1000 resultados para Fair Process
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Magdeburg, Univ., Fak. für Verfahrens- und Systemtechnik, Diss., 2010
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Magdeburg, Univ., Fak. für Verfahrens- und Systemtechnik, Diss., 2010
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Magdeburg, Univ., Fak. für Verfahrens- und Systemtechnik, Diss., 2012
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Magdeburg, Univ., Fak. für Informatik, Diss., 2012
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Magdeburg, Univ., Fak. für Maschinenbau, Diss., 2013
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This article describes the problem of commercializing of scientific researches in universities. Management tasks are reduced to subtasks and combined formal algorithm. The overall control problem is reduced to a set of formal subtasks combined into a single algorithm. Here the necessity of joint control of all commercialization projects as well as the use of information systems for the successful implementation of the existing commercialpotential is shown.
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This work presents the results of an investigation of processes in the melting zone during Electron Beam Welding(EBW) through analysis of the secondary current in the plasma.The studies show that the spectrum of the secondary emission signal during steel welding has a pronounced periodic component at a frequency of around 15–25 kHz. The signal contains quasi-periodic sharp peaks (impulses). These impulses have stochastically varying amplitude and follow each other inseries, at random intervals between series. The impulses have a considerable current (up to 0.5 A). It was established that during electron-beam welding with the focal spot scanning these impulses follow each other almost periodically. It was shown that the probability of occurrence of these high-frequency perturbation increases with the concentration of energy in the interaction zone. The paper also presents hypotheses for the mechanism of the formation of the high-frequency oscillations in the secondary current signal in the plasma.
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Magdeburg, Univ., Fak. für Verfahrens- und Systemtechnik, Diss., 2014
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Magdeburg, Univ., Fak. für Verfahrens- und Systemtechnik, Diss., 2014
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The organic and inorganic forms of soil nitrogen and how they participate in the process of fixation, immobilization and mineralization of ammonium in soils were evaluated, after different periods of incubaton, utilizing two soils, a Lithic Haplustoll and a Typic Eutrorthox. The results obtained permit to suggest that : 1) The method for determination of the ammonium fixing capacity based on the extraction with 2N KC1, is considered to be subject to interferences of other soil fractions capable of retaining ammonium. 2) The increase in exchangeable ammonium content is related to the decrease in amino acids and hydrolyzable ammonium. 3) The immobilization and mineralization processes are still held under mil microbial. The forms more affected by this condition are amino acids and hydrolyzable ammonium.
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We study situations of allocating positions or jobs to students or workers based on priorities. An example is the assignment of medical students to hospital residencies on the basis of one or several entrance exams. For markets without couples, e.g., for ``undergraduate student placement,'' acyclicity is a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a fair and efficient placement mechanism (Ergin, 2002). We show that in the presence of couples, which introduces complementarities into the students' preferences, acyclicity is still necessary, but not sufficient (Theorem 4.1). A second necessary condition (Theorem 4.2) is ``priority-togetherness'' of couples. A priority structure that satisfies both necessary conditions is called pt-acyclic. For student placement problems where all quotas are equal to one we characterize pt-acyclicity (Lemma 5.1) and show that it is a sufficient condition for the existence of a fair and efficient placement mechanism (Theorem 5.1). If in addition to pt-acyclicity we require ``reallocation-'' and ``vacancy-fairness'' for couples, the so-called dictator-bidictator placement mechanism is the unique fair and efficient placement mechanism (Theorem 5.2). Finally, for general student placement problems, we show that pt-acyclicity may not be sufficient for the existence of a fair and efficient placement mechanism (Examples 5.4, 5.5, and 5.6). We identify a sufficient condition such that the so-called sequential placement mechanism produces a fair and efficient allocation (Theorem 5.3).
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In this paper we explore the effect of bounded rationality on the convergence of individual behavior toward equilibrium. In the context of a Cournot game with a unique and symmetric Nash equilibrium, firms are modeled as adaptive economic agents through a genetic algorithm. Computational experiments show that (1) there is remarkable heterogeneity across identical but boundedly rational agents; (2) such individual heterogeneity is not simply a consequence of the random elements contained in the genetic algorithm; (3) the more rational agents are in terms of memory abilities and pre-play evaluation of strategies, the less heterogeneous they are in their actions. At the limit case of full rationality, the outcome converges to the standard result of uniform individual behavior.
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We motivate procedural fairness for matching mechanisms and study two procedurally fair and stable mechanisms: employment by lotto (Aldershof et al., 1999) and the random order mechanism (Roth and Vande Vate, 1990, Ma, 1996). For both mechanisms we give various examples of probability distributions on the set of stable matchings and discuss properties that differentiate employment by lotto and the random order mechanism. Finally, we consider an adjustment of the random order mechanism, the equitable random order mechanism, that combines aspects of procedural and "endstate'' fairness. Aldershof et al. (1999) and Ma (1996) that exist on the probability distribution induced by both mechanisms. Finally, we consider an adjustment of the random order mechanism, the equitable random order mechanism.
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Procedural fairness plays a prominent role in the social discourse concerning the marketplace in particular, and social institutions in general. Random procedures are a simple case, and they have found application in several important social allocation decisions. We investigate random procedures in the laboratory. We find that an unbiased random procedure is an acceptable substitute for an unbiased allocation: similar patterns of acceptance and rejection result when either is inserted as a feasible proposal in a sequential battle-of-the-sexes. We also find that unbiasedness, known to be a crucial characteristic of allocation fairness, is important to procedural fairness: in the context of a random offer game, a biased outcome is more readily accepted when chosen by an unbiased random draw than by one that is biased. Procedural fairness is conceptually different than allocation fairness or attribution-based behavior, and none of the current models of fairness and reciprocity captures our results. Post hoc extension of one of these models (ERC) suggests that a deeper understanding of procedural fairness requires further investigation of competing fairness norms.