire), voluntary nonprofit organisations or for-profit bodies, councils are expected to cooperate widely with agencies in their localities. Indeed, for projects such as regeneration and community renewal, councils may act as the coordinating agency but the success of such projects is measured by collaboration and partnership working (Davies 2002). To place these developments in context, IMC is an example of how, in spite of the fragmentation of traditional forms of government, councils work with other public service agencies and other councils through the medium of interagency partnerships, collaboration between organisations and a mixed economy of service providers. Such an analysis suggests that, following changes to the system of local government, contemporary forms of IMC are less dependent on vertical arrangements (top-down direction from central government) as they are replaced by horizontal modes (expansion of networks and partnership arrangements). Evidence suggests, however that central government continues to steer local authorities through the agency of inspectorates and regulatory bodies, and through policy initiatives, such as local strategic partnerships and local area agreements (Kelly 2006), thus questioning whether, in the case of UK local government, the shift from hierarchy to network and market solutions is less differentiated and transformation less complete than some literature suggests. Vertical or horizontal pressures may promote IMC, yet similar drivers may deter collaboration between local authorities. An example of negative vertical pressure was central government's change of the systems of local taxation during the 1980s. The new taxation regime replaced a tax on property with a tax on individual residency. Although the community charge lasted only a few years, it was a highpoint of the then Conservative government policy that encouraged councils to compete with each other on the basis of the level of local taxation. In practice, however, the complexity of local government funding in the UK rendered worthless any meaningful ambition of councils competing with each other, especially as central government granting to local authorities is predicated (however imperfectly) on at least notional equalisation between those areas with lower tax yields and the more prosperous locations. Horizontal pressures comprise factors such as planning decisions. Over the last quarter century, councils have competed on the granting of permission to out-of-town retail and leisure complexes, now recognised as detrimental to neighbouring authorities because economic forces prevail and local, independent shops are unable to compete with multiple companies. These examples illustrate tensions at the core of the UK polity of whether IMC is feasible when competition between local authorities heightened by local differences reduces opportunities for collaboration. An alternative perspective on IMC is to explore whether specific purposes or functions promote or restrict it. Whether in the principle areas of local government responsibilities relating to social welfare, development and maintenance of the local infrastructure or environmental matters, there are examples of IMC. But opportunities have diminished considerably as councils lost responsibility for services provision as a result of privatisation and transfer of powers to new government agencies or to central government. Over the last twenty years councils have lost their role in the provision of further-or higher-education, public transport and water/sewage. Councils have commissioning power but only a limited presence in providing housing needs, social care and waste management. In other words, as a result of central government policy, there are, in practice, currently far fewer opportunities for councils to cooperate. Since 1997, the New Labour government has promoted IMC through vertical drivers and the development; the operation of these policy initiatives is discussed following the framework of the editors. Current examples of IMC are notable for being driven by higher tiers of government, working with subordinate authorities in principal-agent relations. Collaboration between local authorities and intra-interand cross-sectoral partnerships are initiated by central government. In other words, IMC is shaped by hierarchical drivers from higher levels of government but, in practice, is locally varied and determined less by formula than by necessity and function. © 2007 Springer.